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ABSTRACT
This study examines how private voluntary organizations (PVOs)
provide aid in the wake of disasters in the Third World. The specific
aim of the study was to understand PVO efforts to integrate disaster and
development assistance. The historical reasons why disaster and
development aid are institutionally separated were analyzed as well as
why this separation is unhelpful for reducing the threat of disasters in
practice. A final objective was to examine in detail a post-disaster
model of integration including the obstacles encountered in
implementation.
A two step methodology was used. First, a review was made of
disaster-related literature across disciplines and of PVO programs in
order i) to develop an analytical perspective that treats the
intersection of disaster and development, and ii) to map the integration
models in use. Second, a case study of one PVO's post-disaster program
(in Armero, Colombia) was undertaken to illustrate in detail the
integration process, including obstacles and key relationships.
The research found that PVO efforts to integrate disaster and
development assistance have generally faltered because of institutional
factors. Integrating the two must contend with conflicting program and
management styles of the aid provider(s), competition for limited
resources, institutional competition, project rigidity resulting from
the relief commitment, a dependency relationship, and establishing an
effective relationship with the affected state. To promote integrated
disaster reduction, new ways for enhancing cooperation among the
different actors must take place. Institutional jurisdictions must be
transcended and new arrangements promoted. Development agencies, in
particular, must be encouraged to play their role in the disaster
reduction process.
Thesis Supervisor: Bishwapriya Sanyal
Associate Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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INTRODUCTION
I. Issues
The purpose of this research is to investigate how private voluntary
organizations (PVOs) provide aid in the wake of disasters in the Third
World. The specific aim of the study is to understand PVO efforts to
phase disaster response into long-term development work, and to
understand the mechanics of this integration process. The study is
based on the review of a broad selection of secondary cases of post-
disaster programs in Latin America, Asia, and Africa and the analysis of
one central case study.
Although the international aid community has not ignored the twin
problem of disaster response and development assistance in principle,
they have treated them as largely separate activities in practice.
PVOs, like their UN and governmental counterparts, tend to specialize in
either disaster response or development. This began to change in the
mid-1980s, however, when the famine spreading throughout Africa forced
practitioners to rethink the relationship between poverty, disasters,
and development. It also forced them to rethink how to provide disaster
assistance; it was clearly no longer a simple question of dispensing
relief until things returned to normal.
The international aid community has to address both short- and long-
term needs, and to do so in a mutually reinforcing way. But, the
arbitrary divisions between relief and development assistance
perpetuated by institutional jurisdictions are proving unhelpful in
practice. Agencies have missed important opportunities to use their
disaster response to support later development activities, and to use
development aid to address the underlying vulnerabilities that, unless
ameliorated, will insure the reoccurrence of disasters like the rolling
African famines.
PVOs are particularly appropriate institutions through which to study
the integration question precisely because many of them have been doing
both relief and development programs for some time. PVO efforts to
integrate the two aid types have had only mixed success. The how and
when to phase from relief into development work, for example, is still a
major sticking point of these programs. Previous studies have focused
on ways to improve emergency relief, but they have largely ignored the
mechanics of their integration with subsequent development programs.
The present research will examine why integration efforts have
faltered in practice. We will analyze the institutional process of
integrating emergency response with development after a disaster in
order to identify and understand the key factors. The underlying
objective is to give policy-makers a better understanding about what may
be viable strategies for managing integrated disaster reduction.
II. Research Strategy
A two step methodology will be used. First, a review will be made of
disaster-related literature across disciplines and of PVO programs in
order i) to develop an analytical perspective that treats the
intersection of disaster and development, and ii) to map the integration
models in use. Second, a case study of one PVO's post-disaster program
(in Armero, Colombia) will be undertaken to illustrate in detail the
integration process, including obstacles and key relationships.
A. The Central Case Study
Presently, there is a relatively small body of knowledge about
program approaches used by voluntary organizations after disasters. Few
PVOs have undertaken thorough evaluations of their post-disaster
programs. In addition, the subject is a very complex one. The
diversity of disaster types, the variety of voluntary agencies and their
possible responses, and the complicated nature of post-disaster work
itself all make it difficult to identify what makes a PVO able to
implement development after disaster. For these reasons, the
dissertation's focus on a central case is warranted.
The agency has an interesting history of intervention in relief and
development that makes it a fitting case study. In the 1970s, Save The
Children (SCF) moved away from strictly charity assistance in its
regular programs but continued the special work in disaster and refugee
relief around the world. Today, the agency professes a philosophy of
"helping communities to help themselves" and regards itself as a "long-
range development organization" (Atkin 1988). With its highly
articulated development approach (CBIRD - Community Based Integrated
Rural Development), SCF's disaster relief efforts have been particularly
conscious of the long-term impacts of relief aid.
B. Data Collection and Analysis
Most of the central case material was collected during the first year
of the Project, from January of 1986 to January of 1987. The
opportunity for a researcher to observe and participate in a disaster
event and in an agency's response is rare. I had the invaluable
opportunity to analyze the case as it was unfolding. Moreover, because
this study attempts to understand how an agency coped with the specific
difficulties of a post-disaster project, the perception from someone on
the "inside" rather than outside of the case study is particularly
valuable (Yin, 1984). The potential of biases that my involvement may
produce is checked by using several sources of data to construct the
case and by reviewing other post-disaster projects for corroborating or
disconfirming interpretations (McCall and Simmons, 1969; Murphy, 1980).
For the central case, primary source data is used -- my field notes,
project documents (Project Design, First Year Report, budget, memos),
headquarter documents (emergency communiques, press releases, memos,
financial reports), and interviews (case agency personnel and disaster
professionals in Colombia). The background information about the region
and the disaster comes from numerous secondary sources (Colombian
government reports, press clippings, and international disaster
documentation from agencies such as USAID and UNDRO). For the mapping
of practice, I draw upon several sources of secondary cases including,
the International Relief/Development Project (IRDP) at Harvard and a
sampling of PVO field reports.
III. Organization of the Thesis
The thesis is divided into three main parts with ten chapters in all.
Part I examines the theoretical and institutional origins of the
separation of disaster and development aid, why separation is unhelpful
for disaster reduction, and what we know about PVO efforts to integrate
the two aid types.
Part II presents the central case study of the Armero Disaster
including: the economic and political processes in the Armero Valley
that exacerbated the impact of the disaster and limited the affected
population's resources for coping and recovery; a description of the
disaster and the post-disaster environment; and the description of Save
The Children's project from the initial relief response to the
transition to its community based development programs.
Part III analyzes in detail the strategy that the case program
implemented for integrating their disaster response with development
programs. It identifies and evaluates the set of challenges that the
case agency faced in the process, looking at program and management
factors, the agency's relationship with its program beneficiaries and
with the Colombian government.
The final chapter presents the main conclusions and recommendations
of the dissertation. It outlines where aid agencies can begin to
develop viable institutional mechanisms for managing overlapping
responsibilities in disaster response and longer-term reduction efforts.
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P A R T I
ORIGINS OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
Before the turn of the century, natural disasters were the subjects
of scientific research and tourist accounts. Interest in the social
aspects of such events did not emerge until the 1920s, but even then
remained largely descriptive. Between the 1950s and 1970s, disaster
research in the social sciences was the exclusive domain of a school of
thought which was grounded in behavioralism and functionalism, "human
ecology". They looked at how individuals and organizations responded to
crisis and disasters. Their theoretical dominance was challenged in the
mid-1970s by a group of disaster researchers interested in the
structural questions. This alternative group used marxist analysis to
investigate questions of disaster causation for the first time. In the
last ten years, the debate among these two approaches to disaster
research has produced a shift in the fundamental premises and concepts
of the field.
One very important shift resulting from the debate is the clear
recognition of the relationship between disasters and development. This
theoretical relationship has very important implications for the
practice of disaster and development assistance -- the subject of this
research. To prepare for disasters, we also have to understand
development and its role in creating or ameliorating disaster
vulnerability. To insure sustainable development, we have to understand
disaster causes and consequences. Professionals from both camps are
providing important lessons from the field which are contributing to the
theoretical debate.
In this light, the present section departs from other reviews by
treating the intersection between disasters and development as a
distinct field of study. In so doing, we examine the origins of the
present research problem: why disaster and development assistance are
separated and why today this separation has become framed as a problem.
The international aid community has historically organized disaster
and development assistance as largely separate and distinct activities.
Recently, however, researchers and practitioners are finding that the
division between the two aid types is not only out of sync with current
thinking in disaster research, but is also unhelpful for reducing the
threat of natural disasters in practice. We will examine both the
theoretical and institutional origins of the separation of disaster and
development aid.
Chapter One concentrates on the academic disaster literature. First
a short history of the development of disaster studies is presented.
Then, the review cuts across the diverse disciplines engaged in disaster
research in order to characterize two primary perspectives underlying
them. The review focuses on how each perspective understands the
relationship between disasters and development and illustrates how this
affects the organization of disaster response in practice.
Chapter Two reviews the institutional dimension of the research
problem by looking at the history of the U.S. private foreign aid
sector. The review focuses on the institutional and programmatic
dynamics that contributed to the current separation of disaster and
development aid. In addition, this chapter outlines parallel contexts
(refugees and environment) in which aid agencies must grapple with the
same problem of linking short-term emergency aid and long-term
development. This chapter will show how private voluntary organizations
(PVOs) came to frame this separation as a problem.
Finally, Chapter Three will review what current theory and practice
can tell us about the research issue before us -- how PVOs link disaster
and development assistance. We will draw on both the literature and
field experience to chart the boundaries of current knowledge about
programs and institutions.
In sum, this introductory section of the thesis will address the
following questions,
1. What are the theoretical and institutional origins of the
separation of disaster and development practice?
2. Why is their separation problematic? How did it become framed
as a problem?
3. What do we know about PVO efforts to link disaster and
development aid?
CHAPTER 1
Theoretical Underpinnings of Disaster Practice
I. Brief History of Disaster Studies
Modern disaster research is generally acknowledged to have begun with
the pioneering work of Samuel Prince, a sociologist, who documented a
French munitions ship explosion in Halifax, Nova Scotia in 1917. Over
two thousand people died, six thousand were injured, and ten thousand
were left homeless by the ensuing fire. Prince documented some of the
sociopsychological responses in the wake of the disaster. He also posed
some of the first arguments about crisis and social change. Although
Prince looked at a man-made disaster, social scientists quickly applied
his inquiry to the study of natural hazards.
With the onset of World War II, subsequent research focused primarily
on the behavior of individuals and groups after crisis and disaster.
Sociologists studied, for example, the effects of bombing on human
behavior and social organizations and looked at how families,
communities, and organizations responded in emergencies and post-
emergencies and adjusted to stress (O'Riordan 1986). In 1953, the
National Academy of Sciences and the National Research Council created
the Committee on Disaster Studies' for the support of this research.
'This was later reorganized into the Disaster Research Group.
Other research centers on natural hazards (with geography, sociology,
and interdisciplinary foci) at the Universities of Delaware (Disaster
Research Center), Colorado (Institute of Behavioral Science), Ohio
(Disaster Research Center in 1963), Chicago (Natural Hazards Research
Group) and the University of Bradford (Disaster Research Unit in 1973),
to name a few. These, and other research groups, provide important
journals and newsletters for the community of disaster researchers.
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Although the initiation of disaster research is attributed to
sociologists, it is the geographers who have dominated the field since
the 1950s (Curson 1989). Beginning with Gilbert White's 1945 study of
human adjustments to floods, geographers have studied the changing
relationship between people and their physical environment. Geographers
primarily investigated how individuals and communities perceive risk and
the decisions they take to adjust to that risk.2 Unlike the
sociologists, they also studied the natural hazards themselves --
droughts, earthquakes, floods, volcanic eruptions, etc. -- to understand
the cause of disasters. Geographers' view of disasters causation was
environmentally deterministic -- that is, the natural event was the
cause of a disaster.
An important stimulus for the work of disaster researchers was the
interest in developing an ecological approach in geography in the late
1950s which stressed the "mutual relations" of people and environment.'
Building upon Barrow's 1923 pioneering work, natural hazards researchers
took an active role in shaping ecological approach in geography. A
parallel interest was developing in sociology at the same time. It was
Amos Hawley's early work on urban systems (1950s) and a group of
2See Curson 1989, White and Haas 1975, White 1974, and Hewitt and
Burton 1971 for a sampling of literature.
3This move formed part of the overall move away from environmental
determinism in Geography. In the first four decades of the twentieth
century, the dominant idea guiding research in U.S. geography was that
environment determined culture. By the 1950s, geographers had become
uncomfortable with this and many alternatives were posed -- one of which
was the development of human ecology (Porter 1980).
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sociologists of the "Chicago School"' who contributed substantially to
the development of the approach in sociology.'
Briefly, ecology is the study of adaptation to the environment.
Human ecology, as its name implies, is the study of people's adaptation
to the environment: "A human ecosystem is a population response to the
necessity of maintaining a workable relation to the environment" (Hawley
1986). The process of adaptation is generally considered at the group
level, analyzing the division of labor as the primary form of human
adjustment to a harsh environment.' Often criticized for its
ahistorical approach, human ecology uses systems models which tend to
rely on theories of general equilibrium.' "The task of human ecologists
is to describe systems and to explain the interconnections among people
and environments which sustain the system and keep it equilibrated."
For disaster researchers, the ecology approach seemed a particularly
appropriate way to understand the interaction between human beings and
the extremes (natural hazards) in their environment.
The ecological approach is still considered to be the dominant
paradigm in disaster research today (Oliver-Smith 1986; O'Riordan 1986;
Hewitt, 1983). Besides sociologists and geographers, disaster
'Including, Robert E. Park, Roderick McKenzie, and Ernest W.
Burgess.
"For an in depth review of the development of the Human Ecology
School see Hawley (1986) and Gerald Young (1983).
'Ecology's strict adherence to the study of groups as a fundamental
component of its approach as well as to the assumption of stable
equilibrium have changed over the years. See Orlove (1980).
'Although not the subject of this review, there have been many
variations within human ecology. They have ranged from neofunctional-
ism, neoevolutionism, and "processual" approaches which all attempt to
address perceived shortcomings in the ecological approach.
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researchers in many other disciplines have used the framework of
adaptation and adjustment to shed light on their fundamental questions.
For example, psychologists study disaster situations in order to analyze
individual adjustments to crisis, stress, and trauma as well as their
coping processes and recovery (Green 1982; Cohen and Ahearn 1980; Perry
and Lindell 1978; Bates et al, 1963).S Anthropologists study
communities' cultural adjustment to risk and impact of extremes in
nature (Oliver-Smith 1979; Schwimmer 1969; Wallace 1956a, 1956b; Firth
1959; Belshaw 1951).' Economists look at the local economic impact of
disasters and community economic recovery after disasters (Rubin et al.
1985; French et al, 1984; Geipel 1982; Wright et al, 1979; Friesema At
al, 1979; Haas et al. 1977; Rogers 1970; Dacy and Kunreunther 1969).
Early on, ecologists focused almost exclusively on questions of
individual and organizational behavior in disaster response (Mileti et
al. 1975; White 1974; Dynes 1970; Barton 1970; Clifford 1956). A bit
later, however, researchers also began to study societal responses to
disruption and crisis and the implication of disasters for social change
more generally (Kreps 1984; Bates 1982; McLuckie 1970; Demerath and
Wallace 1957). Historical and social factors that shape individual risk
perception and decision-making in response to disasters were introduced
(White 1974; Hewitt and Burton 1971; Fritz 1961). The ecologist school
continued in disaster research essentially unchallenged until the 1970s.
'For a good summary of where the psychological literature is today,
see Laube and Murphy 1985.
'For a brief review of the development of disaster research in
Anthropology, see Oliver-Smith (1986).
23
With all the attention on the impact and consequences of disaster,
very little research was directed to understanding the origins, or
causes, of disasters during the post-war period. While sociologists
largely ignored the issue of disaster causation, geographers simply
attributed it to the natural agent. Although these researchers studied
how social and economic variables put people at risk to disasters and
then limit their abilities to cope in the aftermath, no one considered
social or economic factors to be important causal variables.
In the mid-1970s, however, the focus of disaster research took a
decisive turn. Sparked by evidence that disasters unequally impacted
poor countries and poorer sectors of industrialized countries, a
systematic inquiry into the origins of disaster was launched. This
research demonstrated the role of humans, their institutions, and social
systems play in making people susceptible to disasters. A group of
anthropologists and social geographers working in third world contexts
had begun to look at social, economic, and political processes which
cause people to live in hazardous locations and assume vulnerable
economic relationships.'" These authors criticized the ecologist
perspective for its lack of comparative method as well as for its
ethnocentric assumptions on which generalized theory was based."
A small group of these disaster researchers took the analysis a step
further. Using marxist dependency analysis, they argued that the
structural causes of disasters could be found in the historical social
'"Anthropologists include Torry (1978, 1979a, 1979b) and Oliver-
Smith (1979). Social geographers include Waddell (1977), Wisner,
O'Keefe and Westgate (1977), O'Keefe, Westgate and Wisner (1976).
"For a summary of the methodological debate see Oliver-Smith
(1986).
and economic processes themselves.". This critical perspective links
disasters with the "development of underdevelopment" theory and argues
that the marginalization process is what directly increases
vulnerability of human populations.
They studied how social forces can alter natural processes -- how
certain forms of development, for example, can lead to deforestation and
soil erosion -- thereby precipitating disasters. The root causes of
disasters, the critical perspective argues, are certain structural
relations which often lead to deteriorating environments and
underdeveloping populations which, when they meet, cause disasters.
This new research directly challenged the behaviorist focus and the
environmentally deterministic view of disaster causation of the
ecologist school.
While not embraced wholesale, many of principles proposed by the
critical perspective have gained wide acceptance by researchers and have
entered into mainstream thinking in the last ten years. For example,
disasters are no longer considered to be caused by uncontrollable
natural events acting on passive populations. Curson (1989) writes,
the "act of God", the independent operation of incomprehensible
and uncontrollable forces, is no longer seen as the dominating
element of a disaster situation. Disasters are always more
prevalent where human populations occupy vulnerable positions.
With the acceptance of humans' role in disasters, policy has focused on
disaster mitigation. Mitigation is also shifting from being a largely
scientific or technical endeavor to reduce physical risks to one which
"In Hewitt's Interpretations of Calamity (1983), a collection of-
articles by the primary authors of this alternative interpretation of
disasters is assembled. Hewitt himself in the introductory article
details the criticism of the ecologist school and formulates the
alternative position.
addresses the social and economic variables as well. Another change is
that development is no longer accepted as the force which will
inherently reduce population's vulnerability to disasters; its potential
for increasing the risks of disaster is also recognized. Essentially,
the ongoing debate between the critical perspective and ecologists has
stimulated the reexamination of a number of fundamental concepts and
premises of disaster research.
Growing importance is also being given to the relationship between
disasters and development. To prepare for disasters -- both their
causes and consequences -- it is now acknowledged that we also have to
understand development.
It is only in this last decade that researchers -- both academic and
professional -- have begun to study disasters in the context of
development. A growing number of case studies examine how development
aid affects vulnerability to disasters. Similarly, studies looking at
how disasters "set-back" development efforts are also on the rise.
Indeed, it is now generally accepted that development strategies should
address underlying socio-economic vulnerabilities to disasters and that
relief strategies should be designed to support subsequent development
activities.
II. The Disaster-Development Relationship in Disaster Studies and
Practice
With the development of the two primary perspectives in disaster
research in mind, we now look at how they have influenced the current
separation of disaster and development assistance in practice. By
examining how each perspective understands two fundamental elements of
disasters -- what causes disasters and what determines the extent of
disaster impact -- we will analyze their view of the disaster-
development relationship. Then, we examine how each perspective has
influenced the organization of disaster aid.
A. The Ecologist Perspective
- Disaster Causation and Impact
Ecologists accept the physical or "natural"" origin of disasters.
The disaster agent -- the volcano eruption, drought, earthquake, flood
and the like -- is an aberrant event of nature which results from the
extremes in normal geophysical processes. These hazardous events repre-
sent the potential for damage. It is only when they meet with a human
population, that they trigger disasters (UNDRO 1986; Wijkman and
Timberlake 1984). In this view, populations suffer natural disasters
but do not directly cause them.
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"Of course, the ecologist view draws a distinction between "man-
made" disasters (war, refugees, industrial accidents) and the more
"natural" events.
Since the 1970s, ecologists have also begun to examine how people may
exacerbate disaster impact (Grayson and Sheets 1979; White 1974). Some
people are more "vulnerable" to disaster agents than others. Certain
socio-economic factors within development -- such as, patterns of
population growth, settlement, land use, technology use, and migration -
- place populations at more risk to disaster agents and heighten their
potential to do damage (Advisory Committee on the IDNDR 1987).
Despite the recognition of these aggravating factors, ecologists
argue that people are vulnerable to disasters ultimately because of how
they perceive risk and the individual choices they taKe in response to
their perception. Very simply, people live in hazard-prone areas
because they consider that the benefits of doing so outweigh the risks
(O'Riordan 1986). Curson (1989), for example, argues that,
Although disasters result from the interaction of natural and
social systems the two cannot be considered as causative (Burton
et al. 1978). Natural and social environments are inherently
neither malevolent nor benevolent but largely neutral to their
human populations. Primarily it is people who by the nature of
their philosophies, attitudes and behavior modify or transform
this environmental neutrality into either a useful resource or a
potentially disastrous scenario. (emphasis mine)
They treat vulnerability as the end result, as a condition. Development
processes or systemic forces that may create vulnerability are outside
of the ecologists' research focus and understanding of disaster
causation.
The concepts above are embodied in definitions"' of disasters used by
"Although there is still no one accepted definition of disasters,
the many definitions in use do illustrate for us the overwhelming focus
on the study of disaster impact and the key assumptions about the
disaster-development relationship embedded therein. Even within one
discipline, such as sociology, there is no single definition which is
either agreed upon or that is particularly helpful for directing their
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ecologists. Early definitions largely formulated disasters as either
the physical agent itself or the physical consequences of the agent
(Curson 1986). In the early 1960s, one of the first socially-oriented
definition of disasters was advanced by Charles Fritz (1961) who said a
disaster was an,
accidental or uncontrollable event concentrated in time and space
in which a society or a relatively self-sufficient subdivision of
it undergoes sever changes. The social structure is disrupted and
the fulfillment of all or some of the essential functions of the
society is prevented."
More recent working definitions have reflected the now central
concept of vulnerability -- the state of people's capacity to cope with
disaster events. It is the lack of ability to cope with an event which
makes an event disastrous instead of simply hazardous. A geographer,
Heathcote (1979), defines disasters as: "extreme geophysical events
greatly exceeding normal human expectations in terms of magnitude or
frequency and causing significant material damage to man and his works."
Another disaster specialist, Frederick Krimgold (1976), said "disasters
can be defined as crises that overwhelm, at least for a time, people's
capacities to manage and cope".
This simple perusal of earlier and later definitions reflects the
enduring preoccupation with the impact as the defining element of a
research (Quarantelli 1986, 1987; Dynes 1986).
"The above definition reflected researchers' early focus on rapid-
onset, natural disasters. The definition is insufficient today as most
disaster researchers study events not included in this definition, like
the African droughts, which are slow-onset disasters, or the Bhopal dis-
aster, which was tragically man-made.
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disaster. It is here, through their concept of vulnerability, that the
ecologists articulate the disaster-development relationship."
The amount of damage caused by disaster agent differs depending on
the country's state of development (Funaro-Curtis 1982). The general
assumption of the ecologists is that the more underdeveloped a country
or a region of a country is, the more it will suffer damage to life and
property in a disaster. It does not go unnoticed that a volcanic
eruption in Japan kills only a fraction the number that a similar
eruption in Colombia does.
Recently, ecologists have also recognized that disasters affect
development. Disasters are seen to cause, what has been called, "the
development set-back problem". That is, the damage caused by disasters
represents a constraint for societies in the process of "modernization"
(Funaro-Curtis 1982; Burton et al, 1978; Kates 1975). The loss of human
life and the decline of people's standard of living -- through the loss
of jobs, homelessness, health problems, malnutrition, and displacement -
- that result from disaster events represent not only human tragedy but
also a decline in a nation's human capital much needed for development.
In terms of physical capital, governments must increase current and
capital expenditures for relief and reconstruction purposes while their
revenues (income tax receipts and exports) decline due to the disaster.
Governments must also divert public funds away from development purposes
towards reconstruction. In this way, "disasters constitute an acute
"Very early disaster researchers did not see any relationship
between development (level and process) to disaster impact (or causa-
tion, for that matter).
development problem because they affect people, property, and entire
economies" (Funaro-Curtis 1982).
- Implications for Practice: The Ecologists and Disaster Assistance
The ecologist view has been the dominant influence in how disaster
assistance has been structured since the end of World War II. With
research's concern for disaster impact, it is not surprising that focus
in practice has been on the emergency itself and the short period
immediately following. Disaster assistance's general objective is to
best protect lives and property from danger and to return to normal as
quickly as possible. In the language of ecologists, the objective has
been to improve society's capacity to adapt and to quickly return to
equilibrium. Because people were seen as passive receivers of disaster
impact, disaster planning emphasized the development of high-technology
hazard prediction schemes and more efficient management schemes,
stressing logistics and coordination of emergency relief.
Ecologists argue that people locate in hazard-prone areas because
their perceptions of risk are different from some "scientific"
assessments (O'Riordan 1986). As a result, people need to be educated
as to the real hazards they face and how they can cope with them.
Disaster mitigation professionals have naturally assumed this role and
have harnessed western technology and organizational experience in this
effort (O'Riordan 1986; Davis 1975). Since the 1970s debate, a more
judicious use of technology is being promoted. With the greater
interest in understanding indigenous adaption processes, aid is being
refocused to support, rather than replace, the local communities' coping
mechanisms.
In their studies of disaster recovery processes, researchers
characterized different phases, or stages, of the post-disaster period -
- emergency, rehabilitation/reconstruction, and development.'" Each
stage has "different problems, varied sets of issues and contrasting
types of reactions..." (Mileti et al, 1975, pg. 100). Post-disaster
stages have their corollary in disaster aid: a "logical" division of
labor in the organization of a disaster response. Naturally,
emergencies require different assistance packages than do the stages of
recovery and rehabilitation, and altogether different than development.
Different agencies with different objectives and operational styles
provide emergency and reconstruction aid packages and programs."
Just as disasters are largely seen as uncontrollable events of nature
or war that interrupted the normal course of development, so disaster
aid is seen as a temporary parenthesis in development assistance. An
economist, Eaton (1989) summarizes this commonly-held differentiation
between the two types of assistance,
... relief aid, intended to maintain current consumption levels
during a shortfall in income that is perceived as temporary, and
development aid that is intended to raise investment and future
consumption.
The schism between the disaster and development assistance is indeed
quite marked.
"Haas et al, (1977) distinguished four phases: 1) emergency, 2)
restoration, 3) replacement and reconstruction, and 4) commemorative,
betterment and developmental reconstruction. Others distinguish only
three phases: emergency/relief, recovery and reconstruction.
"'The dominant conceptualization of foreign assistance emerges from
this stages framework. For working definitions of relief, recovery, and
development aid, see Appendices.
As we will explain in more detail in Chapter 2, the emphasis on
phases has been reflected in a generalized separation of relief and
development aid -- both institutionally and programmatically. The U.N
system, for example, has the U.N. Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO)
which responds with emergency relief aid after disasters and is quite
separate from the U.N. Development Program (UNDP). Within USAID there
is a separate Office of Foreign Disasters Assistance (OFDA) which has
generally been limited to the provision of only short-term aid. In
fact, an entire relief network has emerged which has traditionally been
quite separate from the development complex (Kent 1987).
Likewise, the private foreign aid sector has also provided disaster
relief and development aid separately -- either through agencies
specialized in one or the other aid type, or by having separate
divisions within the same agency doing each. Different kinds of
professionals and management schemes have been in play for the two aid
types. Relief agencies have been characterized by their specialized
staffs and reliance on centrally managed logistical support and short-
term intervention. Agencies doing reconstruction and development work
have tended to be concerned with participatory management and a long-
term impact horizon.
When assistance is provided separately, success is measured by how
well the agency does each set of activities -- that is, doing relief
quickly and efficiently, rehabilitation and reconstruction
appropriately. It is assumed that the completion of these stages allows
the resumption of the community's development trajectory. Linear
continuity is assumed between them.
In summary, the ecologist perspective envisions disaster causality
originating in the extreme physical event; the risk for doing damage is
then exacerbated by its meeting with a vulnerable population.
Vulnerability, itself, is the result of individual behavior and choices.
In terms of impact, the ecologists see that disasters and development
mutually influence one other. A disaster can negatively affect a
nation's push for development through the "set-back" problem and,
conversely, the level of development place people in conditions of
vulnerability, thereby determining the extent of the disaster impact.
Ecologist research has focused on the processes of human adaptation to
crisis events and on the definition and study of post-disaster stages.
Most practical attention has been placed on problems encountered during
the emergency period. The assumption that outside relief aid is usually
necessary in disasters has pervaded the aid community. The stress on
disaster stages has resulted in an institutional division of labor
between those who provide disaster and those who provide development
assistance.
B. Disaster Research Begins to Shift
... these are crucial times to be involved in disaster
research. Not only are the events and processes of
disasters becoming more acute, but the methods and
theoretical approaches to understanding the contexts,
causes and consequences of disasters are in a state of
flux.
- Oliver-Smith (1986).
Beginning in the 1970s, a few anthropologists and social geographers
undertook new research directions which challenged the dominant view of
the ecologists. Their research produced a series of recurrent and
consistent findings which led to a fundamental reconceptualization of
disaster causation. With sufficient historical data for the first time
available in the 1970s, researchers analyzed the type, frequency,
location, and damage of disasters throughout the globe. Researchers
found that the frequency and gravity of disasters have been increasing
since the 1940s and that they were disproportionately affecting poor
Third World countries (O'Keefe et al. 1976)." Dworkin (1974) and
Thompson (1982), two surveys of the world disaster situation showing
this apparent trend, were widely accepted by disaster researchers."
From his review of disaster surveys performed in the previous decade,
Kates (1980) noted that among poor nations "per capita deaths [are]
perhaps a hundred times greater; relative per capita damage perhaps
[are] ten times greater than among rich nations" in the wake of a
disaster." In 1981, Fernandez published an article arguing that
disaster-prone areas shared common features -- those characteristic of
underdeveloped areas.
Shah (1983) and Hagman (1984) presented evidence suggesting that the
number of disasters were growing, but without a concurrent increase in
the number of natural events (earthquakes, storms, etc.). Other
researchers found no evidence of climatic changes that might explain the
"Disaster statistics suffer serious problems of reliability and
comparability across nations. However, estimates have been made and do,
arguably, support certain conclusion drawing.
"For methodological reasons, these surveys did not include wars,
famines, epidemics, or industrial disasters which account for, by far,
the most deaths (Curson 1989).
"These studies have been followed up by even more alarming studies
of the global disaster situation in the 1980s. Kent (1987) cites that
over the fifteen-year period between 1970 and 1985, developed countries
suffered only "3 percent of the world's major disasters, accounted for
less than 1 percent of all disaster-related deaths (0.05 percent) and
severe social disruptions (0.0469 percent) due to major disasters".
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increase in disasters (O'Keefe, Westgate and Wisner 1976). The reason,
then, had to lie on the other side of the equation -- with increasing
vulnerability of populations. Researchers began to investigate with
more rigor the issue of vulnerability in order to explain the growing
number of disasters.
This research led to a reexamination of the role of development in
causing disasters. During this period, studies of a number of slow-
onset and long-duration types of disasters were undertaken. The drought
in the Sahel and famines in Bangladesh brought to light the issue of
causality like no study of earthquakes or volcanic eruption ever had.
French radical intellectuals focused on colonial and post-colonial
international political-economic system to explain the origins of the
Sahelian famine of 1968-1974." A consensus was emerging that it was
people, in the way they dealt with the environment and structured their
social and economic systems, who actually created conditions for
disaster agents themselves (Kent 1987).
The once obvious distinction between man-made and natural disasters
also fell by the wayside. Disasters were often generated by forces much
more complicated than previously thought. A myriad of interrelated
factors -- poverty, political instability, technology, for example --
all may precipitate and exacerbate any given disaster. A man-made
disaster may trigger a natural disaster or vice-a-versa. Take this
scenario, for example: A war prompts an outflow of refugees from an
agricultural area leaving it short of farmers to plant and harvest
"See Franke and Chasin (1980) for discussion of the work of the
French Agriculturalists.
which, in turn, threatens the onset of a famine (Kent 1987). These
multifactor disasters have been dubbed, "complex disasters".
These related investigations -- into disaster frequency and impact
globally and into disaster causation -- changed the way disaster
research had been conducted. No longer researched in isolation,
disasters and their relationship with development emerged as a major
orienting theme. Even ecologists now agree that all disasters have, at
their root, populations' vulnerability. Nevertheless, this concept of
vulnerability has been a key point of debate -- whether it results from
individual decision-making (ecologist view) or also from the social and
economic organization of the population (structuralist view). It is to
this latter perspective that we now turn.
C. The Critical Perspective
- Disaster Causation and Impact
Emerging from the research of the 1970s, a group of disaster
researchers using marxist analysis now turned to investigate the pre-
viously neglected area of disaster causation. In contrast to the
ecologists' environmental determinism, the critical perspective argues
that it is the interaction between human beings and their environment
which cause disasters.
This interaction works in two ways. Similar to ecologists, the
critical perspective stresses that a vulnerable population must be
present to interact with the physical agent in order to have a disaster.
However, rather than being an exacerbating factor, a population's
vulnerability is itself a causal variable of disasters. Together with
the physical agent, vulnerability "triggers" the event (Susman et al.
1983). The second way the human-environment interaction causes a
disaster is when people directly alter their physical environment,
thereby creating the conditions which engender disaster agents
themselves. Deforestation is a clear example of human beings changing
the environment and putting themselves at risk. The two variables which
interact to cause a disaster are a vulnerable population and a
deteriorating environment.
This perspective studies the roots of these two causal variables,
which they argue to be structural in nature, not behavioral. Using the
"development of underdevelopment" perspective (Seidman 1974; Rhodes
1970; Frank 1969), they argue that the marginalization process -- the
interplay between external (foreign domination) and internal factors
(economic structures) -- is what leads to vulnerable populations and
deteriorating environments. Unequal relations create dependency, cause
populations to migrate and disrupt economies and societies (Waddell
1983). Population and other social pressures cause the progressive
destruction of the environment. From the local to the international
level, social systems create vulnerability to disasters (Morren 1983;
Torry 1979).
2 Direction of Disaster Causation
deteriorating
physical
enviornment'
CAPITALIST DEV'T:
increasing + D I S A S T E R
marginalization
underdeveloping
population
abbreviated version from:
Susnan et al. 1983.
Thus, natural disasters are not aberrant events, but the results of
"normal" social and economic relations -- they are characteristic
features of societies and place (Oliver-Smith 1986; Hewitt 1983). Baird
et al. (1975) defined disasters to be "the extreme situation which is
implicit in the everyday condition of the population". Disasters are
"parts of processes with spatial, temporal, and other properties"
(Morren 1983). Thus, this perspective argues that there is a direct
relationship between development and disaster vulnerability.
Jeffrey (1981) distinguishes the marxist concept of vulnerability
from that of the traditional view explaining that,
It is not sufficient to list certain "factors" which may affect
vulnerability, but rather the relationships between and among them
must be clearly established. ...it is not sufficient to list such
factors as history of settlement, government policies and agricul-
tural practices as affecting vulnerability. It is necessary to go
beyond a consideration of discrete causes and to focus on the
system of relations. (emphasis mine).
Therefore, it is insufficient to argue that population growth is the
cause of soil erosion due to over-farming or that a city's uncontrolled
growth into hazardous areas is the cause of a landslide (Torry 1986;
Zaman 1986; Jeffrey 1981). Rather, population movements, for example,
have to be understood in relation to the process of national
development, both economic and political. The poor are forced to leave
relatively secure forms of adaptation and move into hazardous locations
and economic relationships (Susman et al. 1983). Population growth and
its location cannot, therefore, be isolated as a singular causal factor
in disasters.
Researchers using marxist analysis have focused on changing economic
relations -- the emergence of commercial cultivation for export -- and
the progressive destruction of the environment due to population and
other social pressures (Waddell 1983). They have studied slow-onset
disasters, like famine, which tend to be linked with environmental
degradation in rural conditions in pre-industrial societies. These
provide the best illustration of how social and economic exploitation
and environmental abuse are themselves causes of disasters.
Wisner et al. (1977) study colonial and neo-colonial periods in Kenya
to show how the penetration of capitalism into the arid zones resulted
in the expropriation of land and the diversion of credit and marketing
facilities away from the traditional peasantry. This "development" all
but destroyed the traditional land use and herd management systems in
the rural areas. With a restricted land base, over-farming and erosion
obviously ensued thereby increasing farmer's vulnerability to drought.
Baird et al,(1975) analyze the origin of the large number of deaths
resulting from Hurricane Fifi in Northern Honduras in 1974. Earlier,
large companies had taken over the region for the cultivation of bananas
for export displacing great numbers of peasant farmers from the fertile
valleys. They were forced to clear and cultivate the surrounding
hillsides thereby increasing the potential for soil erosion. When Fifi
struck, the peasants were literally swept off the hillside."
In sum, the critical perspective consistently argues that there is a
direct relationship between development and disasters. More than
isolated factors, it is the process of capitalist development in third
world societies which makes their populations more vulnerable to
disasters. Furthermore, people are not passive actors upon which
"Jeffrey (1981) looks at similar processes in her analysis of
vulnerability and disasters in Indonesia. Hagman (1984) also reports
similar factors which are increasing the populations' vulnerability to
drought and flooding in various Latin American countries.
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disaster fall; they are often active agents of disasters through their
interaction with the environment. Vulnerability -- manifested in
deteriorating environments and underdeveloping populations -- also
determines the extent of disaster impact.
- Implications for Practice: The Critical Perspective and Disaster
Assistance
These analysts have worked primarily at the levels of research and
criticism of the effects of the relief system. The debate that they
have sparked, however, has engendered a constructive shift in mainstream
research and practice away from the strict emergency focus to one on
disaster mitigation and prevention.
The critical perspective criticizes the direction and aims of much of
traditional disaster assistance, particularly what they see as an
overemphasis on the emergency and the resulting emphasis on
technological solutions. As it is, they argue, relief aid simply
reinforces the status quo before the disaster -- the process of
development which produced such vulnerability in the first place (Susman
et al. 1983). Traditional reconstruction aid restores things as they
were (Hewitt 1983). In this light, disaster assistance is hardly
neutral. It promotes further dependency which will, once again,
encourage the deterioration of the physical environment and
marginalization of the population, ultimately increasing vulnerability
to disaster (Susman et al. 1983; Cannon 1977; O'Keefe and Wisner 1976).
The current constellation of disaster and development aid allows the
redomination of unequal relations.
Waddell (1983) argues, "...it is highly unlikely that any relief
strategy, however well conceived, can modify the structure of the
economy or concomitant social order." To reduce the threat of
disasters, they argue, disaster mitigation assistance must address the
fundamental questions of economic dependency and patterns of social
relations. Rather than pervasive, high-tech solutions, aid providers
would do better to understand the social, economic and political
processes in order to direct relief to support local coping mechanisms.
Disaster mitigation planning, therefore, must be concentrated within
development planning (Susman et al, 1983; O'Keefe and Conway 1975).
Because exploitation is an important disaster cause, the development
planning context must be socialist in nature (Susman et al, 1983; Wisner
1978, 1976; Wisner et al.,1977; Cannon 1977; Westgate and O'Keefe
1976a). When post-disaster relief is required, it should be "based on
the preservation and reinforcement of indigenous responses and involve a
minimum of external intervention (national or international)" (Waddell
1983). This perspective calls for a new disaster planning model which
would include socialist development planning to reduce vulnerabilities
(proactive approach) and relief aid that is non-dependency generating
(reactive approach).
III. A Distinct Area of Study and Practice: The Disaster and
Development Intersection
Theory: An Emerging Perspective
The critical perspective has stimulated a vital and productive debate
over basic premises and concepts within disaster research. Concurrent
with this theoretical challenge, providers of disaster and development
aid have also been facing, for the first time, a set of dilemmas in the
field which challenge the traditional disaster practice. I argue that
together these challenges represent a watershed in disaster studies and
planning -- a major rethinking of the disaster-development relationship.
The reorganization of aid is currently underway.
Today, a new current of thought about disasters and their
relationship with development is emerging from the ranks of disaster and
development practitioners. In their attempt to make sense of the
practical dilemmas, they have borrowed principles from the ecologist and
critical perspectives. This perspective embraces the findings that
challenge the traditional view of the "natural" separation of disasters
and development. At the same time, however, it resists, as the only
alternative, the negative prognosis for disaster and development aid
argued by the critical perspective at the other extreme. Instead, these
practitioners and experts recognize the variability of the relationships
between disasters and development and argue a positive prospect for
practice.
Today, the understanding of what constitutes a "disaster" is much
broader than before. In the last decade alone, the understanding of the
factors that engender and compound disasters are far more clearly
recognized (Kent 1987). While it is impossible to pull out one
definition of disasters used by practitioners, it is possible to
generalize about the direction of causality accepted by most: Natural
hazard plus vulnerable population produces disaster. Populations are
vulnerable because of a number of factors inherent in certain
development processes and natural hazards are occurring more because of
environmental mismanagement and abuse resulting in its serious
deterioration.
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Disaster professionals from the field are helping to define new
approaches in disaster planning. The dilemmas that they face have
caused many to question the basic assumptions underlyinig the way
disaster assistance is provided.
The practical dilemmas which practitioners face in the field arise
from an apparent dichotomy between relief and development which was
first articulated in the 1970s."' Traditional emergency relief had
apparent negative consequences for development. After the cyclone and
civil war hit Bangladesh in the early 1970s, critics of the relief
system and the relief community itself began to reassess the
effectiveness and impact of the aid. (This was the first time that
humanitarian aid had come under any scrutiny.) They found that
development programs which followed disaster aid often had to deal with
the damaging consequences of inappropriate relief aid provided earlier,
and were often impaired by dependencies created by the overly pervasive
and invasive relief assistance.
"This will be elaborated in greater detail in the next chapter
where we will review the history of private foreign assistance.
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Since this time, the literature evaluating and cataloguing relief's
impacts on development has continued to grow." Analysts found, for
example, that many of the relief "solutions" actually left the
populations even more vulnerable to disasters than they had been before.
Ian Davis (1981) notes countless occasions where housing built after
earthquakes ignored seismic-resistant codes. On other occasions, the
inappropriate provision of food aid and other in-kind relief has been
widely criticized for atrophying the local production and marketing
channels and hindering the economic recovery of disaster-struck regions
(Hay 1986). Disaster aid's propensity to create or reinforce
communities' dependency on outside materials and expertise has been
widely illustrated (Rolfe et al. 1987; Lincoln Young 1983; Cuny 1983;
AFSC 1982).
At the project level, relief programs have impeded the introduction
of development programs. Bates (1982) documents a common problem which
emerges when a relief and a development program met in close
geographical proximity in Guatemala after the earthquake in 1976. He
gives the example of a relief agency who gave away houses to villagers
while a development agency attempted to recruit them for a self-help
housing scheme in which they must contribute their labor. Obviously,
the two different activities and approaches clashed, thwarting the
latter's efforts.
Aid providers continue to encounter the disaster-development
relationship in a variety of their work settings. In their work with
grassroots environmental projects, with refugees, and particularly with
"'Linden (1976), Lissner (1977), Dudasik (1979), Shawcross (1984),
and Harrell-Bond (1986) are all practitioners.
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the mega disasters like the rolling African Famine during the 1980s, aid
providers must manage the intersection between poverty, development, and
disasters. In all these areas, practitioners have tried to structure
short-term aid which meets immediate needs in an emergency without
creating new dependencies and to follow relief with long-term
development work.
The theoretical debate represented by the behavioral versus the
structuralist approach to disaster causation resonated with many
practitioners and the dilemmas they were facing. From their experience,
they have long recognized that disasters and development are
unequivocally related. However, they saw that the disaster-development
relationships may also take various forms. Like the ecologists, they
have seen how underdevelopment puts increasing numbers of people at risk
to natural hazards and has resulted in more deaths. Like the critical
perspective, they have seen how greater development (particularly in
terms of high technology) has increased the risk of disasters.
To explain these different outcomes, some experts have attempted to
analyze disasters within the explicit context of development (Anderson
and Woodrow 1989; Franklin 1985; Cuny 1983). That is, they frame the
concept of vulnerability specifically as a development problem. The
process of development contributes directly to a population's
vulnerability. Anderson and Woodrow (1989) write,
Vulnerabilities refer to the long-term factors which affect the
ability of a community to respond to events or which make it
susceptible to calamities... .Vulnerabilities precede disasters,
contribute to their severity, impede effective disaster response
and continue afterwards.
This group does stress the circumstances which put people at risk to
disasters, like population growth, land-use, and technology. While
clearly not the marxist variety of social relations, the analysis of
these factors nonetheless go beyond the superficial perusal given them
by the ecologists. These development factors, in fact, are at the
center of much of their work. A recent World Bank report (Kreimer 1989)
put it this way,
Extreme events are integral components of the environment.
However, the extent of damage that results from them is to a
significant degree a function of the decisions made, activities
undertaken, and technologies utilized during the process of
development. In many cases, costly losses produced by an extreme
event are preventable.
However, by looking at factors rather than processes, practitioners stop
short of the marxist structural analysis of vulnerability. Instead of
changing political and economic structural processes, practitioners are
most interested in knowing how to adjust to these factors in order to
mitigate the impact of future disasters.
The over arching importance of development factors in the disaster
equation led professionals to explore how disaster assistance can deal
with the social and economic dimensions of disasters. Practitioners
take as a starting point that development must be the ultimate objective
for all disaster intervention -- both for mitigation and post-disaster
response. Disaster professionals resist the marxist interpretation that
disaster aid cannot mitigate disasters because it always reinforces the
political and social status quo (which engendered poverty and
vulnerability in the first place). Aid may do that. Or, it may foster
economic change which leads to political and social reform." Most take
"In fact, the disaster professional in the PVO sector works from
an understanding of "alternative development" in which empowerment and
the eradication of poverty towards self-reliance are the key concepts in
an appropriate development.
a positive view of development and aid -- which argues that if it is
properly directed, aid may allow populations to decrease their
vulnerability to disasters.
Recently, professionals are looking for principles to aid them design
their disaster response. Some use a concept of development which
includes its relationship with disasters. Anderson (1985) summarizes
the concept of development as "a process through which people's
vulnerability (economic, social, political, personal) is reduced." It
is this "development" that this emerging perspective argues should be
the objective of all disaster aid.
To address both short-term immediate needs and long-term risk-
generating factors, professionals are increasingly arguing that it is
important to integrate disaster and development aid in practice as well
as in principle. Before disasters happen, development activities must
be directed to prevent, prepare for, and mitigate their impacts; after a
disaster occurs, disaster assistance provided should be linked with
development programs which reduce populations' vulnerability to future
disasters." Bender (1989) and Kreimer (1989) stress that disaster
mitigation and prevention should be "integral components" of
development. In practice, however, relief and development aid are still
often miles apart. We will look at what we know about integration of
disaster and development assistance in practice in Chapter 3, "Practice:
Integrating Disaster and Development Aid Programs".
"For a sampling, see Kreimer and Zador (1989), Kent (1987),
Kibreab (1987), Hay (1986), Gorman and Foote (1985), Cuny (1985),
Anderson (1985), Bates (1982), AFSC (1982), and Kates (1980).
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In sum, this review of the disaster literature has shown that most
theorizing about the relationship between disasters and development has
focused on the redefinition/reconceptualization of disaster causation
and what role development plays in this. This theorizing is also
intricately linked with practical considerations in disaster and
development assistance. Above, we have outlined how the changing
conceptualizations have directly translated into the way that disaster
aid has been structured in the post-War period. Likewise, recurring
practical dilemmas have also motivated the reexamination of the accepted
conceptualization of disasters and development and reorganization of
practice.
CHAPTER 2
The Institutional Dimension of Disaster and Development Aid
The relationship between disasters, relief and development represents
one of the major recurrent themes in the history of private foreign
aid." From the initial motivation for private aid to cross borders, to
their shift from welfare to development programs, to attempts to
reconcile apparent contradictions between disaster assistance and long-
term development aid. This history of the understanding of the
relationship between disaster relief and development aid and its
institutional setting is at the same time the backdrop and the origin of
the present research.
The link between theory and practice is perhaps nowhere more clear
than in the area of foreign assistance. The three theoretical
perspectives outlined in the previous chapter have had direct
consequences for the organization of disaster relief and its
relationship (or lack of it) with development assistance. This chapter
presents a more complete review of the history of private foreign
assistance, charting the evolution of the institutional dimension of the
theoretical issues discussed earlier.
First, we will examine how private foreign assistance resulted in the
institutional separation of relief and development aid. Next, we will
sketch the present institutional setting of international disaster
assistance with special reference to the factors that conspire to keep
"This history of private foreign assistance is drawn primarily
from Sommer (1977), Bolling and Smith (1982), Cuny (1983), Kent (1987).
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the two aid types apart. Following, we will chart the changes in
foreign assistance (emerging contradictions) and in the global
environment (mounting pressures) that, together with the conceptual
transformations documented above, culminated in the identification of
the disaster-development split as the major obstacle to international
disaster reduction assistance.
I. The Importance of Private Voluntary Organizations in Disasters
Private voluntary organizations (PVOs) have joined with governments,
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and special relief agencies in
responding to the tremendous human suffering. Although the smallest
actor in terms of dollar resources, PVOs play central roles in disasters
which give their actions a far greater impact than mere dollars invested
would suggest. The resources, expertise and coordination which PVOs
provide are substantial and crucial to disaster response.
As a group, the PVO sector actually represents an important source of
assistance for both relief and recovery. Hingson (1981) cites the
private international assistance" raised and delivered 15% of the
foreign assistance received in Kampuchea through 1981. In the case of
the 1976 earthquake in Guatemala, the sector provided the extraordinary
48% of the total international assistance received by those affected by
the disaster. In absolute dollars, these percentages were equivalent to
$110 million in Kampuchea and $75 million in Guatemala.
In the last fifteen years, the PVOs have demonstrated their growing
capabilities and professionalism in disaster assistance roles. On the
"These figures for the private international assistance includes
North America, Western Europe, Japan, Australia and New Zealand.
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home front, they play the important role of alerting the general public
of disasters and provide a channel for donations to those affected.
Many times, PVOs are already on the scene doing development work when
the disaster strikes. They send immediate assessment reports from the
field, alerting the aid community and potential donors of needs and
priorities sometimes days before any disaster personnel can make it to
the affected area. PVOs often send their own disasters experts who work
hand-in-hand with those of the UN and donor governments in assessing
damage and planning the relief response.
While not always the svelte, unencumbered action agents they portray
themselves to be, PVOs often do have more organizational and
programmatic options than the large IGOs and donor governments. For
example, the agency can choose to establish their own project on the
ground, to channel funds to a local group or enter into joint projects
with a local agency. Often, they can also resist spending their funds
during the emergency period and, instead, use them for reconstruction
and rehabilitation. The charter of bilateral and multilateral relief
agencies often explicitly prohibit certain of these organizational
arrangements and usually restrict both aid periods and types of aid."
Because they are largely involved in field operations, PVOs often
occupy a special niche in disaster response. Especially in communities
"Other organizational advantages often contributed to PVOs are, in
fact, elusive most of the time. For example, donors will often give
their money to the PVOs because they believe they will deliver the aid
more directly to the affected communities. In particular circumstances,
PVOs are seen to provide a welcome alternative to the government-to-
government channels which are seen as cumbersome or politically-charged.
While true in some cases, some PVOs were able to get relief to those who
needed it in countries at times when donor governments and even the IGOs
were not allowed in. In most cases, however, PVOs are not more able to
escape political pressures than are other donors.
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where they already have programs, PVOs may be more likely to work
through the local leaders and encourage broad community involvement in
the disaster relief and reconstruction activities. These agencies are
able to reinforce local efforts that may be overlooked by larger relief
programs. Through their development work, the PVOs are already familiar
with communities' traditional forms of mutual aid and self-help in
normal times. In times of.disasters, the PVOs will often work with the
affected community's traditional response and mechanisms for coping in
crisis -- unlike their larger relief counterparts who often respond
reflexively with massive food and material assistance."
Just as the above characteristics and roles make PVOs attractive to
donors, they have also made these agencies attractive to donor
governments and IGOs. Through their many relationships with other
relief actors, PVOs have assumed greater importance. To avoid political
pressures, governments will often chose to channel funds through PVOs
instead of directly. To improve their operations on the ground,
intergovernmental organizations are increasingly using the grassroots
knowledge of the PVOs by working jointly in disaster response.
Governments of the affected country have also tended to become more
interested in PVO activities. To enlist PVOs to "fill the gaps" of
their own relief activities, host governments very often share funds,
personnel, and material with PVOs. In many cases, these arrangements
"These advantages in theory are not always translated to
advantages in practice. Too often, the opposite is true. Like all
outsiders, PVOs new to the scene may feel their relief projects
threatened by local leadership, or are in a huge rush to do something
visible to send pictures to home office. Like all aid agencies working
in an emergency, PVOs too feel the pressures to centralize and take
control over their relief activities at the expense of their development
principles.
allow PVOs to multiply the impact of their work and to insure its
sustainability."
Finally, the PVOs are particularly well positioned to contribute to
integrating disaster with development assistance. The standard
development projects that many PVOs undertake, in fact, already have a
significant disaster mitigation dimension. Although not called disaster
mitigation per se, projects which work with communities to plant trees,
terrace hillsides, and to introduce sustainable agricultural techniques
are, in fact, tackling the problems of environmental degradation which
is intricately linked with disasters. Development programs which aid
communities to improve land tenure arrangements or change market
relationships also seek to reduce certain economic dependencies which
reduce the communities array of coping options in times of crisis. And
as PVOs explore more how to directly reduce the incidence and extent of
disasters, they are coming back repeatedly to these kinds of projects.
As a result, PVOs are in a unique position -- because of their
grassroots knowledge and growing professionalism in sustainable
development -- to move from emergency relief activities to disaster
mitigation in their standard programs."
"Many PVOs may also feel that their work is threatened by too
close relationships with host governments, particularly those
governments who are seen to be part of the problem rather than the
solution.
"All of the above strengths of the PVO sector is not to meant to
gloss over the many negatives. These agencies are subject to a myriad
of pressures which limit their abilities to respond effectively in
disasters. Not to mention the tremendous difficulties inherent in
responding to a crisis event. Because of their own religious or charity
principles/mandates, many PVOs put on themselves their own limits to
what, when, and where they can intervene. Very often, PVOs end up
competing with each other for victims, program turf, and recognition.
In an effort to insure funding, they often try as hard as possible to
distinguish themselves from the other agencies at times making it near
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With the importance of PVOs in mind, we now turn to the review of the
historical developments in private foreign aid. Specifically, we will
explain how disaster relief and development aid emerged as separate
types of foreign aid and why, in the last decade, this separation became
framed as a problem in practice.
II. The Disaster-Development Rift
U.S. private voluntary assistance overseas dates back to before 1900.
At its inception, all private voluntary assistance was humanitarian,
first responding to crises caused by political conflict and famine, then
by rapid onset disasters and wars. Private relief assistance from the
U.S. was provided for thousands of Santo Domingans fleeing revolutionary
unrest on their island in 1793; in the 1820s, aid was sent to the Greeks
during the time they were fighting the Ottomans; and in 1847, assistance
was sent during the Great Irish Famine. These efforts were ad hoc
missionary-style responses to specific events.
In 1882, the best known relief organization, the American Red Cross,
came into being." After World War I, other private organizations
emerged such as the American Friends Service Committee, the Rockefeller
and the Carnegie Corporation among others, forming for the first time,
"a cadre of trained administrators and overseas fieldworkers" (Sommer
1977).
impossible to coordinate joint projects.
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"During and after the First World War, the Red Cross movement
remained the single most important landmark in the evolution of
humanitarian relief." (Kent 1987, pg. 35)
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Today's relief operations grew out of approaches developed to help in
the relief and reconstruction of Europe after World War II. During the
post-war period through the 1960s, disasters were treated in isolation
from development. Immediately following the war, PVOs played an
important role in meeting emergency and short-term relief needs,
relieving the misery of war victims, displaced and malnourished people.
Their tasks consisted primarily of logistics. Few PVOs, however,
participated in long-term recovery activities. At the time, these
agencies and their activities were assumed to be temporary because the
countries of Europe would quickly be able to return to normalcy.
By the early 1950s, the needs in Europe had subsided and the PVOs
began to look for other roles. The relief agencies began to apply their
experience from Europe to refugee problems arising in trouble spots in
the Third World as well as to provide relief assistance in the wake of
natural disasters often in the newly independent nations. At this
point, they also began to involve themselves with longer-term recovery
activities. But their role in the occasional conflict or disaster did
not seem to be enough to occupy the many PVOs which had emerged in the
wake of the War.
The PVOs' desire for institutional stability coincided with the
emergence of the development field as a "major institutional growth
industry" for foreign aid sector generally (Kent 1987). The development
funds, however, were in the hands of the international governmental
organizations and their brand of development (large-scale capital
transfers and investment, infrastructure projects, and the extension of
trade) was not possible for PVOs to undertake. Although the PVOs were
acquiring development concerns, most of them were still oriented towards
relief and humanitarian assistance with little vision of their role in
development. Because of the paucity of funds and the PVOs' still
limited development perspectives, the comparatively large and wealthy
IGOs generally considered the smaller and poorer PVOs as amateurish do-
gooders. An institutional division of labor had emerged in which both
sides kept their distance.
In addition to institutional skepticism, the division of labor also
reflected the dominant attitude shared by all that disasters were simply
temporary setbacks. While the IGO sector believed that for economic
development, the developing countries needed outside aid, they believed
that these same nations were able to handle the temporary disruptions
caused by disasters. As a result, disaster relief was primarily the
task for national governments complemented with a relatively small
amount of foreign humanitarian aid, which the private voluntary sector
appropriately provided. Foreign governments still sent "sympathy" and
material aid in the wake of disasters, but theirs was by no means
important responsibility for relief or recovery.
This neat division of labor between the IGOs and PVOs began to change
in the next ten years. With the influence of the U.N. movements in
community development in the 1960s, PVOs were able to make their first
concrete steps away from relief and humanitarian aid as their primary
activities. The number of new international PVOs shot up and both old
and new agencies alike embraced community development as their
institutional mandate. With albeit restricted funds from public donors,
they were able to undertake small-scale projects directly aiding the
poor in rural communities in the Third World. These grassroots projects
eventually came to symbolize appropriate assistance and increasingly
drew attention, and funding, from the IGOs and donor governments.
However, at this early stage of the PVO shift towards development,
relief and recovery work in the Third World continued to be the PVO
sector's mainstay activity.
In the early 1970s, the provision of relief and humanitarian aid also
entered into serious question for the first time in its history. As
PVOs gained more experience in the new setting, they began to find that
many of the approaches they had employed in war and refugee relief in
Europe made little sense in the Third World. Partially influenced by
the new "development" PVOs, they found that their emergency-focused,
centrally administered, logistics approach effective for post-war and
refugee relief omitted activities necessary for the social and economic
post-disaster recovery of Third World countries. For example, their
relief distribution bypassed or replaced local markets and institutions
and often completely neglected the affected communities' indigenous
mechanisms for coping with disasters. There was a growing awareness
that recovery from disasters was not a simple matter of "bouncing back"
but depended in large part on a given country's development.
III. The Separation of Disaster and Development Aid
The contradictions between post-war relief practice and the disaster-
recovery needs in the Third World came to a head in the early 1970s.
After the cyclone and civil war hit Bangladesh in the early 1970s, the
relief community, unhappy with its performance, began to reassess the
effectiveness and impact of relief aid. Research into the approaches
used to provide relief assistance produced reports of inappropriate aid,
dependencies, and counterproductive consequences. Similarly, review of
other relief efforts found that few of the agencies had much experience
in the countries where they were responding and fewer still employed
personnel with the appropriate expertise for the kinds of disasters they
were facing. The foreign aid community generally began to reexamine the
very principles underlying the understanding of disasters and disaster
relief.
This uproar over humanitarian aid was accompanied by the
consolidation of many PVOs' move away from the relief -- both
philosophically and in their standard assistance programs. In 1973,
Robert McNamara gave his now-famous speech changing the World Bank's
focus to programs directly targeted to reduce poverty. International
PVOs followed suit and began their definitive transformation into
private development organizations. By this time, the vast majority of
the PVOs had some kind of development role."
But development's gain was disaster relief's loss once again. The
PVOs themselves had firmly relegated disaster relief to second-rate
status just as their IGO counterparts had done 15 years earlier. The
newer, "more serious" business of development had usurped the PVOs'
traditional relief and humanitarian focus. The PVOs now too argued that
relief assistance had little long-term effect on the reduction of
poverty. Unless the root causes of poverty could be ameliorated, they
argued, populations would never be able to break out of the cycle of
poverty and, among other things, would be unable to better cope with
"As PVOs further evolved their own brand of development, rooted in
community development, towards what today is generally called the
"assisted self-reliance" approach to development, their role in the
foreign aid sector generally changed. The IGOs and donor governments
began to recognize the role and potential of PVOs in development. They
increased their funding of PVOs and implementation of joint projects.
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disasters. Many feared relief aid might even worsen poverty in the
long-run through its tendency to create dependency on outside resources
and expertise. PVO agency philosophies often reflected these concerns.
Thus, the institutional and professional disdain for charity firmly
reinforced the schism between relief and development aid that had
emerged during the 1960s.
Although some in the development community did claim that "the era of
relief was ended", this view was clearly premature. The need for
disasters relief and humanitarian assistance would simply not go away.
Not only were more people dying from natural disasters than the decade
earlier1 but also improved media technology brought aisasters
immediately stateside. As awareness of the Third World and their
problems grew, the public put increasing pressure on the foreign aid
community to respond.
The PVOs also were using the increased public awareness to their
advantage. During the 1970s, appeals during disasters allowed PVOs to
increase their visibility and image as effective people-to-people,
grassroots alternative for development as well as relief. In turn, the
donating public carefully scrutinized the effectiveness of these
agencies in times of disaster equating their performance with overall
agency effectiveness. Demonstrating their competence in relief was
critical for PVOs' organizational security, not to mention survival.
As a result of increasing importance of disaster projects, the PVOs
now devised a number of internal institutional arrangements.
Development PVOs formed new departments for disaster relief and their
"
6Six times more people died each year in natural disasters in the
1970s than the 1960s (Tinker and Philips 1986).
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importance within the organizations began to grow. However, it was rare
to find an agency in which the specialized units interacted much with
the mainstream development departments within the same agency. It was
even rarer to find a project manager in an agency that had both disaster
and development experience. The kind of disaster relief was still
primarily a logistics exercise delivering relevant materials, resources,
and expertise.
Curiously, although PVOs' institutional interests in development were
increasingly linked to disasters (visibility, image, and funding), the
agencies still did not make the programmatic link between the two. Even
development PVOs still handled relief as an altogether distinct aspect
of aid -- organizationally and programmatically. When, in the 1970s,
disaster research -- in particular, the work of the Marxists geographers
-- brought the relationship between development, vulnerability, and
disaster impact into the mainstream of thinking, PVOs continued to
provide disaster aid in the old way. It took a huge shock to the aid
community for them to reexamine their disaster practice.
At the end of 1984, world attention began to focus on a disaster
event of unprecedented proportions. In Africa, a famine was spreading
through the continent claiming the largest number of human lives since
World War II in Europe (Tinker and Philips 1986). As the enormous
proportions of the disaster became clear, the international community
mobilized to provide immediate aid to stem the rising tide of death.
The devastation and duration of the famine were overwhelming.
Battling a disaster of such magnitude and duration forced
practitioners to rethink the cause of such disasters -- focusing on
their relationship with development. Most importantly, they were forced
to rethink their own approaches to disaster practice. PVOs looked at
their efforts throughout the famine -- they were so busy meeting
emergency needs that they could not even begin to go after the
underlying problems of the continent which were causing the famine
itself. The problems were clearly linked to development which, unless
corrected, would insure the continuation of famines." PVOs asked
themselves how they could change the conditions which make people
vulnerable to disasters in the first place.
Similarly, they took a hard look at the purpose of providing disaster
relief. They asked themselves, as development agencies what was the
objective for their disaster assistance? What should be their role in
disaster response? How should they design their short-term emergency
actions to insure long-term rehabilitation and development that gets at
underlying vulnerabilities?
IV. Framing the Problem: The Separation of Disaster and Development Aid
The need for disaster assistance was clearly on the rise, PVOs were
responding to more disasters than the decade before, and with the famine
in Africa, the PVOs were dramatically faced with the urgency of getting
their houses in order. Their exploration of the questions surrounding
the link between disasters and development has shaped the PVO sector in
the 1980s. Cuny (1983) observes that,
371t was all to evident that Africa's process of development
neglected the agricultural sector upon which the majority of Africans
depend for their livelihood. Overcultivation, overgrazing and
deforestation resulted in desertification -- a position of extreme
environmental, economic, and social vulnerability. In these conditions
it only took the onset of the next drought, which are typical in the
drylands, to trigger the rolling famine.
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The growing awareness by volags of the connection between disaster
response and development is the single most important trend in
disaster programs today. More agencies are taking a hard look at
their performance and the relationship between their post-disaster
programs and longer-term development activities.
After the African famine of the 1980s, many PVOs began to revamp
their disaster programs to not simply relieve human suffering after
disasters, but also to reduce vulnerability to disasters in the first
place and to prepare prone communities to cope with them when they do
occur. Consensus grew that prevention, mitigation and preparedness were
the most appropriate points for which PVOs to enter to address the
disaster-development relationship.
Today, many agree that the major obstacle to taking this proactive
stance, and to effective disaster reduction assistance generally, is the
historical organizational and programmatic separation of disaster and
development aid itself. The institutions responsible for disaster
reduction policies do not connect with the development system in many
countries.
While the events in Africa provided a critical push, similar
imperatives to reduce the threat of disasters were arising from a broad
range of work settings. PVOs' concern for i) environmental impacts of
development, ii) their direct experience of the development setback
problem, iii) the concern for project sustainability, and finally, iv)
the soaring number of refugees worldwide who require permanent solutions
have all led practitioners to reexamine the link between their disaster
and development aid programs. We will look at each in turn.
Not just in the African famine but through their grassroots work
generally, PVOs have been keenly aware of the growing crisis of the
environment. This has been a particularly strong motivator for linking
disaster and development aid. The world's forests are rapidly
diminishing and, in many parts of the world, the lands are suffering
from catastrophic degradation of one sort or another. For those PVOs
working with the poor, it is very clear that the development problems of
the poor have intrinsic environmental aspects. Shortages of arable and
pasture land have caused over farming, decreasing productivity, and have
accelerated populations' move into ecologically fragile areas. The poor
have the weakest entitlement to land and other resources and, as a
result, they are the ones being pushed onto marginal lands and
contributing to environmental degradation (although they are often less
destructive than large commercial developers). In the 1980s, the global
community reached a turning point in its perception of the relationship
between environment, poverty, and economic development.38 With the
advent of the African famine, disasters were also added to this
equation.
PVOs, in particular, have been at the forefront of promoting
development approaches and technology that redress environmental
degradation and which are environmentally sustainable. For example,
PVOs have introduced more efficient stoves that reduce amount of fuel
wood needed to cook in rural areas throughout Latin America. Agencies
have worked with communities to plant fruit trees in hilly areas to
provide increased nutritional and economic resources while at the same
time to reduce soil erosion. A 1984 United Nations Environment
"The World Commission on Environment and Development published its
report, Our Common Future in 1987 which many have seen as a clear
indication of this turning point in world perception (Lewis 1988).
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Programme report praised PVOs as the most effective agencies in the
campaign against desertification.
During this decade, many PVOs saw their own brand of development
programs as the means to check environmental degradation. By doing so,
they would also be working to prevent and mitigate future disasters. In
tracing the causes of the African famine and the likely solutions, a
clear distinction was made between the kinds of development programs in
terms of their consequences for disasters. The large-scale, urban-based
development policy and projects were linked to environmental degradation
and the exacerbation of economic inequalities -- clearly part of the
problem. On the other hand, the small-scale, technologically
appropriate, grassroots projects undertaken by the PVOs in their
standard development programming were tackling the problems of poverty
and environmental degradation -- trying to change precisely those
conditions which make people more vulnerable to disasters.
Agencies have also struggled with the disaster-development
relationship in their other kinds of development projects. They
directly feel the negative impact that a disaster inflicts on their
existing development projects. Agencies commonly become involved in
disaster relief response in an area where they are already working (Cuny
1983). They do so in order to, among other reasons, protect (or
recuperate) development gains already made. However by responding, they
frequently have to divert human, financial, and organizational resources
away from ongoing development activities in order to meet the new set of
immediate demands. The agency's standard development program and
project goals are setback.
PVOs working in disaster prone areas also recognize the flip side of
the setback problem. Development projects that do not address the
population's fundamental position of vulnerability will themselves not
have any lasting impact. A development project is sustainable when it
can continue an appropriate level of benefits after the outside
intervention ends (USAID 1988). This is obviously jeopardized in areas
repeatedly suffering disasters. A housing program, for example, cannot
continue to render its stream of services if the project area is flooded
every year outstripping the community to cope.
For PVOs, sustainability is an important indicator of their projects'
effectiveness -- can an agency pull-out and leave beh.id a functioning,
self-reliant project or is the project dependent on the intervening
agency for its survival? Their experience in responding to disasters
are prompting agencies to examine how disasters affect their ability to
do sustainable development. Specifically, can agencies enhance broad-
based local participation and strong local institutional capacity -- two
important ingredients for sustainable projects. The IGO sector, which
increasingly evaluates PVO performance in order to provide them funding,
also uses project sustainability as an important measure of
effectiveness.
Finally, the growing crisis of refugees worldwide have encouraged aid
providers to look for ways to link emergency relief with "durable
solutions". While statistics are notoriously unreliable, estimates of
refugees world wide put the number around 15 million (The Economist
1989). Their sheer numbers reflect the fact that refugees can no longer
be seen as a transient phenomenon. Already by the early 1980s, many
were arguing that aid "solutions" had to go beyond short-term relief to
long-term development programs to help refugees gain a self-reliant
existence, whether they are resettled back home or in a new place
(UNHCR/ILO 1982).
To compound the crisis, the growth of refugees is taking place in the
least developed nations, most are in Asia and Africa. UNHCR reported in
1987/88 that,
a majority of the countries listed as least developed (less than
US$400 per capita GDP) are, or recently have been, involved in
refugee or refugee-like situations as sources, sanctuaries or
both.
Mostly of rural origins, the refugees flee to similar areas in the
receiving countries where the majority of the population is already
living in conditions of poverty -- poor areas receiving poor refugees.
A massive influx of refugees often has tremendous social and economic
impact on the receiving population.
In these settings, the objective of "durable solutions" is an issue
of poverty alleviation and integrated development for both refugees and
the host country. Refugee assistance cannot be effectively provided in
isolation from development assistance. Practitioners have consistently
argued that income-generating schemes and resettlement projects targeted
for refugees have to be integrated into the ongoing development of the
region for them to work.
Since the early 1980s, concerns over the skyrocketing costs of
handling the growing numbers of refugees, the large donors looked
increasingly to the PVO sector as implementing partners." In doing
resettlement projects with refugees, PVOs face another set of
"Kent 1987 notes that in 1981 the first International Conference
on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA I) was an important shift to
the recognition and reliance on PVOs.
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development implications of relief assistance. Particularly in
situations in which relief aid is comprehensive and prolonged, a
relationship of dependency between the agency and the refugees often
develops. The dependency relationship has many manifestations in the
context of these projects -- the expectation of indefinite donations and
reluctance to participate on the part of refugees and paternalistic
assistance on the part of the aid agency. While dependency is a very
complex topic and often contradictory in its usage as a term,
practitioners have said "it is a visible factor" and one that must be
dealt with by PVOs initiating income-generation and resettlement schemes
with refugees (Anderson and Woodrow 1989; Rolfe et al, 1987; Cuny 1983;
AFSC 1982) .4
Through their prolonged work with refugees, PVOs recognized that "the
way [in which] relief assistance is provided influences the settlement
initiatives of the refugees and their further integration process"
(Apfel 1987). They faced the need to develop effective strategies to
phase their relief into development assistance.
From the above it is clear that PVOs have faced the intersection of
relief and development aid in a wide variety of settings and have had to
cope with the issues within each. The position that the PVOs occupy in
disasters has allowed them to be important innovators during the 1980s.
For policy-makers, the PVO sector has generated valuable experience for
how to approach the disaster-development connection in practice.
In the next chapter, we will review the different approaches that the
PVO sector take to integrate disaster and development assistance. But
"'The dependency relationship is dealt with in detail in Chapter 8.
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first, we will briefly describe the present constellation of actors that
make up the disaster response network. Despite efforts to the contrary,
the loosely functioning disaster response network has made little
progress on coordinating disaster with development aid in practice.
V. The Present Institutional Setting of Disaster Assistance"
A. The Donors
Today, a wide range of actors provide assistance in times of
disaster. By far the most critical actors are the governments and
organizations of the affected countries themselves. They are
responsible for disaster prevention and mitigation, they are the first
on the scene when disaster strikes, and they bear primary responsibility
for relief operations. They also provide more resources to the relief
effort than do foreign donors -- about two to one more resources (Kent
1987; Brown 1979).
In this overview of foreign disaster assistance, however, we focus on
international donors -- of primary interest is the private voluntary
sector, but much larger in terms of resources transferred are foreign
governments and intergovernmental organizations. These foreign donors
interact with a wide range of actors within the affected country,
including the national and local government and quasi-governmental
organizations, indigenous PVOs and, of course, the affected communities
themselves.
Donor governments provide, by far, the largest amount of foreign
relief assistance coming from the outside. The USAID Office of Foreign
"This section is drawn primarily from Green (1977), Brown (1979),
Kent (1983 and 1987), and Macalister-Smith (1985).
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Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is the world's largest donor and is
authorized to donate up to $3 million for any single disaster and, if
need be, can go to congress for additional appropriations."'
Nevertheless, the U.S. government takes great pains to see that disaster
relief is kept separate from development assistance. Although within
USAID, the OFDA is its own office. Disaster aid is limited in terms of
amount and the time period; its use is carefully stipulated for relief
only. Since the early 1970s, the OFDA has also been involved in
emergency preparedness and prevention activities as well as disaster
response."' They work closely with other disaster organizations and, in
the case of emergency, channel funds and materials directly to the
governments of the affected country as well as through IGOs and PVOs.
Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) include a range of
organizations. Regional and economic groups often play a part in
disaster relief, such as the European Community, the Organization of
African Unity, Pan-Caribbean Disaster Preparedness and Prevention
Project, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The
development planning and financing institutions, such as the World Bank,
will also often play a role in disaster reconstruction. However, the
United Nations (UN) organizations are by far the most active and
"Aid provided by governments is always seen to have some political
implications, especially when it is direct government-to-government
transfers. The U.S. government often supports friendly governments with
aid while bypassing unfriendly governments. Also, disasters provide
another way for supporting U.S. producers through food subsidies and
technology sent for relief. These have been documented extensively. To
lesson some of the political implications, governments will channel
funds through the IGOs and directly to the implementing PVOs.
"'The OFDA was instrumental in organizing the different disaster
preparedness projects (notable in the Caribbean) as well as funding
training in emergency management throughout the world.
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pervasive. In times of disaster, there are at least 16 U.N. agencies
which can become involved in disaster relief activities -- for example,
there is UNHCR, UNDRO, UNICEF, FAO, WHO, ILO.
The IGOs do not usually directly distribute relief on site, but
rather channel resources to those working on the ground (recipient
government officials and voluntary organizations). Compared to
bilateral aid, the financial contributions of most IGOs to relief are
relatively small. IGOs are also known to be slow to respond in
emergencies, encumbered by their bureaucracies." They are often
accused of being overly concerned with their own institutional interests
rather than those of the affected." To their advantage, however, IGOs
have the very important element of "access". They are usually familiar
with conditions of the country (resources, infrastructure, operations)
from existing working relationship with government which can be used to
their advantage in a disaster response. The host government also knows
the IGOs and will call upon them for aid when disaster strikes. They
have often played the role of "lead agency" coordinating to various
degrees foreign relief assistance.
The IGOs still predominantly respond with disaster assistance only
after an event. UNDRO and UNHCR respond with humanitarian relief aid
during the emergency period. The World Bank is an important provider of
"However, UNICEF, whose mandate does not require it to seek the
approval of member governments to intervene, can often take quicker
initiative than other IGOs.
"In particular, the U.N. system encounters special problems that
make it difficult for its different agencies to act cooperatively or
with a common voice. Their uncertain mandates and the inconsistent use
of U.N. agencies by governments has led to competition and rivalry
between the agencies (Kent 1987).
reconstruction and rehabilitation aid after the emergency period which
is critical for recovery. Over the years, the Bank has moved to include
economic, as well as physical, recovery projects. In general, these
development planning and financing institutions, however, are still
reluctant to deal with disaster management (prevention, mitigation) on a
non-crisis basis. Although some funds recently have been made available
for longer-term prevention activities," the funds are scarce and most
come not from the mainstream development agencies, but from humanitarian
assistance agencies (Kreimer and Zador 1989).
The number and variety of PVOs providing disaster aid, as mentioned
earlier, has increased tremendously since the War. iney provide the
least amount of resources of the above donors but the total amount that
the PVO sector provides to a given disaster is significant and are
critical actors for the reasons outlined earlier. An intervening PVO
may often both fund others' operations and/or implement its own relief
project on the ground. In disasters which often represent delicate
political situations, PVOs are often seen as taking an independent
stance and working directly with people rather than governments
(although this is frequently not the case in reality).
The Red Cross is the principle PVO network for mobilizing and
distributing international assistance in times of disaster. However,
unlike the Red Cross, most PVOs are primarily involved in development
"Most notably (from Kreimer and Zador 1989): After the 1985
earthquake in Mexico, the World Bank's Earthquake Rehabilitation and
Reconstruction Project was allocated to prevention and mitigation
activities -- namely, seismic engineering research and a program for the
structural reinforcement of schools and health care facilities subject
to earthquakes. The World Bank's La Paz Municipal Development Project
(1987) allocated one third of the funds to mitigate landslides and
floods which had been plaguing that city for centuries.
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programs and disaster relief is only one component of their work.
During the last fifteen years or so, PVOs have developed specializations
in their disaster response. CARE, for example, is well known for its
logistics ability in handling large scale food distributions. Oxfam is
noted for its clean water schemes and camp operations and Save The
Children for their expertise in dealing with problems faced by children.
Others are known for their work and disaster technology in particular
sectors such as housing or agriculture. In addition to emergency relief
and reconstruction, PVOs also are increasingly involved in emergency
preparedness activities.
B. The Foreign Disaster Assistance Community
Many analysts throughout the last twenty years have attempted to
bring some coherence to the actions of this group of actors providing
disaster relief. Many hoped to form an "international disaster relief
system" in the 1970s, arguing that there was at least some potential to
respond to disasters in a coordinate and predictable manner (Kent 1983;
Cuny 1983; Brown 1979; Green 1977). But by the end of the 1980s
analysts have largely accepted that what they have is not a formal
system, but rather a loose "network" of actors whose disaster response
is still largely lacking coordination, reliability, and formality.
During the 1960s, the international response to disasters was almost
without exception uncoordinated, ad hoc response of a large number of
donor agencies of great variety. There were very few links between PVOs
and government donors for funding disaster response. PVOs maintained
little contact with each other during disaster relief operations," nor
did they coordinate funding appeals or logistical arrangements.
Governments of affected countries -- even those of disaster prone
countries -- rarely had disaster or emergency plans or any kind of
planning mechanisms.
However, the large number and variety of actors responding in any
given disaster and the growing awareness of the inappropriate and highly
politicized nature of the relief being provided spawned an effort to
improve relief aid and its coordination." During the 1970s, the media,
interests groups as well as recipient governments levied intense
pressure on the foreign aid community to improve its provision of
relief. The U.N. and its major agencies received much of the attention
and they undertook considerable organizational changes--creating
specialized units or departments to deal solely with disaster relief,
preparedness, and prevention. Most importantly, the United Nations
Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO) was created in 1971.
PVOs also began to rethink their isolated approach to disaster
relief. During the 1970s, they too created international, regional, and
domestic coordinating mechanisms for their disaster aid. The
International Council of Voluntary Agencies created the Voluntary Agency
Steering Committee in 1972 to help coordinate the international relief
response and information sharing of the major private voluntary groups.
"'The League of Red Cross Societies were an exception. Early on,
they provided information to The International Council of Voluntary
Agencies (a clearing house for PVOs).
"In the late 1960s early 1970s, a string of severe disasters
captured the attention of the First World which, among other things,
revealed that the international aid community was unprepared and
unsophisticated in its disaster response.
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IGOs also began to coordinate disaster relief with the PVOs during the
1970s -- the League of the Red Cross and UNDRO, for example, have worked
out a rather effective coordinating arrangement. These mechanisms
reflected the sector's recognition that coordination is an important
aspect of effective relief.
However, into the 1980s effective coordination of relief response
proved to be generally difficult and efforts to do so inevitably fell
short of their goals. No actor is free from contending pressures that
influence their ability to structure their response. Extreme logistical
conditions are characteristic of disaster situations which make it
difficult to pool information or resources. Deep organizational
differences along the lines of agency priorities, mandates, and
approaches have kept many agencies at arms length from each other.
Coordination between the PVOs has been particularly difficult because of
their fund raising need to differentiate themselves from the pack.""
Sometimes the lack of exchange between actors in the same disaster is
simply a result of the low priority that different agencies give to
liaison relationships. On the ground, however, PVOs will more often
form coordinating groups especially if there is a permanent field
personnel; these, however, tend to be ephemeral. In 1987, Kent
concluded that,
the myriad of actors with relief roles could not easily be honed
into a system, either informal or formal. The diversity of
interests and approaches alone meant that greater systematization
was an elusive if not impossible goal.
"Many PVOs appeal to the same general donor public for funding.
This competition at the coffers is not conducive for collaboration on
site. Some PVOs, however, have managed to get together to make joint
appeals after a disaster and to agree on the use of the collected funds.
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Today, while foreign disaster aid frequently suffers from the
difficulties described above, the efforts to coordinate have produced an
institutional network of sorts which has reduced much of the duplication
and haphazardness characteristic of disaster aid through the early
1970s. The IGOs have stockpiled emergency materials indifferent regions
of the world for faster response; governments are establishing and
reinforcing national emergency plans. With the shift towards disaster
prevention and preparedness, disaster experts have developed new
technologies and mechanisms for improving disaster response. The
governments of the affected countries, rather than the international
community itself, have often proven to be the best coordinators of
disaster relief (Kent 1987; Franklin 1985).
PVOs have come a long way from the kind of disaster assistance that
they provided during the post-World War II era. Their experience with
environmental deterioration, refugees, and disasters have led them to
recognize the need to act pro-actively and to address the underlying
disaster vulnerabilities. The loosely functioning disaster response
network, however, has made only limited progress on the issue of
integrating with development aid. The next chapter reviews the efforts
in this area.
CHAPTER 3
Practice: Integrating Disaster and Development Aid Programs
We have seen both the theoretical and practical reasons for
integrating the two aid types in the previous two chapters. A new
consensus among disaster experts has emerged which recognizes that it is
people, in the way they deal with the environment and structure their
social and economic systems, who actually create conditions for disaster
agents to do damage. Similarly, researchers agree that development is
no longer accepted as the force which will inherently reduce a
population's vulnerability to disasters; its potential for increasing
the risks of disaster is also recognized. That is, populations are at
risk because of a number of factors inherent in certain development
processes, like population growth, land-use, and technology.
In practice too, aid providers can no longer afford to ignore
disaster vulnerabilities which untreated insure the continuance of
disasters and which threaten the sustainability of their development
programs. They now argue that in order to effectively address both
emergency needs and the long-term risk-generating factors, they must
integrate these objectives in operations.
This chapter will examine what we know about institutional efforts to
integrate disaster and development aid programs on the ground. Although
a topic of discussion for some time, efforts have been spotty and
evaluation of experience equally so. This chapter, therefore, seeks to
fill in our knowledge about disaster-development practice.
This chapter then first identifies the integration efforts, both PVO
and others, that are currently taking place in two instances -- before
and after disasters." Then, through the review of a selection of cases
of PVO programs, this chapter makes a preliminary mapping of disaster-
development linking efforts in the post-disaster period. While not
meant to be definitive, this typology is the first of its kind and
attempts to identify both overall linking approaches and the important
components in the link. The typology will raise issues that will be
explored in detail throughout the remainder of the dissertation using
the central case study of Armero, Colombia.
By examining practice, this research finds that there is in fact a
specific stage that aid agencies manage, the transition stage, to phase
relief into development. This stage entails management strategies,
programs, and agency-beneficiary relations. Post-disaster programs
moving to development also encounter a variety of recurring problems or
obstacles with which they must cope; these too will be outlined.
Despite their efforts, the present research confirms others'
observations that few agencies have successfully resolved the issue of
linking. Our mapping of practice, however, provides us with the
starting point for evaluating what may be viable approaches to the
integration of disaster and development aid in the PVO sector.
"No attempt is made to evaluate how widespread their use is,
however. Indeed, the starting point is that integration of disaster and
development aid is still the exception rather than the rule.
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I. Integrating Disaster and Development Assistance
Institutional and program approaches to disaster response have
artificially and unnecessarily separated the two aid types over the
years. Hay (1986) asserts that "...the arbitrary divisions between
relief and development assistance are unhelpful in practice...".
Kibreab (1987) calls the separation of relief and development assistance
a "false dichotomy" perpetuated by institutional jurisdictions. Cuny
(1983) asserts that aid providers have missed important opportunities to
use relief to aid development. As a result of the separation, the move
from relief to broader and longer-term development programs, in many
cases, has simply not been made (Kent 1987; Sommer 1977).
More disaster and development professionals are arguing that there is
no reason that disaster relief should be artificially separated from
development objectives and continue to have negative developmental
impact. Unlike the critical perspective, practitioners argue that there
is nothing inherently evil about outside assistance. A major thrust of
their work explores how to restructure both disaster and long-term
development aid to mutually support each other in order to reduce
vulnerability to disasters. There are two instances in which PVOs
attempt to integrate -- before and after disasters.
A. Pre-Disaster Integration
Before a disaster happens, development programs in hazard prone areas
include components which prevent, prepare for, and mitigate disaster
impacts. For example, the Organization of American States (OAS)
incorporates hazard assessment and mitigation into some of their
regional development plans. They have also placed disaster specialists
in development planning (Bender 1989). The World Bank, too, has
recently included a mitigation component in a non-emergency municipal
development project in La Paz, Bolivia. The Bank has also given
"freestanding" disaster mitigation loans to Mexico to address a range of
their disaster risks which form part of their country portfolio of
loans. The regional and intergovernmental organizations have been
relative late comers to disaster-related development aid."1
The private voluntary organizations, on the other hand, have long
been involved in disaster-related development, even before these
projects were called such. As mentioned earlier, they have worked with
communities to reforest lands, terrace erosion areas, introduce more
efficient wood burning stoves, educate farmers about environmentally
sound agricultural practices and food storage schemes, implement rural
water resource projects in drought prone areas, and encourage local
saving societies to mention just a few of the kinds of development
projects that have disaster mitigation objectives. Many small- and
medium-scale projects were not targeted at economic growth (like the
larger IGO projects) but rather emphasized social and economic security.
The PVO sector has also led other institutions in their recognition
of the affected communities as important resources in times of disaster.
Traditional forms of mutual self-help, leadership, and social
organization are all mechanisms that communities use to cope with
hardship and stress. In their non-emergency projects, many PVOs seek to
strengthen communities' capabilities prior to a disaster as a proactive
"These institutions are, at the same time, watching keenly that
the disaster mitigation components do not replace existing development
funds destined for new investments.
strategy to mitigate disaster impact and to aid recovery (Anderson and
Woodrow 1989; Sykes 1989).
B. Post-Disaster Integration
After disasters, there seem to be two major approaches to promote the
linking of relief and development assistance in use. The first approach
reorients relief itself -- what and how it is provided -- in order to
bring it into line with development objectives. The approach downplays
the distinction between stages after a disaster and argues that
"development principles" can be introduced from the very beginning. As
Cuny (1983) notes,
It should be clear now that relief and reconstruction programs
cannot be viewed or carried out as separate or distinct
operations. They must be conducted in the same manner as
development programs.
The reorientation of relief represents a major break from the
traditional way relief has been provided in the immediate post-war
period -- a logistics approach that was invasive, pervasive, and devoid
of beneficiary participation. Instead, this new focus for disaster
relief is in accordance with development objectives. Relief aid,
delivered in a fashion that "builds on local resources and capabilities,
reinforces local decision-making power, and is sensitive to indigenous
social structure and culture", can encourage development later (Snow
1987). Operationally, this usually means that post-disaster
interventions must include beneficiary participation in relief (needs
assessment, administration, and evaluation) and long-term objectives
from the project's initiation.
Reoriented (or, "development-oriented") relief, then, has moved away
from its top-down, logistics approach. The amount of aid needed has
been reassessed downwards in most cases. Technology which is more
appropriate for third world settings and for project sustainability has
been introduced. The collected experience of reorienting relief to
support subsequent development has been growing (Anderson and Woodrow
1989; Apfel 1987; Rolfe et al., 1987; Cuny 1985; Reiff 1985; Bates 1982;
UNHCR/ILO 1982).
Related to reorienting relief, this first approach also advocates
integrating development objectives into disaster recovery programs. For
example, a project which not only restores but also improves irrigation
and food storage infrastructure to redress the vulnerabilities revealed
by the disaster. These intermediate programs resembie the pre-disaster
integration efforts mentioned above, but are shorter in duration and
specifically linked with reconstruction activities. They also advocate
the incorporation of disaster prevention and mitigation into development
programs. In general, evidence suggests that these adjustments have
made relief aid more appropriate, less dependency generating, and more
complementary to the development programs that may follow.
The second approach -- and the subject of this thesis -- to promote
the integration of disaster and development assistance complements the
reoriented relief approach. This second one is the creation of
institutional arrangements for making the transition from relief to
disaster-resistant development." Disasters provide the momentum to
revamp out-dated institutional arrangements -- specifically, to overcome
"Sometimes PVOs do not want to link their relief programs with
longer-term development programs because to do so is outside of their
agency's mandate (as in a strictly relief agency) or the situation
simply may not warrant it (the affected population is managing its own
recovery and sufficiently accessing resources). These situations, while
not infrequent in disasters, are not our present concern.
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institutional jurisdictions in order to manage overlapping
responsibilities from the short- to long-term disaster reduction
activities. PVOs use programs, management strategies, and relationships
with beneficiaries and the host State to shift the disaster response to
development.
This second approach is receiving much less research attention.
There is no comprehensive look at how PVOs make the program transition
after disasters nor at what the process itself entails. Project reports
and academic writings are littered only with fragmentary references to
linking. Rolfe et al. (1987), for example, have collected and
catalogued some data on how PVOs use income-generation projects with
refugees to bridge from relief to development. Cuny (1983) observed
that some PVOs use relief assistance as a way to gain a presence on the
scene, to then introduce their longer-term programs.
Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have been looking into how to
integrate emergency and development assistance. The Technical Support
Service of UNHCR, for example, has promoted activities that link refugee
aid to development programs since 1985. They have been exploring inter-
agency means for doing so, such as doing joint projects with development
agencies in several countries. Another of their models involves "the
expansion of development projects which previously took no account of
refugees to benefit the latter, with UNHCR raising the funds for the
refugee component." (UNHCR 1987/1988)
Overall, the literature's treatment of institutional linking models
has left many questions unanswered. For example, a recent book reviews
different approaches to disaster assistance and suggests that some may
offer "a viable model for linking emergency relief with development"
(Anderson and Woodrow 1989). The authors reference a particular example
in which the "viable model" included the implementation of a sequence of
post-disaster programs -- leading from the most temporary, interim
programs, to medium-term "disaster prevention programs" (which greatly
resembled integrated rural development projects) and, finally, to
longer-term governmental development programs. The programs appeared to
target the same geographical region. The authors suggested in passing
that one viable linking model would be this progression of projects
within one region.
This example, however, did not evaluate in any detail its proposed
model for linking. Like the literature generally, tnis case begs a
number of questions. Can we say that "viable linking" is one in which
an agency's portfolio shifts from mostly relief projects to mostly
development projects? Or, should the project participants move to a
development program be the variable defining affective linking? Does
the fact that the emergency, medium-term, and long-term projects are
contiguous with one another signal that integration of disaster and
development objectives has taken place? Or, does linking imply some
kind of coordination and interaction between? What are the problems
that these post-disaster integration efforts commonly meet, and how do
programs overcome them?
Important answers to these questions are to be found on the ground,
in the arena of implementation. The transition is not solely a question
of institutional coordination, as the literature at times seems to
imply. From our review of post-disaster programs, we find that PVOs use
programs and management strategies, and the relationships with their
program participants and the host government in different ways in order
to institutionally link aid programs and to insure the transition from
disaster response to development.
We now turn to a characterization of what is involved in the
disaster-development linking process generally and, from our review of
PVO practice, of what are the components of such a linking.
II. Institutional Approaches to Disaster-Development Linking Process
Agencies which intervene after a disaster make a number of decisions
about when to intervene and what kind of aid to provide. Equally
important, they also define how to integrate objectives and insure the
move to the development programs after relief. They are faced with a
wide array of implementation questions. They must decide if they will
meet the variety of needs that are found in the disaster aftermath or
concentrate their efforts in one sector. The relationship between
activities must also be defined -- whether to closely build development
out of their earlier disaster programs, for example. With many felt
needs of the affected populations, PVOs must decide whether to
concentrate their efforts with a particular group of beneficiaries or
geographic area. Do they sequence their own programs from the most
temporary and interim to more permanent activities or do they coordinate
with other programs? In answering issues like these, agencies define
post-disaster approaches to link emergency aid to development programs.
The point at which agencies ought best to phase-out relief is rarely
clear. Although agencies know that they ought to limit the duration of
relief, at what point is relief best stopped? Do they just stop after
some arbitrary amount of time? Although somewhat harsh, it is argued,
this kind of "jolt" may be the best way to encourage aid recipients to
speed up their own recovery efforts and/or to return to traditional
coping strategies. Or, do they phase-out relief only after certain
recovery trends and programs have "taken hold"? Proponents of this view
argue that until people are able to return to work and permanent
solutions, such as housing, are in place, that cutting off relief is not
only inhumane but also counterproductive.
Still, neither approach provides precise indicators for when to stop
relief and both belie the very strong pressures that agencies often face
to continue relief assistance. Moreover, the wrong choice may have some
alarming results. Introducing development criteria too early may render
both the relief and development aid ineffectual and even damaging (Rolfe
et al. 1987). Prolonging relief wastes valuable resources and
encourages dependency (Cuny 1983).
These examples of the implementation issues that PVOs must face in
order to move from relief to development underscore the importance of
understanding the mechanics -- the "how to" -- of making the transition.
They must determine how program and administrative arrangements will
begin to meet development objectives. Are relief activities built-upon
or themselves remodelled into development programs? How does the
management of the project change to support new programs? How will the
beneficiaries' organization and the relationship with the agency
translate from relief to development? What relationships external to
the project -- for example, with the state, other PVOs, and development
trends -- need to be established or transformed to permit the programs
or their benefits to be sustainable?
This transition is an issue which few aid organizations have
successfully resolved. However, they have been attempting to do it,
even if in an ad hoc manner much of the time. The objective of the
present focus on the institutional mechanisms for linking aid is to
begin to fill the gaps in this area of disaster literature. The
remainder of this chapter, therefore, is concerned with first order of
exploratory research -- the identification and categorization of PVO
linking practice.
A. Models and Scenarios
We draw a preliminary mapping of PVO practice which characterizes
four linking models. These models include the different arrangements of
assistance, as indicated by the circles below, arranged across the post-
disaster stages from emergency to development. Each assistance circle
may include different kinds of programs, management strategies, and
relationships. The intersection of these circles indicates
institutional areas where assistance overlap with each other and what is
referred here as institutional linking. Alongside these models are
included short vignettes of actual post-disaster programs drawn from the
literature.
The present mapping may refer to post-disaster programs in which a
single agency does both relief and development programs as well as to
cases in which more than one agency is involved.
- The Multiple Program Approach
The PVO undertakes a number of different activities/programs in the
affected area after the disaster in order to meet a variety of post-
disaster needs. The agency provides emergency relief as well as stop-
gap recovery programs and, eventually, longer-term deveiopment
programs." These programs do not deliberately complement or supplement
each other, although there may be some overlap of beneficiaries or
implementation period. Although contiguous programs, the phase-out of
relief is not coordinated with phase-in of other programs.
Example 1": In the wake of the disaster in Armero, Colombia,
Catholic Relief Services responded with much needed emergency assistance
-- medicine, clothing, personal hygiene supplies, and food -- to many of
the camps and shelters in the Armero Valley. A bit later, CRS also
implemented some interim programs that included the creation of short-
term paid activities (tree planting and cleaning parks) and well-
digging. The idea of these programs was to aid communities until their
usual water supplies were restored and villagers could find permanent
income sources (or they were restored or created). For the longer-
"The different post-disaster programs will be defined later in
this chapter.
"Adapted from Anderson and Woodrow (1989).
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term, CRS began a variety of development projects which included, among
others, the construction of housing and the funding of small-scale
enterprise development (loans, training, revolving funds). All these
programs were undertaken in different localities throughout the Diocese
of Ibagu6 which included the city of Ibagud, the Armero Valley, and some
mountain communities above the Valley.
Examle 2": After the earthquake in Guatemala in 1976, outside PV0s
flooded the affected areas. The Salvation Army distributed free food.
The American Red Cross and the Mennonites constructed over 10,000
temporary houses for disaster victims. World Neighbors initiated a
lamina (roofing) program that subsidized the sale of roofing materials
and provided training and technical assistance for anti-seismic
construction techniques. All four agencies implemented their programs
through local grassroots organizations with some overlapping of
geographical area and implementation periods.
- Integrated Relief and Recovery Approach
relief overy) development
The agency does both emergency relief to meet immediate needs and
recovery programs at the same time, side by side, with the same
beneficiaries. The agency does not follow its disaster intervention
"Adapted from Bates et al. (1982).
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with any specific development program or attempt to channel their
efforts into other development plans. Rather, through its relief and
recovery programs the PVO hopes to set up the appropriate environment
and infrastructure conducive for development activities to take off.
Example 1": Catholic Relief Services in Thailand was asked to
manage health care provision for the Greenhill Site B refugee camp. CRS
stressed prevention and public health education in addition to the
traditional curative medical services. During their stay in the camp,
some residents were trained as health workers and the medical center was
staffed with Khmer personnel, with CRS doctors playing a supportive
role. There was no provision made to have these trained Khmer health
workers to join specific long-term program upon their departure from
camps. However, they will take their skills with them when they return
to Kampuchea.
Example 2": In 1979/1980, over one million refugees entered Somalia
from Ethiopia, most ending up in thirty-five refugee camps. The
American Friends Service Committee and Quaker Peace Service (British
Quakers) were invited to implement a "flexible development program" in
one of the refugee camps (Daray Macaane) in Northwest Somalia. The
program encouraged income generation projects, including individual
gardens and a small business loan and assistance scheme. The program
focused on interim projects to supplement aid received in the camp and
skills that the refugees could take with them when they left the camps
to resettle.
"Adapted from Anderson and Woodrow (1989).
"Adapted from Rolfe et al. (1987).
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- Integrated Recovery and Development Approach
The PVO responds with recovery programs with the explicit intent of
incorporating them into broader development programs which include
disaster-related components. This emphasis does not build on relief
efforts in the area (theirs or anybody else's).
This is the most common kind of linking used by development agencies
whose mandates do not include disaster relief. It has, however, been
used mostly for the physical realm of disaster reconstruction.
Exaple 1": In late 1884, CARE began to distribute food in
Kordofan, one of the largest regions of Sudan in response to the urgent
needs of the famine (1983-1985). They also operated a supplementary
feeding program for pregnant and lactating women and children under
five, a high-risk group. In the midst of their relief project, CARE
began thinking about the long-term environmental factors that had
brought on the current drought and famine. By the end of 1985, they had
designed and begun implementation of an agroforestry extension program
with the Forestry Department of Sudan (Ministry of Agriculture and
Natural Resources) to halt continued desertification and to restore the
viability of agricultural activities in Kordofan.
"Adapted from Anderson and Woodrow (1989).
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Example 2": As a result of the 1973 drought in Mali, five thousand
people sought refuge in a government relief camp in the town of Goundam.
By 1974, several thousand refugees still remained in the camps; they
were primarily nomadic herders who were unable to reinstate their former
lifestyle. An agricultural resettlement project -- a new village named
Tin Aicha -- was begun with 100 nomad families on land granted by the
local commandant on the shore of Lake Faguibine. The American Friends
Service Committee (AFSC) was asked to support the work of other Malian
groups by "provid[ing] technical assistance and funds for community
projects" in the new village. AFSC worked in the community through
1980.
- Shaping Development out of Relief Approach
relie recqvey) development
The PVO initiates its relief response with the specific motive of
beginning a particular development project. Relief activities are
transformed into standard development programs and the beneficiaries of
the relief program move along into the longer-term programs too. This
approach is essentially a linear process -- it builds on a single
"Adapted from AFSC (1982).
project and location, rather than many different projects and/or
localities."
Example 1: After the Armero disaster, Save The Children set up an
emergency camp for survivors. The camp provided its residents with
shelter, food, water, medical care, and soon initiated small income
earning activities. Three months later, the agency bought a farm and
hired permanent staff with development expertise who consolidated plans
to implement with camp residents an integrated recovery project.
Six months after establishing the camp, they began transforming the
temporary relief and recovery measures into long-term, self-help
programs -- an income generation program, housing, education, and
primary health care programs were all initiated.
Example 26': In Santo Domingo, Philippines, the Volcano erupted
endangering a number of villages targeted for work by the International
Institute of Rural Reconstruction (IIRR). The IIRR rerouted their newly
trained "rural reconstruction facilitators" (RRFs), initially scheduled
to begin community development work in the villages, to live in the
evacuation centers and work as part of the disaster response team of the
municipality as "action coordinators". While not participating in the
distribution of material relief supplies, the RRFs worked in the
organization of the residents. The RRFs saw that the centers were
organized according to village, they consulted the residents and helped
"A slight variation on the above is when the agency has a
development project in an area when disaster strikes. In response, the
agency adds a relief component to its ongoing project. When disaster
passes, the agency phases out the relief and returns to its original
development project, perhaps with some new disaster-related components
added.
6'Adapted from Anderson and Woodrow (1989).
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them form groups to maintain the evacuation centers and to solve
immediate needs. After three months, the people returned to their
villages and the RRFs also went to the villages to begin their original
tasks of community development. They formed interest groups in their
villages and began simple projects that had rapid success.
Example 3": Three different PVOs were working with cereal banks in
many small villages in Burkina Faso to develop community capacity to
manage their own food security. When the drought of the early 1980s
struck, the long-term viability of the cereal banks was threatened, and
relief grain was necessary to both thwart the immediate threat of famine
and to safeguard the development gains that had been made.
The cereal banks responded to the crisis in a number of different
ways. Some became conduits for relief grain donated from the outside
(by the government, international donors, PVOs) to the villages at risk,
others took their own funds and bought extra grain from outside sources
to loan to their villagers, others provided free assistance from their
"solidarity funds" to those in need, and still others received donations
of grain to replenish their stocks as the drought passed. After the
drought passed, the cereal banks returned to their usual food security
(development) function.
The above modeling of practice depicts a range of solutions which
PVOs have devised to move to development after disasters. Some agencies
begin sooner than others and emphasize either the earlier or later
programs. Some stress recovery activities and their incorporation into
"
2Adapted from Anderson and Woodrow (1989).
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development programs, while others stress the more immediate relief and
intermediate, stop-gap recovery needs. Some agencies more closely
coordinate their aid programs, having the earlier programs complement
and supplement the following ones, while others address needs as they
present themselves in the post-disaster situation gradually shifting to
all development programs. Different funding arrangements are also
reflected; an agency may undertake recovery programs as part of their
existing relief or development programs or in addition to them, with
extra funds.
B. Central Components of Institutional Linking
Our review of post-disaster programs also uncovered that PVOs use
different mechanisms to link programs. These components can be grouped
roughly into three program elements: 1) programs (type and use), 2)
management strategies (internal organizational arrangements and external
relationships), and 3) the relationship between agency and the program
participants. Below, we will outline these components.
Activities/programs: It is the replacement of temporary projects
with permanent solutions which is the link to development programs. A
common example is the agency that provides tents during the emergency
and then introduces a housing program in the development stage.
Agencies with specific expertise -- like housing or health -- tend to
follow this model. Other agencies may work in multiple sectors and
transform their activities from temporary to durable solutions.
Programs also overlap each other in implementation periods -- ie. the
phasing in of recovery and development programs before the finish of the
relief programs. The programs may not be targeting the same
beneficiaries, however.
For a single agency, this overlap of programs can be conceptualized
as a "portfolio" of aid programs meeting the variety of needs in a post-
disaster situation. The agency, over time, changes its portfolio from
doing more relief programs to more development programs. The link is
the replacement of various temporary measures with permanent solutions,
and the transformation of others into development programs.
Management arrangements: The institutional infrastructure set during
the relief response takes on the planning and implementation of the
development programs, thereby providing the link between the two aid
types. For example, some relief programs may use local staff,
decentralized decision-making, longer time scale and runding period.
This kind of management structure can lead the shift to new development
tasks. Or, an agency may set about to change their more traditional,
logistics management arrangements in order to take on longer-term
programs.
The agency may also manage its external relationships -- that is,
with public and private efforts -- to link with longer-term resources
and to shift to sustainable development benefits. Or, the PVO may
target their programs to benefit both victims and other area populations
in the affected region. This shared relationship with the affected
region provides the link between the two programs. Some disaster and
development programs are suitably targeted at regions rather than
individual beneficiaries because they provide social goods -- such as
regional infrastructure.
Relationship with beneficiaries: Here, it is the PVO's relationship
with the relief beneficiaries which provides the link. For example,
village leaders and community committees work with an agency in
different programs. It is the relationship or association established
with the community during the relief response bridges into development
programs.
In other cases, the program participants themselves may move (either
individually or in groups) to durable solutions. A program that
resettles refugees from camps to agricultural settlements would fall
here, for example.
In sum, then, the components that PVOs use to bridge the gap may be a
contiguous meeting of programs in the same region or with the same
general population; the disaster-related activities themselves are
transformed or built upon into permanent solutions or sustainable
programs; the agency's administration and management established the
program's presence in the area and serves the short-term to long-term
objectives; and finally, the beneficiaries themselves move between
programs, or they provide the organization and relationship to work into
development programs. More common than any single linking component is
the combination of these linking components; disaster assistance may
link with development through the institutional infrastructure,
relationship with program participants, and its programs elements.
III. What is a viable linking approach?
A. From Linking Patterns to Effective Linking Strategies
Broadly speaking, linking disaster with development programs consists
of shifting programs from short-term, temporary measures meeting
immediate needs to programs which would provide permanent solutions to
long-term needs with the goals of becoming self-sustaining. The shift
requires the phase out of certain relief activities, the replacement of
various temporary measures with permanent solutions, and the
transformation of others into development programs. One agency may
attempt to make the link with their own programs or more than one agency
may be involved in the linking.
A successful linking, then, is one in which the disaster programs
shift to development programs which themselves also include disaster
reduction objectives. But it is not enough that the programs shift; the
program beneficiaries must also make the transition and be involved in
the development process. If either of these two elements does not make
the transition, then the linking has been incomplete.
Our mapping of linking patterns and their components above does not
tell us which approaches are more effective for bringing about a
successful linking of disaster with development programs. Just because
we identify a contiguous meeting of emergency, medium-term, and long-
term projects in a common geographic area does not mean that a viable
approach for phasing relief into development has been found. Programs
which do not build upon each other may be ineffective in terms of
people's or area's recovery and development. Neither does an integrated
transition to development programs necessarily produce success as we
will see in our central case study where most of the original
beneficiary families did not progress in the process. While not
prescriptive in itself, our mapping does, however, allow us to identify
some preliminary areas of PVO practice which warrant further
exploration.
We can see from our review of secondary cases that much of what
passes for linking disaster with development assistance actually falls
short. The first linking model, the multiple program approach, suggests
some possible shortcomings. Because the agency takes a "shotgun"
approach to disaster needs over time, the effects of earlier activities
may dissipate before they can complement or supplement the programs in
the next stages. By not linking the programs or beneficiaries directly,
the opportunity to speed the phasing-out of relief by hooking on to new
recovery and development programs may be lost.
The second linking model, the integrated relief and recovery
approach, is also likely to experience the similar dissipation of
efforts. This model puts great emphasis in the program participants
providing the link to development programs, rather than any formal
institutional or programmatic linking mechanisms of the agencies
themselves. That being the case, factors which promote sustainability -
- particularly in terms of hazard reduction and disaster mitigation --
are introduced during the recovery period with no programmatic follow-up
later. However, sustainability is a long-term process; the programs
that might be necessary to insure it do not necessarily bridge into the
longer-term.
The third model, the integrated recovery and development approach,
appears to be the most successful currently at integrating short- and
long-term objectives. These programs also tend to work with the same
beneficiaries and in the same program sectors -- such as housing -- from
recovery to development. However, the integration tends to focus
largely on infrastructure and rebuilding programs (zoning, building
codes) while less on making social programs or economic reactivation
programs address disaster vulnerabilities."
"Oliver-Smith (1990) notes that reconstruction type recovery
programs are most often linked with infrastructure works, technology
programs, and knowledge transfer type development programs. Much more
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The fourth model, the shaping development from relief approach, inte-
grates its programs from the short- to the long-term. Importantly, the
approach uses the recovery programs to create the conditions for phasing
out relief and, at the same time, to introduce development programs.
However, an agency's involvement in relief programs, which may by
necessity be comprehensive and direct, can produce their major obstacle
(dependency relationship) to working with the original beneficiaries to
transform programs to recovery and development.
B. The Obstacles to Linking Disaster and Development Aid after
Disasters
Linking disaster and development aid is, at the same time, one of the
most proclaimed concepts in principle and the least implemented in
practice. Everyone agrees that the two must be linked. Theory has
given ample justification for it; practitioners have pointed the way to
do it. And yet, disaster and development aid are still largely
separate, they seldom come together without clashing, attempts to link
them frequently fall short of objectives, and disaster-related
development programs too often remain in institutional no-man's land.
Why has disaster-development linking been slow in coming?
At the macro level, the obstacles are found primarily within the aid
system and result from pressures felt by the bilateral donors, affected
governments, and other larger international institutions, such as the
U.N. agencies. While the following obstacles are not the rule for PVOs,
they do affect them because PVOs enter into formal partnerships with
these other aid actors and must operate within specified parameters. In
difficult (and less written about) is linking disaster programs with
development programs promoting institutional building or local
empowerment towards greater social equity and justice.
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the field, PVO post-disaster projects are greatly affected by the
actions of others.
Donor governments want to maintain a strict distinction between
emergency funds (humanitarian and short-term only) and regular
development funds. They provide the latter according to their foreign
policy considerations. By keeping them separate they are able to avoid
being "ensnared" into providing long-term aid to countries after
disasters (Kent 1987). As a result, donor governments often restrict
the time period of funding to a few months or specify that the funds can
be spent on relief items only. Both these stipulations preclude
implementing agencies, including PVOs, from moving into medium- and
longer-term recovery and development projects and often make it
difficult for them to include beneficiary participation because of the
pressure to spend the money quickly. When aid goes to an "unfriendly"
country, the donor government may stipulate that aid may not be provided
through the recipient government (ministries, regional or local) thereby
guaranteeing that the funds will not be spent on development-oriented
programs.
Other pressures in the aid system that keep the two aid types apart
are questions of resources and expertise. Development agencies are
hesitant to take on disaster-related development projects (prevention,
mitigation) because they do not want to over-extend their limited
resource base. They see these projects as competitors for existing
funds rather than as add-on projects which bring their own funding. As
a result, fewer funds are dedicated to disaster-related activities and
to their PVO implementers.
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After disasters, the integration of disaster and development programs
in many cases simply does not happen because no institution,
governmental or nongovernmental, picks up the disaster-related
development needs. Over the years, relief agencies, through their close
association with disasters and their victims, were the first to
recognize the need for comprehensive solutions to fundamental disaster
vulnerabilities. However, they were the least prepared to provide this
kind of aid. On the other hand, those with the required skills and
resources -- the large national and international development agencies -
- were the least attuned to disasters and, as a result, to disaster-
related development needs. This, however, is changing (as explained
earlier) as development agencies see the sustainability of their
development projects being threatened by disasters.
In the PVO sector, there are other institutional obstacles hindering
the integration of disaster and development aid. As we discussed
earlier, the shunning of relief work by some development-minded PVOs and
the persistence of the relief-only approach of others has kept the two
aid types apart, not to mention the competition among PVOs generated by
funding mechanisms. Some of these are changing; others are not. Inter-
agency coordination, while common, continues to be an area of particular
difficulty.
An important set of obstacles for PVOs to integrate disaster and
development aid, then, is found at the micro (project) level. There are
those obstacles which are internal to the projects themselves: agencies
have very different mandates, objectives, and administrative styles that
often clash in the field after a disaster. At their base, these
conflicts arise from different roles of the aid provider(s), competition
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for resources (human and material), institutional competition (between
agencies or branches within the same agency), project rigidity resulting
from the relief commitment, as well as the more widely reported
manifestations of dependency relationship that hinders the shift to
development program criteria.
Then, there are those obstacles which originate from the post-
disaster environment more directly -- the extent of the disaster impact
(social, economic and physical). In particular, the pervasive and
prolonged relief aid can set the conditions for dependency on outside
material assistance. Dependency influences the relationship the agency
can establish with its program participants and makes it more difficult
for the agency to phase relief into development programs. Just as
important are the pre-disaster conditions of the affected region -- the
economic relationships, political traditions, development trends, and
characteristics of the population. These external factors set
parameters for PVO program and management choices and influence their
effectiveness.
The above mapping of linking approaches and their components does not
tell us which are more effective in practice. Before agencies can
design better strategies to get to development programs after disasters
they need to understand the obstacles in the integration process.
Through the central case study of Save The Children's Project Armero, we
will now explore in detail the linking process, relationships, and
obstacles of one approach for integrating disaster and development aid.
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THE CENTRAL CASE STUDY
Presently, there is a relatively small body of knowledge about
program approaches used by voluntary organizations after disasters. Few
PVOs have undertaken thorough evaluations of their post-disaster
programs (Franklin 1985; Cuny 1983). The subject is a very complex one.
The diversity of disaster types, the variety of voluntary agencies and
their possible responses, and the complicated nature of post-disaster
work itself all make it difficult to identify what makes PVOs able to
integrate disaster and development assistance after disasters. For
these reasons, the dissertation's focus on a central case is warranted.
Because of the limited knowledge and the complexity of the subject
itself, this case of the Armero Disaster places special attention on the
context and the temporal dimension in which the project unfolds.
Chapters 4 and 5 evaluate how the economic and political processes in
the Armero Valley exacerbated the impact of the disaster and limited the
affected population's resources for coping and recovery. Chapter 5
describes the Disaster itself and sets the post-disaster context in
which the case agency implemented its programs. Chapter 6 sets out Save
The Children's project from the initial relief response to the
transition to its community-based development programs.
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P A R T I I:
CHAPTER 4
Pre-Disaster Conditions: Armero's Economic and Political Vulnerabilities
I. Introduction
This chapter traces historical processes that shaped key
relationships in the disaster and afterwards. Specifically, the
Valley's outward-oriented development pattern and its traditional
relationship with the Colombian State were key factors which exacerbated
the impact of the disaster and limited the affected population's
resources for coping and recovery.
Following is an analysis of the conditions that put the area at risk,
concentrating on the economic and political processes." Throughout the
chapters to come, the pre-disaster conditions and processes of
development will remain important explanatory themes.
In 1985, Armero, a town of 30,000 inhabitants, was the bustling
center of the rich agricultural region of Northern Tolima. Nestled at
the foot of the Cordillera Central (Colombia's central mountain range),
it was the cross-roads between the coffee-producing mountainous region
and the sorghum, peanut, and rice producing valley. Armero had become
the region's most important commercial center and was home to the
valley's modest agro-processing industry.
Geographically, Armero was right in the middle of the country -- just
140 km from Bogotd, 113 from Manizales, and 84 from Ibagud. The
municipality, which includes the city of Armero and the surrounding
"My intent is not to be exhaustive in this analysis, but to
highlight the most important pre-disaster conditions (and their
historical roots) that influenced the post-disaster conditions.
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small hamlets and countryside, was composed of 432 km2 , with the city
itself occupying 3.86 km2 in 1973 (see map)."6 Prior to the disaster,
the municipality's population was over 45,000. In the discussion that
follows, when talking about the Armero Valley we will be referring to
the area from the banks of the Magdalena River to the skirts of the
cordillera central, including Mendez, and Guayabal to Mariquita -- but
not the cordillera communities or meseta of Ldrida.
Approximately 88% of the municipal land is plains; the rest is
mountainous area in the cordillera. Both regions represent very
different histories -- including climates, peoples, land tenure systems,
and development patterns. Of temperate climate, the cordillera was made
up of small communities of minifundias who produced coffee as well as
smaller cultivations of subsistence crops. The Valley, on the other
hand, had an average temperature of 910 F. and included some of the most
fertile land in the country because of repeated flooding by the
Lagunilla River (1775, 1845, 1950). The area was developed in large
haciendas with highly mechanized crops. While the mountain region
directly above Armero depended on the town for markets, in general the
settlements of the cordillera were oriented towards the other side of
the mountain. Throughout this chapter, we treat the Armero Valley as
our primary focus of analysis.
6 Data taken from Zarate (1982), Volume 5, which cited 1973 data
from IGAC and DANE (Banco de Datos), Bogoti.
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II. Historical Development of the Municipality of Armero
The Spanish colonized the region in the 1500s pushing out and
exterminating the indian tribes during the first century of
occupation." During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the land
of the now Armero Valley was used primarily as pasture and for the
extraction of wood. A marketing center from the late 1800s, the city of
Armero sprang up along a major crossroad connecting the region to all of
the primary cities -- BogotA, Manizales, Cali, Neiva, Dorada, Medellin -
- as well as outlets on both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.
Armero was not formally founded (constituted as a caserio) until 1885
when it was known as San Lorenzo y Tasageras (names of the two meadows
where it was erected). Workers of the largest hacienda, El Santuario,
which grew tobacco and raised cattle invaded the land. The workers
settled there because it sat at the crossroads of two major roads and
the sawmill and a small train station had been built by the English
settlers. Although all products and people moving through the region
had to pass through San Lorenzo, the town grew slowly for the next 30
years.
In the first half of the nineteenth century, tobacco had made the
region famous throughout Colombia and as far away as Europe. There were
also gold and silver mines in the surrounding hills of the cordillera
which reached the height of importance at this time. The region's world
famous tobacco and the high price of silver attracted foreigners to
"The Panches were established in the northern and central regions
of Tolima. The Pijaos were situated in the west along the cordillera
central. Tolima was one of the first areas of the country to be
colonized. Many of the cities of the region -- Ibagud, Mariquita, Honda
-- date back to that period.
109
Northern Tolima -- especially the English who managed the financial and
banking sectors. With the fall of the price of silver and the many
strikes by miners in the 1840s, the English came down into the Valley
and invested in tobacco, soon controlling most of its production. On
the streets and sidewalks of San Lorenzo (Armero), the tobacco was
dried. Coffee, silver, and woods were all marketed out of the region by
train which passed through the town.
Guayabal had been virtually destroyed during the War of a Thousand
Days (La Guerra de los Mil Dias) from 1889 to 1902 (Oquist 1980; Dix
1967). As a result, the designated municipality was transferred from
Guayabal to San Lorenzo in 1908. At that time, the town had grown to
2,000 people. The name of the town was then changed from San Lorenzo to
Armero in 1930 to honor a local hero of the Independence.
Between 1930 and 1938, a bonanza of rice in the Valley and coffee in
the mountains drove the development of the region. With the relative
prosperity of the area, Armero grew to a town of 9,000 in 1948 as people
from all over the country as well as Europe arrived to work in the
Valley's agriculture. From 1938 to 1963, cotton replaced rice as the
main driver of the Valley's development. The success of cotton was
invested in the booming town. New banks, shops, small industry, iron
works all opened. The town's cattle fair was the second most important
in the central part of the country after Giradot. The flourishing town,
surrounded by cotton fields, was given the nickname of the White City
(La Ciudad Blanca), from this period.
In the Armero Valley itself, there was little pressure for land by
the agricultural workers. Nevertheless, in the cordillera and other
regions of Tolima and the country, struggles for land had been ongoing
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since the 1930s." Primarily a reflection of the fighting between the
two dominant parties -- the Liberals and the Conservatives -- the
struggle for land and political dominance spawned the bloodiest period
in Colombia's history, La Violencia, which lasted over ten years."
This violent conflict, that took place primarily in the countryside,
resulted in massive migration out of the rural areas to the towns and
cities throughout the country. It was the major drive of urbanization
in Colombia's history.
During La Violencia, the rural violence was notoriously severe in six
departments (like states) -- Tolima being one of the six. In the
Valley, the city of Armero suffered just eight days of violence with
looting and vandalism; when the cotton harvest began, the violence was
put aside. A military mayor was appointed from 1953 to 1957 and the
city experienced relative calm and progress. But, in the coffee region
just above Armero, there was a great deal of violence with many deaths.
Throughout the period of La Violencia (1948-1958), a situation of
unrest continued in the cordillera and spread throughout the Valley.
Some of the large landowners abandoned the region for Ibague and BogotA.
Armero swelled with people fleeing rural violence from all over the
country. Partly due to the violence suffered in the other small towns,
"'The 1930s was a period of Liberal Party dominance, having
abruptly displaced the Conservative Party hegemony of the first thirty
years of the twentieth century. The Liberals introduced agricultural
reform and other important social legislation, particularly between
1934-38. Non-elite groups had been competing for power and influence,
even by the end of the 1920s. The working class was increasingly
organized, as an important strike on the banana plantations in 1928
demonstrated. All of this threatened the traditional landowning class
and the Church.
"More on this following.
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Armero became the most important center in the area, overtaking Libano
and Guayabal. Despite the violence, the cotton bonanza managed to
maintain some stability in the area for a bit longer.
By 1957 (with the fall of the military government), however, the
Armero region had suffered gravely. Farms were abandoned, the economy
of the region was in shambles, many families had left for the large
cities, and there was insufficient work for the abundant labor that had
arrived fleeing the violence. Worse yet, cotton production entered a
disastrous crisis by 1963 and with it the city of Armero stagnated. Due
to political arrangements at the national level, the municipality
entered a period of unprecedented disorder as fierce regional
politicking distorted public administration."
From the early 1960s to the time of the disaster, the development of
the Armero Valley was based on two primary crops -- rice and a new crop,
sorghum. As in the past, the Valley's agriculture production was tied
to foreign markets; this specialization produced a continuous series of
boom and bust. Furthermore, large cattle raising enterprises had
expanded throughout the Valley. The city had now grown to a population
of approximately 29,000 by the mid-1980s.
In 1985, the area was still one of the most productive agricultural
areas of the country -- sorghum, rice, cotton, peanuts, and corn
respectively being the municipality's most important products. It was
"This situation is a direct reflection of the new political
arrangements of the Frente Nacional (National Front) in which the two
parties shared evenly the executive power and the state apparatus.
Although the Frente Nacional formally ended in 1974, the impact of this
power sharing continues to this day. The Department of Tolima is one of
the worst cases in the country of poor planning due to particularly
fierce regional politicking. More on this in the next section.
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calculated that the Armero Valley produced 20% of the country's
agricultural product. The agricultural sector was the most important
employer of labor in the Valley.
Armero was the primary market for small producers of the Valley and
cordillera. Although Armero had no sizable agro-industry (it sent all
of the products to Ibague and BogotA for processing), the city was the
primary banking and financial center after the departmental capital.
Five banks had branches there. The city also housed a branch of the
University of Tolima's School of Agriculture, an important center of
experimentation and development. The city's regional hospital, mental
hospital, high schools, and transportation network provided important
services for the population of the Valley. A rich cultural tradition,
Armero had an Archeological Museum and a nationally recognized dance
troupe of regional tradition. The commercial farmers, a sophisticated
group who sent their children abroad to study, had homes as well as
their grower associations and cooperatives in the city.
III. Apparent Prosperity of Valley Hides its Fundamental Vulnerabilities
Despite appearances of prosperity, Armero's development was built on
a precarious foundation. The region's almost absolute dependency on
outside economic and political relations placed it in a vulnerable
position when the disaster struck. We now examine in detail the
Valley's outward-oriented development and its traditional relationship
with the Colombian State and the conditions of economic and political
vulnerability which these produced.
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A. Economic Vulnerabilities
In the Armero Valley, agriculture was the most important employer;
labor had few other alternatives. For all of Tolima, the agricultural
sector employed 51.7% of the labor force in 1984. The service sector
and commerce employed 18.6% and 11.2 percent respectively. Jobs in
these sectors were almost exclusively located in the departmental
capital, as were the jobs in manufacturing which employed just 6%.7"
Armero and its Valley were even more skewed towards sole dependence on
agricultural employment than was the department as a whole.
The concentrated land tenure patterns7 ' and commercial agricultural
production in the Valley produced one of the highest concentrations of
salaried agricultural workers in the entire country. For Tolima
generally, 68.4% of agricultural employment is concentrated in
commercial production -- 5.5% of the employed are patrons or employers,
only .78% are permanent employees, and a full 62% of the agricultural
7
"Plan de Desarrollo del Tolima, Table 8, "Tolima, Estructura del
VAB y del Empleo por Ramas de Actividad, 1984".
71 Proportional Distribution of Land Ownership
in the Municipality of Armero' 1981
Farm size (ha.) Owners () Land surface (%)
0-1 12.84% 0.90%
1-3 10.54 0.55
3-5 9.50 1.11
5-10 16.49 3.48
10-30 25.78 12.28
30-100 15.66 24.17
100 + 9.19 58.31
Source: Catastro de Armero, 1981. ('includes cordillera and plains)
That is, 24.85% of the landowners own 82.48% of the land (in parcels
over 30 hectares; 58.31% are over 100 hectares) and 49.37% of landowners
own 6.04% of the land (in less than 10 hectare parcels).
For the entire department of Tolima, 64.6% of the landowners own 9.3%
of the land in less than one hectare parcels, and 9.6% of the landowners
possess 64.9% of the land in plots greater than 50 hectares (data for
1984; from Plan, vol. I, Table No. 18).
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workers are seasonal and day laborers. The rest of the agricultural
employment (31.6%) were small farmers -- small owners and family
labor." Although data are not available for the Armero Valley alone,
this concentration is again likely to be even greater because the coffee
cultivations in the cordillera which are the bulk of the small farms
would not be included.
Because of these characteristics, agricultural labor in the Valley is
highly sensitive to fluctuations in economic activity in the exterior
making the sector a particularly unstable source of employment. When,
in the early 1970s and then again in the early 1980s, the country
experienced severe recession, the Armero region felt the impact directly
and immediately. Inflation was high, credit dried up, prices of
production inputs (machinery, fertilizers and pesticides) rose. The
agricultural work force was squeezed and unemployment rose. This
situation has been steadily exacerbated by the gradual conversion of
some large haciendas to intensive cattle raising, an activity which
absorbs much fewer labor than even mechanized farming. The influx of
laborers during La Violencia as well as seasonal immigration from other
regions, kept the agricultural wages low relative to the rest of the
country. High unemployment has obligated labor to seek work in the
urban commercial sector -- primarily in small commercial activities,
many of them in the informal sector -- which was gaining in relative
importance (Plan, "Aspectos Econ6micos", 1985). For many, the only
"These figures taken from Plan, Volume I, Table 16, "Distribuci6n
de la poblaci6n ocupada en la producci6n empresarial y campesina por
posiciones ocupacionales en el Departamento del Tolima". Elaborated by
Miguel Osorio Castro, based on data from DANE, the Ministry of
Agriculture, SENA, and others.
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solution has been to leave the region." Unlike in traditional
campesino regions, agricultural workers in the Valley do not have
traditional coping mechanisms in hard times: they do not have their own
subsistence crops nor formal patron relationships with their employers
to sustain them.
The Armero Valley's continued development along past lines was
becoming obviously unsustainable. The Valley had staked its development
on an export-oriented model that was depended solely on agriculture
production." By 1985, the area's production was in unabated decline.
The agricultural and cattle raising area is saturated
and the lands after much exploitation demand ever more
effort to maintain their levels of production.
- Plan, "Aspectos Econ6micos", pg. 65."
Erosion was a problem in some areas and the limited coverage of
irrigation also limited agricultural growth in the region. Neither had
the Department of Tolima been able to successfully develop their
manufacturing sector. Industry in the department grew extremely slow
and never really diversified." As a result, capital had few
alternatives in the region other than where it was to begin with -- in
"The population figures for the rural and urban areas of Tolima
reflect this clear trend:
Year Total Urban Rural
1951-1964 1.79 4.57 0.28
1964-1973 0.79 2.74 -0.85
1973-1985 1.06 1.92 0.10
Source: Plan, Volumen II, "Diagn6stico Departamental". Documento Anexo
III Demogrdfico y DANE Resultados Preliminares del Censo de Poblaci6n.
74The dependence on the export sector was far higher than the
national average. See Plan, Volume I, (1985), pg. 69.
"All translations are the author's unless otherwise indicated.
"Much slower than the national average. For the reasons that
industry never grew in Tolima, see Plan. Volume I, pp. 66-70.
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commercial agriculture -- thereby reinforcing the prior concentration.
Much of the capital left the Valley. Little in the way of developing
departmental (internal) markets through improving intra-departmental
roads and communication, or warehousing capacity has been done. The
agro-industry, similarly, has remained underdeveloped in the region.
The economy in the rich Armero Valley has remained undiversified and
export based throughout its entire history.
Although Tolima ranked high in terms of socio-economic development
relative to the other departments," its apparent prosperity and that of
the Armero Valley in particular was, in fact, very misleading. Some of
the basic social indicators revealed the area's fundamental
contradictions. Infant mortality rates, for example, were 72.5 per
1,000 and 11.7% of the urban population were illiterate -- both high
rates for a region of its development standing.
During the economic crisis of the 1980s, Northern Tolima suffered
more on average than did the nation as a whole. With already decreasing
production, credit dried up and farmers found themselves carrying
greater debt burdens than ever before. While the national unemployment
rate was 14% in 1984, in Tolima official unemployment was 17.6%. When
the national financial transfers were reduced for all departments,
Tolima, which was already receiving low transfers, was particularly hard
hit.
In sum, when the disaster struck in November of 1985, the economy of
the region was already feeling the brunt of a development model which
"Tolima ranks llth out of 33 departments in per capita income, 5th
in aqueducts coverage, 10th for sewage coverage, and 7th place for
hospital beds per capita. (Plan. pg. 74.)
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was having declining results and was reeling from the economic crisis of
the 1980s. Increasing difficulties for farmers, weak internal markets,
and precarious employment relations characterized the Armero Valley.
B. Political Vulnerabilities
In Tolima, the traditional relationship between the people and the
State has been based on a long history of clientalism and patronage,
which reflect Colombia's particular political developments. In the
Armero Valley, these political relationships contributed to the disaster
in the first place, exacerbated its effects, and limited the area's
recovery.
The history of political relations produced a particularly weak
regional and municipal administrations. In 1985, Tolima's public
institutions -- both decentralized national agencies and the regional
and municipal administrations -- were some of the most politicized and
least technically competent in the entire country (Plan, Volume II,
1985). Writing in 1982, Zarate said that Armero was a particularly
serious case, where "the politicking and poor administration end in one
of the highest budgets in Tolima" and where, "technical [proficiency]
counts for absolutely nothing"." A tradition of exclusionary politics
resulted in a lack of base community organization. Weak civic pressure
on local government and the decentralized institutions left their
administration unchecked to function according to the requirements of
politics.
"Zarate (1982), pp. 247 and 243, respectively.
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- Exclusionary Political System Produces Unprecedented Violence and
Reinforces Regional Power Structure and Loyalties
For its entire history, Colombian politics has been characterized by
an almost exclusive dominance of two parties, the Liberals and
Conservatives." In modern Colombia, there has been a lack of any
substantive ideological differences between the two. Although they have
competed fiercely between themselves for political hegemony, they have
always been firmly united in maintaining their (elite) control over the
distribution of power within the state. Their means of doing so --
through limiting alternative sources of political expression -- has
resulted in violent conflict repeatedly throughout Colombia's history."
As James Payne wrote in 1968, "on a scale of political deaths per
generation, Colombia has one of the highest levels of political conflict
in the world."
Control of Colombia's democracy has been gained and maintained by one
or the other party through exclusion. Before 1958, whichever party had
control excluded the other completely from the benefits of power. In
all of Colombia's history up to that time, only once (in 1861) did power
change hands other than as a result of a split within the governing
party. The party which won the national administration appointed all
"Only Colombia and Uruguay, of the Latin American countries, have
preserved the traditional two-party system.
"In the first century of its independence Colombia went through
thirteen periods of violent political strife, some of them lasting for
four to five years at a time. The period, most marking Colombia's
history was during 1946 to the mid 1960s, was so sustained and severe,
it is called simply La Violencia (more on this following). The
violence, which is both means and result of political exclusion,
continues to this writing. Presidential elections held in May of this
year, saw the assassination of four presidential candidates all of whom
were alternatives to the two traditional parties.
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posts in the public administration, including governors, mayors, and
even teachers in the public school system. Of this system, Oquist
(1980) writes,
the group that did not control the state could expect only
discrimination from it, whereas those persons politically
connected with the party in power could expect to monopolize state
decision making and the benefits to be derived from state power.
Colombia is a country of political paradoxes. Heralded as the oldest
democracy in Latin America, Colombia has a long history of restricting
popular participation, a high rate of voter abstentionism, and an active
guerilla movement (dating back to campesino movements in the 1920s). In
more than 25 of the last 30 years, Colombia has been under a "state of
siege" which removes all power from the Congress and concentrates it in
the president and the armed forces.
During the post-independence period, the major political issues of
federalism versus centralism gave rise to the Liberal and Conservative
parties in 1849. With freedom from the Spanish, political power
devolved to the local criollo oligarchy, a group of wealthy landowners,
merchants, and clergy who had occupied key economic positions in the
state, but had been discriminated against socially by the Spaniards.
Within the local oligarchy, those who formed the Liberal party saw their
interests best served by a federal system of government, free trade, and
the separation of church and state (with the concomitant civil marriage,
secular education system, and freedom of religion). Those who formed
the Conservative party, on the other hand, favored a centralized system
of government, trade protectionism, a close relationship between church
and state -- that is, they sought the preservation of the traditional
order. It was the Liberals, however, who gained and consolidated power
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through the civil wars of 1858-63, holding power until 1885 when the
Conservatives won control and held it through 1930.
During the second half of the last century, local gamonales", led
repeated violent confrontations (civil wars) between the two parties.
These confrontations built up intense party loyalties among the whole
population. Such loyalty was based upon kinship and patronage rather
than on ideological or political grounds. Large landowners had the
power to enlist their agricultural workers on behalf of their own
political party allegiances. As a result, party identification was
plainly reflected in the geographical distribution of the population,
with some areas almost exclusively Conservative or Liberal. As Dix
(1967) writes,
The frequency of civil wars and the party struggles they
represented -- characteristics less true of most other Latin
American nations -- cemented the cohesion of particular
communities around one of the political contenders.
To this day, most Colombians in the rural areas traditionally identify
with one or the other party through their regional ties and retain this
loyalty throughout their lives. In Colombia, Dix goes on to state, "any
change in political identification requires corresponding changes in
1A gamonal is a large landowner who is at the same time a
political leader in his region. His power is exercised through
patronage and clientelism. Local gamonales make up the base of the
traditional parties. They are either born into this position or are
connected to the local families with wealth and prestige (See Santa,
1970). This hereditary leadership system is true at the local, regional
and national levels. For instance, ex-presidents Alfonso Lopez, one of
the strongest leaders of the Liberal party, is the son of another
president. Alvaro Gomez, one of the most important leaders of the
Conservative party along with the ex-president Misael Pastrana,
succeeded his father, another ex-president. A recent mayor of Bogote,
Andrds Pastrana, was the son of the above mentioned ex-president.
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one's closest social and personal relationships," and "to change one's
party loyalty is to be considered an apostate and a traitor".
In 1930, after fifty years of Conservative hegemony, a Liberal
president was finally elected due to a split in the Conservative party.
From 1930 to 1946 the Liberals used their national power to extend their
control at the local level. They used both reforms" and violence in
what many have termed a sort of revenge against the Conservative party
who had held control for so long. However, the Liberal dominance did
not last. In the 1946 presidential elections, the Liberal Party was
itself divided (between Jorge E. Gaitin and Gabriel Turbay) and lost its
political supremacy.
Once back in power, the Conservatives started a campaign of
repression against the partisans of the former Liberal party government.
The official violence was countered by guerrilla warfare, fueled by the
Liberal and Communist parties. The country was once again moving toward
a period of civil war. The violence, which had started in 1946, was
dramatically sharpened by the assassination of the populist leader and
Liberal presidential candidate, Jorge E. Gaitin, in 1948.
Gaitin, from a lower-class background, was a Liberal dissident with a
reformist and anti-oligarchical platform. He was supported especially
by the urban middle and working classes and despised by both the
Conservative and Liberal elite. By 1947, he had reached the leadership
of the Liberal Party. In the 1940s, Gaitin had organized UNIR (Unidn
"One of the most important of these reforms was the Land Reform
(Ley de Tierras) of 1935, which allowed thousands of peasants to
legalize their land. The large landowners strongly resented this reform
and, in some cases, did not recognize its legitimacy. The Liberals also
implemented labor legislation, union organization, and the modernization
of the state's fiscal and financial system.
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Nacional Independiente Revoluclonaria) that supported landless and poor
peasants in their struggle for land. On February 7, 1948, he led an
impressive silent demonstration in BogotA to protest the increasing wave
of violence.
Dix, writing in 1967, said,
What is truly significant about the rise of Gaitin was that to
date he has been the only Colombian to have attained major
political stature by challenging the position of the elite and
appealing to the Colombian masses.
A little over a month after the silent march, on April 9, the undisputed
hero of the Liberal masses was assassinated in downtown Bogot&. The
capital exploded in one of the most massive urban riots of this century.
The violence quickly spread all over the nation. The bloody
confrontation between Liberal and Conservative reached unprecedented
levels. From 1946 to 1958 an undeclared civil war devastated a broad
area of the Colombian countryside. The death toll during La Violencla,
as the period was known, reached over 300,000 lives -- 112,000 of them
between 1948 and 1950 alone.
The Liberal and the Conservative leadership saw the violent events
that followed Gait&n's assassination as a serious potential for
revolution. A temporary Liberal-Conservative coalition emerged shortly
thereafter but, by May 1949, the alliance had ended as the two parties
engaged once again in their classic struggle for party control. In the
parliamentary elections in June of the same year, the Liberals obtained
the majority but, on October 9, 1949, Conservative President Ospina
closed the Congress. The Liberal Party then withdrew from the
presidential elections held in November.
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During La Violencia, the military also split along party lines,
thereby decreasing the Conservative government's repressive capacity.
This division was reflected between the generally Liberal army officers
and the extremely sectarian Conservative police. The presence of the
state completely disappeared in many areas of the country, while in
others its presence only consisted of the police and the army on a
temporary basis. In some areas, the mayoral offices and governorships -
- traditional civilian institutions -- were taken over by army officers.
In hopes of pacifying the nation, the leadership of the two
traditional parties united to support a coup d'etat led by Army
Commander General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla on June 13, liz 3 . Because the
coup enjoyed national political support, the military government was
perceived as legitimate. On June 19, 1953, a general amnesty was
offered to those involved in the violence which drastically reduced the
scale of the conflict.
This period of peace did not last long, however; by late 1954, the
scale of violence was once again on the rise. The army instituted a
systematic repression of both Liberals and Conservatives. This time,
the resurgence of violence corresponded more to socio-economic conflicts
than to traditional partisan rivalries. As this became clear, the
leaders of both parties came together once again to protect their
interests.
By the end of 1956, both parties' leaders had declared their hostile
opposition to Rojas who they considered to be an usurper of their
rightful power. On May 10, 1957, following a four-day resistance
campaign led by a bipartisan coalition, the Rojas government fell. The
power was then transferred to a military junta in charge of guiding the
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political transition to the assumption of power by a Conservative-
Liberal coalition called the Frente Nacional (National Front).3
- The Frente Nacional: Implications for Modern Political Relations with
the Colombian State
The Frente Nacional (FN) was perhaps the most bizarre experiment in
democratic government that has been tried anywhere. Basically, the two
parties agreed to a strict sharing of power between themselves, which
also excluded by law the participation of any other party. Although
elections would continue to be held, the votes would be shared equally
between the two parties regardless of how they were cast. The intent
was to remove the competitive element in the political system which had
led to so much violence. The agreement stipulated that, at the national
level, seats in Congress were to be divided fifty-fifty and, at the
local level, departmental assemblies and municipal councils the same.
The presidency was to alternate between the two parties every four
years. All official posts in the country -- ministries, governorships,
and mayors -- were to be evenly divided between Liberals and
Conservatives. Beginning in 1958, this arrangement was scheduled to
last through 1974.
Both parties, and every faction within them, were to obtain equal
treatment, access to political decision-making, and political posts. No
one among the socio-economically powerful groups controlling Colombia's
traditional political parties would ever have to fear official
"
3The Frente Nacional (FN) was a result of the bipartisan agreement
signed in Benindorm which called for the formation of a Civil Front. On
December 1957, a plebiscite gave popular endorsement to it. The FN
started in 1958 and lasted until 1974, encompassing four presidential
terms. For considerations on the formation and development of the FN see
Dix (1967), chapter 6.
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discrimination. All were guaranteed access to at least some of the
benefits derived from political power. Indeed, one of the Frente
Nacional government's first acts in 1958 was to modify the income tax
laws by increasing exemptions, reversing the Rojas' tax reform which had
increased tax rates on high incomes.
Despite these obvious immediate gains for the party elites, the FN
agreements hurt the traditional parties in the long run. The division
of the political seats and bureaucracy was carried to extremes. In
places where the population was 100% of one party, some people became
nominally of the other party just to fill the 50% of the seats or
official posts allocated to that party.
This bipartisan alliance took away one of the basic reasons for party
loyalty: opposition to the other party. The inter-party struggles
practically disappeared, as factional fighting within each party took
their place. Regional gamonales grew in importance as control of
patronage was already in their hands, rather than the party itself.
They competed ever more fiercely and the party fractions grew even more
intense. In this way, the Frente Nacional strengthened further the
patronage system in Colombia.
Each party remains a sort of confederation of small local and
regional bosses, whose allegiances to the party are not based on any
common ideology. If any party leader dares to promote reforms, he has
to negotiate with local leaders, most of whom are not interested in
national programs not tied to additional promotion, patronage, or other
benefits, but rather to the maintenance of the status quo." The
"Closely related to the problem of organization is the problem of
party finance. Since there is no official control over this, the data
is not available. Nevertheless, it is well known that the main official
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patronage system, based on the power of gamonales and the lack of common
ideology, consumed the public administration of the country which lost
most semblance of civic logic and operated, in large part, according to
political interests.
Although the Frente Nacional agreements expired in 1974, vestiges of
the parity arrangement survive to the present. As mentioned earlier,
this political patronage system has been particularly strong in Tolima.
The Armero Valley has always been a Liberal party stronghold. The
contemporary power struggle in the region was between two departmental
representatives, Jaramillo and Santofimio, both Liberals. Armero had
been predominantly with Jaramillo, who saw his most important power base
in the area erased with the tragedy. Of the closest towns, Guyabal was
with the same political camp. However, Santofimio controlled the other
nearest town, Lerida. He also has more power at the national level as
he is on the national directorate of the Liberal Party."'
This history of exclusionary politics and vestiges of the Frente
Nacional arrangements had produced in Tolima, and the Armero Valley, one
income of the parties comes from "voluntary" donations by government
employees. Since such donations do not cover all costs of political
campaigns, the candidates own contributions, and especially private
donations are the core of the party's financial strength. Wealthy aspi-
rants to elected positions are able to obtain good positions on the
electoral lists by promising to pay for expenses above and beyond their
own campaigns. Additionally, the contributions from the private sector
are crucial not only to secure the financial stability of the campaign,
but to shape the political agenda of the candidates. (This unregulated
and weak party finance situation became the entry way of the drug
related money into politics. Since the early 1980s, numerous scandals
regarding mafia connections in Colombian politics have affected both
traditional parties.)
"In the aftermath of the disaster their struggle influenced, in
large part, government policy, the relationship with the survivor
population, and the options available to the assisting agencies in the
zone. More on this in the next chapter.
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of the most politicized public administrations in the country and a
fierce competition between local leaders for the control of a well-
developed patronage system.
These conditions had also resulted in the almost complete lack of
base community organization. Before the disaster, few organizations had
existed among Armero's poor population who were to make up the great
majority of survivors (CINEP 1986). There were no neighborhood
associations, unions, or producer groups that were known to be very
active (although one association of mobile shoe repairers did exist).
The Armeritas were notoriously apathetic catholics with few strong
church-related organizations. Only the political parties were well
organized and active within the poorer neighborhoods. The lack of
organization represented a serious lack of an important resources that
communities traditionally use for coping with disasters.
The poor residents of Armero had little contact with government
assistance programs. But those who did, interacted with social service
programs like family welfare and some primary health care programs.
Even the agricultural extension programs were service-oriented. The
role of the target community was to organize in order to receive free
seeds or the latest round of vaccinations. The survivors understood the
government emergency and reconstruction programs in exactly the same
way.
In the next chapter, we now see how these conditions exacerbated the
avalanche's first round affects -- the government's response and the
relationship that emerged between the affected communities and aid
providers -- and greatly influenced the area's possibilities for
recovery.
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CHAPTER 5
El Ruiz Avalanche Disaster, Colombia
I. Disaster Vulnerability
Armero's greatest vulnerability -- its location relative to the
active volcano, El Nevado Del Ruiz -- was known long before the 1985
disaster. El Ruiz volcano is located in the northern part of the Andean
volcanic chain and Colombia's cordillera central. One of its many
rivers that originated in the ice-cap, the Lagunilla River, came out of
the mountains 70 km. later at the town of Armero and continued to the
Magdalena River (see map). The Volcano had long been active. It had
exploded at least twice before, in 1595 and 1845." The latter caused a
lahar" very similar to that of the 1985 disaster and, covering the
present site of Armero, resulted in one thousand deaths."'
The volcano had shown signs of renewed activity since November 1984.
A series of earthquakes up to magnitude 4 led the Colombian government
to install a seismic monitoring network in July of 1985. An average of
17 earthquakes daily were recorded between July and October of that
year. Colombian authorities also had a detailed risk map produced by
"There is also evidence that El Ruiz erupted in 1828/29 and in
1832/33 (Herd et al. 1986).
"A lahar is a "flowing masses of volcanic debris and other
sediment intimately mixed with water". It is estimated that lahars
account for at least ten percent of all volcano-related deaths worldwide
(Sigurdsson and Carey 1986).
"Prior to the El Ruiz disaster, the largest known number of deaths
due to lahars occurred at two Indonesian volcanoes -- in 1919, 5,110
people died and in 1822, 3,600 died (Sigurdsson and Carey 1986).
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October 7, 1985 which specified the areas of highest risk, including
Armero's risk to lahars."'
The governor of Tolima, the mayor of Armero, along with other mayors
of Tolima and officials of the relevant public institutions all were
informed of the hazards. The people in the areas at risk were also
provided with some information about what to do in case of an eruption.
The second week of September 1985, the newspapers published the risk
maps, but were accused of sensationalism and awakening panic in the
population. In Armero, several talks on disaster preparedness were
conducted in the church. Because there was insufficient knowledge to
accurately predict the timing of an eruption, evacuation plans were not
enforced. Neither did the at-risk areas have adequate
telecommunications equipment to warn populations in the case of an
eruption.
On the afternoon of November 13, 1985, rain and ash had begun falling
around 5 p.m., causing concern to many in the town. An emergency
meeting of the regional emergency committee was called at the Red Cross
in Ibagud. But at this point, fearing only a flood, a cautious
directive to evacuate people who lived along the banks of the Lagunilla
River was given. The local official of the emergency committee of the
Civil Defense in Armero called BogotA around 7 in the evening and was
told that the ash was nothing to be alarmed about. In turn, he
announced the news from the loudspeakers of the church and the local
radio station also carried the announcement. Some survivors have said
that around 9 p.m. there were confusing radio reports about an explosion
"Risk map by the Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Geol6gico-
Mineras (INGEOMINAS) and the University of Caldas.
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of the volcano. At that time, however, many people were watching the
big soccer game or had already gone to bed. There was never a general
order to evacuate Armero.
On that day, the risk maps were shown to have been deadly accurate.
After the fact, there has been much discussion around why so many people
were taken unaware, given the official knowledge of the disaster risk.
Many experts argue that the tragic loss of human life could have been
largely avoided.
II. November 13, 1985
It was six thirty in the morning and the pilot [flying over
Armero] said: Armero has been erased, I'm telling you, Armero has
been erased. I flew twice over the site, not believing my eyes or
that this was possible. I flew over two times, I swear, it isn't
that I've been drugged or that I'm sleepy or some crazy person,
Armero is erased. Below one can only see an immense beach.
Eighty or eight-five percent has been destroyed.
- pg. 45. Los Ultimos Dias de Armero.
Shortly after 3:00 p.m., El Nevado del Ruiz Volcano suffered a small
gas explosion which sent ash to the northern towns of Fresno, Mariquita,
and Honda between 4 and 5 p.m.. At 9 p.m., the main explosion occurred
whose consequences were of enormous proportions. The eruption resulted
in the melting of approximately 10 percent of the volcano's ice-cap.
Torrents of meltwater, ice, and debris raced down the narrow river
gorges on the sides of the volcano. On the eastern side, the most
damaging lahar coursed down the Lagunilla river (a drop in elevation of
about 4 km.) carrying trees, rocks and soil with it." In the lower
"We will concentrate on what happened in the Armero Valley,
however, on the other side of the cordillera heavy damage was also
sustained. The aid figures we use here will distinguish, where
possible, between assistance that reached the Armero Valley and other
areas of the country where survivors concentrated.
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part of the river, above Armero, a small land-slide had formed a natural
damn and a small lake. When the lahar reached the damn it was retained
momentarily. But it finally burst the damn and raced towards Armero
with even greater intensity.
Shortly before midnight, the avalanche reached the valley below. In
just fifteen minutes, the mud had completely covered the town of Armero.
As much as 15 meters high of mud had overrun the town, dragging homes,
cars, and debris in its path. Eyewitness accounts described building
crumpling like paper as the lahar hit. Approximately 22,000 people were
entombed in the mud, another 5,000 people injured. Just 15% of the town
was left standing (see map). The damage was mind-boggiing.
In the hours and days following, most of those who had survived had
saved themselves and those around them. The first to arrive on the
scene from the outside, the Colombian Red Cross, Civil Defense, and
Army, searched the area for survivors. Days passed and people were
still being pulled from the mud. Many were found wandering the
neighboring countryside in a daze. More than 5,000 people were
evacuated, primarily by helicopters. Those requiring hospitalization
(approximately 1,200)" were sent across the entire country to hospitals
that could receive them. Families were separated, with their members
ending up in Bogotd, Ibague, even as far away as Cali and Medellin over
200 km. away. No registration of survivors was done in the first weeks.
In the aftermath of the disaster, schools, soccer fields, and
community centers were converted into shelters. Tent camps mushroomed,
"According to Gueri and Perez 1986.
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MAP OF THE DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE EXPLOSION OF THE VOLCANO,EL NEVADO DEL RUIZ, IN COLOMBIA ON NOVEMBER 13, 1985
Guayzai
CUNDINAMARCA
LA ZONA DEL DESASTRE (Tomado de "Semana')
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and hastily thrown up temporary housing was built throughout the Armero
Valley and Ibagud. Lists of survivors appeared in the doors of
churches, radio stations, offices of the Civil Defense. With nightfall,
survivors stayed awake in terror. Rumors that children were being
spirited out of the area for adoption spread as parents furiously
searched for their missing children. Material donations flooded in as
official assistance programs, national and international, all scrambled
to meet the emergency needs of the affected populations.
III. Damage
Unlike other disasters, in Armero the hardest hit initially were the
wealthy. It was their homes, situated along the Lagunilla River to take
advantage of the cooling breezes, that were completely destroyed. The
poor of Armero, however, lived on the side of town farthest from the
river gorge. These neighborhoods were nearest to the small hills where
the population was able to escape the avalanche on the night of the
tragedy. Thus, the survivor population was made up primarily of the
poorest stratum of Armero.
The Armero disaster did such extensive damage that the survivor
population was left with very few material resources. Not much was left
that could be salvaged to aid in the recovery of the area; the majority
of survivors had to start a new life in a new place completely from
scratch. From disaster survivors, they became refugees in their own
country as they had no home to which to return.
Besides Armero, the avalanche also greatly affected the neighboring
populations. The rural areas surrounding the city also had their homes
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and work places destroyed in the disaster." Although the majority of
the affected population left the region, large numbers did remain and
inundated neighboring towns to stay with friends and relatives.
Guayabal, for example, received over 4,000 refugees the first year --
tripling their pre-disaster population. Lhrida's population effectively
doubled when around 3,000 looked to settle there (Resurgir 1986a).
The Valley's economy was particularly hard hit. All area roads,
bridges, aqueducts, telephone lines, and electrical grids were damaged,
if not completely destroyed. The Valley lost 129 square km. of prime
agricultural land, along with its valuable machinery and
infrastructure."' With the disappearance of the transportation network
and Armero, traditional producers in the cordillera lost their primary
market channels and watched their produce rot. Unemployment in the
department reached 21% (from 5% prior) with approximately 70%
unemployment among the survivors ."'
The large influx of donations -- most notably food -- hurt the small
producers who were able to get some of their produce to the albeit
"Rural areas affected in Tolima were: Libano, Murillo,
Villahermosa, Casablanca.
"Unfortunately, the estimates of damage are all a bit different.
USAID, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) (Nov. 22, 1985)
estimated that about 60% of the livestock and 30% of the rice, maize,
peanuts, and soybeans of the immediate area in the valley were
destroyed. Vega (1987) stated that in addition to the city of Armero,
30% of the territory that was the municipality of Armero (its outlying
rural land and communities) was covered by mud. In addition, the
Ministry of Agriculture (Nov. 1985) reported that the valley's three
mills and only grain storage warehouses (located in Armero) were all
destroyed. The majority of the valley's farm machinery also disappeared
as they were stored in the city center in workshops, garages, and shops.
"Figures from Actuar 1986 (pg. 6) and Resurgir (January 1986).
The unemployment among survivors is a gross estimate; actual figures do
not exist.
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smaller markets in Guayabal and Ldrida. Only building materials
suppliers and beer hall establishments found adequate demand for their
goods in the first six months. With the influx of survivors and
assistance agencies to neighboring towns, housing rents skyrocketed.
During the entire first year after the disaster, the Valley's economy
continued in virtual shambles.
IV. Aid Agencies and Resurgir
The Colombian government jumped in to coordinate the emergency
assistance. For the sake of speed, efficiency, and following a long
Colombian tradition, the government took a centralized approach,
creating the coordinating body, Resurgir, in BogotA. A few days after
the disaster, the President of the country appointed military mayors in
neighboring towns, such as Guayabal and Ldrida, who were receiving a
great influx of survivors. These military mayors stayed for around a
year. There were few opportunities for local government or survivors to
participate in decision-making.
Resurgir's primary function was "to finance the activities and works
that are required by the social, economic and material rehabilitation of
the population and zones affected by the volcanic activity of El Ruiz."
However, faced with the need to act rapidly in a number of areas,
Resurgir quickly assumed many more functions. In addition to financing,
Resurgir took on the planning, coordination, and implementation of all
kinds of reconstruction and rehabilitation projects (Gomez Barrero
1986). In addition, Resurgir had the difficult task of defining who was
"Articulo 1* Decreto 3406 de 1985.
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an official survivor, a damnificado, a designation that made them
officially eligible for disaster assistance.
Under overwhelming pressure from the media and donors in the first
months, Resurgir played the role of fireman, rushing to put out small
and large crises alike. But in taking on more and more, Resurgir found
it efficiently could do less and less. With the headquarters in BogotA
over four hours by car from the disaster zone, Resurgir was quickly
labelled by those living and working in the zone as "those who do not
understand the reality" (Vega 1987). The agency soon found itself as
the favorite whipping boy for everything that went wrong in the disaster
zone.
Between November 1985 and July 1986, Resurgir's efforts focused
largely on relief activities. Over 90% of their expenditures during
this period went to pensions, groceries, medicine, and emergency camps
and the beginnings of permanent housing construction." Contrary to
world experience, Armero's relief period was particularly prolonged --
it was roughly three times the relief period in other disasters (Cuny
1983).
In addition to relief, the government placed primary emphasis on the
physical rebuilding of Armero. The first director of Resurgir was a
developer whose firm was well known for quick and efficient construction
of high income housing. Initially, Resurgir conceived of Armero's
disappearance as largely a physical problem -- a town disappeared, one
"$3.155.9 million pesos were donated through Resurgir between
November 1985 and June 30 1986. (Gomez Barrero 1986).
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had to be erected in its place. Other critical sectors received less
attention. 7
The national and international communities also donated generously to
the emergency effort." With Resurgir, the Red Cross and the Colombian
Welfare Institute (Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar, ICBF)
erected an entire aid distribution network which functioned through the
camps and shelters in the Valley. From November 1985, thirty-five
shelters and camps were established throughout the country: twenty-one
attended by the Red Cross, five by ICBF with support from Resurgir, and
nine self-administered by the sheltered with support from private
groups.
This centrist government approach in relief was matched by a diffuse
and poorly coordinated PVO and private response. For example, in the
first six months alone, over 35 PVOs began recovery programs in the
Armero Valley. (The numbers were much greater throughout the entire
country.) Their programs consisted overwhelmingly of the construction
of housing. These programs generally were slow in getting underway
because of any number of problems. Ldrida, in particular, suffered
setbacks of a technical nature. The housing plans had been made based
on aerial photographs which grossly underestimated site leveling which
was needed. Also, the site chosen for housing in Ldrida was on pure
9 Although Resurgir had a unit for economic development, few policy
directions emerged in the first year; neither did they coordinate much
of the huge inflow of money and resources which largely by-passed the
government body (Piedrahita 1986).
"Foreign governments, international agencies, foreign NGOs all
donated generously. This aid has been catalogued by a number of groups;
the OFDA (1985) summary was used in the present research.
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rock -- a condition that delayed the laying of infrastructure and
skyrocketed costs.
Over the first year, a number of PVOs did initiate micro-enterprise
development programs in the area. These began in the midst of the
relief period and with families who often were still moving in and out
of the Valley. Not surprising, these programs experienced a high rate
of default and abuse.
A number of groups attempted to coordinate the different agencies'
interventions; but, coordination was the exception rather than the rule.
Each agency had its hands full trying to get their program started in
the very difficult post-disaster circumstances, leaving little time to
coordinate with others. Many coordination meetings (which tried to be
national in scope) were called in Bogota, making it impossible for many
of those in the zone to participate. The programs and criteria of the
PVOs also differed tremendously and, as a result, agencies found
themselves competing with each other to attract beneficiaries and to
make headlines. Nevertheless, there were examples of fruitful
coordination among smaller groups. Guayabal, for example, had a very
positive experience in which the PVOs, government institutions, and
municipal administrators met regularly and implemented a number of joint
programs.
Overall, the Valley's first year after the disaster was a situation
in which there was simply too much aid chasing too few survivors.
Agencies -- public and private -- acted with inadequate awareness of the
relevant activities of others, resulting in duplicated efforts, missed
opportunities, and gaps in coverage.
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V. Chaos Settles into Discernible Patterns
According to Resurgir's own July, 1986 report, Informe Final, a total
of 28,317 people were classified as official survivors (damnificados)
and they had spread out in twenty locations all across the country. The
survivors with any resources at all left the area to start afresh with
relatives in Bogotd, or went to other regional capitals in search of
employment." But throughout the first year, many survivors returned to
the area looking for their loved ones in hopes of finding them alive;
some stayed, while most left again. It is estimated that about 48% of
the survivors eventually settled out of the area entirely, in BogotA and
Ibagud. The next largest group settled in Guayabal (approximately 15%),
then Lerida (10%).'
Those who remained in the Valley divided naturally into two groups:
the "floating population" and those who went to live in the shelters and
camps.'"' The "floating" population, in general better educated and
skilled, had possessed a certain level of economic stability before the
disaster. Within this group were also small politicians, some
"Santana Rodriguez (1989) uses figures of 80% of the survivors
left the Armero Valley.
"'These figures are of where people applied for their
identification carnets. Although they may not represent the final
destination of the survivors, Resurgir and others have taken these
figures to be indicators, at least, of resettlement patterns. Over the
first year, it became clear that the majority settled outside of the
region. (Data: Resurgir. Table No.1, "Poblaci6n Carnetizada por
Resurgir", April 16, 1986, pg. 28. These figures also include the
survivors from Chinchind, Caldas (the other side of the cordillera).
"'In the disaster's aftermath, an overwhelming majority of refugees
(87%) had gone to live with relatives, most of whom lived outside of the
region. The remaining (13%) joined the different shelters and camps in
various parts of the country, including in the Valley. Most of the
sheltered populations were in camps in Ibagud, with Guayabal being the
largest encampment in the Valley.
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professionals and small landholders as well as agricultural workers and
artisans. It was beneath their sense of dignity to live in the camps as
"beggars". Immediately after the disaster, these families took whatever
work they could and rented rooms in the surrounding villages. Unlike
their counterparts in the camps, the "floaters" maintained themselves
with very little support from official or private aid agencies. This
group of survivors became the most active in the recovery process. They
were, for example, the organizers in Guayabal of the local
representative committee of disaster survivors and, nationally, of the
Coordinadora de Damnificados de Armero, a lobbying force for survivor
participation in the reconstruction. A year later, this group also won
the city government in Guayabal.
The families that lived in the camps, on the other hand, were the
poorest, the least skilled, and the least experienced in community
organization of the survivors.1" Our case study camp was representative
of other camps in this regard. There, 70% of the residents were
functionally illiterate and they possessed practically nothing in the
way of community organization experience. Between them, however, they
did have wide experience in different productive activities, such as
agriculture and animal husbandry, construction, commerce, and petty
services (SCF 1985).
The poor went to the camps to receive relief assistance in order to
survive. By virtue of living within the established distribution
'This is a common occurrence in post-disaster and refugee
situations. Apfel (1987) notes that "while the most dynamic people
among the refugees try to establish themselves as self-settlers where
they find an opportunity to use their skills and capacities, the weakest
part of the refugee population opt for organized settlements." (pg. 25)
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network, the camp families received many more donated goods and services
than the survivors who went to live in the surrounding areas. And, as
enormous amounts of free food, clothing, medical attention, household
goods continued to flow into the camps, the population's resolve to take
the rebuilding of their lives into their own hands waned.
On the one hand, the pervasive relief and the way operations was run
created conditions which made dependent behavior a reasonable and
effective coping strategy for people who ended up in the camps. On the
other hand, the way that aid was managed impeded the Armeritas from
feeling the primary actors in their own reconstruction and from taking
it into their own hands (Canon Moreno and Millan 1987). Unfortunately,
serious social problems also arose there. Alcohol and drug abuse rose
alarmingly, and violence was commonplace within the camps. "The
survivors' state of motivation varied between desperation and
aggression, the mentality of waiting for charity, the death of hope that
leads to inactivity" (CINEP 1986a).
During the first four months or so, few avenues existed for the
survivors, either in the camps or outside, to participate in decision-
making. "The only right that the survivors have had is to receive aid
that others manage and lately to be heard by Resurgir. Legally they do
not have representation in Resurgir" (CINEP 1986a). Their lack of
organization before the disaster and their instability afterwards made
it difficult for any survivor organization to consolidate.
VI. Emerging Antagonisms Between People, State, and Aid Providers
Both the governmental response and the international and national
private response was immediate, active, and pervasive. The number of
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assistance programs flooding the area created a dynamic of competition
between them as they vied for media coverage and attempted to attract
beneficiaries. The relief response was poorly coordinated and its
duration was particularly long. To further complicate matters,
journalists, mayoral candidates, politicians, businessmen, evangelicals,
professionals offering their services, and volunteers of all sorts,
including the stray adventurist, all passed through the area. Interests
of all kinds greatly politicized the aid. The result of this situation
was growing antagonisms between people, the state, and aid providers.
A. Between Center and Region
In the Valley, those working in issues of the disaster -- the
decentralized institutions, the local politicians, and the appointed
mayors -- soon felt bypassed by the government's central management of
resources. Officials of Resurgir arrived to the zone by helicopter and
their visits were usually short affairs. While those in the field were
permanently on the front lines attending the daily problems of managing
the post-disaster recovery with insufficient authority and support to do
what they believed needed to be done. The predictable friction between
those in the field and those in the boardrooms in the capital emerged in
earnest.
B. Between Political Factions
The political struggle between the two Liberal Party factions emerged
in the redevelopment policy for the Valley. Santofimio asserted
pressure at the national level to rebuild Armero in the neighboring town
of Ldrida, his pre-disaster stronghold. Just four months after the
disaster, Resurgir designated Lsrida as the "New Armero" and began to
direct the vast majority of resources for the area's rehabilitation
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there. In Ldrida, Resurgir bought and donated the land and
infrastructure to PVOs who would do their housing projects there. On
many occasions, survivors were told that they would not receive any
government benefits (largely understood as housing and monthly pensions)
unless they moved to the town.
On the other hand, Guayabal, Jaramillo's territory, was practically
ignored by Resurgir despite the fact that it had more refugees than the
former and was legally the new municipality of Armero. Only with
pressure from agencies and others working in Guayabal were money and
other resources eventually redirected to the Guayabal area as well.'
This national level political decision had serious repercussions for
already strained social relations in the Valley. Historically, those in
Ldrida have not liked the Armeritas because Armero, although newer, had
grown faster and had become the commercial center of the region, while
Ldrida remained outside any major development. Many of the wealthy,
more traditional farming families lived in Ldrida. The designation of
the city as the "New Armero" and the invasion of their town by Armeritas
produced deeply felt conflicts and overt discrimination against the
newcomers.
The Armero disaster also became fodder for political struggles at the
local level. In fact, the reconstruction efforts coincided with an
election year. The control over the resources that were made available
"'This same political struggle played out in the national board
room of Resurgir as well. The positions within Resurgir were divided
between Jaramillistas and Santofimistas. The first Director of Resurgir
was a Liberal from BogotA (Pedro Gomez Barrero). Later, a Jaramillista
took over (Carlos Alberto Rocha Jaramillo), and finally a Santofimista
(Bernardo Bonilla Paris). When Bonilla took over, the other camp
started to attack his management of the disaster relief in the House of
Representatives in Bogota.
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became another element in the patronage system in Tolima. Neighboring
towns finally were able to have the school room built or the electric
generator that they had been unable to get before the disaster. The
other side of the coin was also evident, however: many towns lost out
in the partitioning of resources for political reasons. In the camps,
as well, political associations sought to recruit members and sometimes
pitted groups against each other.
Nationally and locally, politicians from both the left and right
greatly politicized the aid efforts, particularly those of the
government. The Left argued that the survivors ought to be given free
houses, health care, and micro-enterprises -- their entitlements
(reivindicaciones) in the interest of social and economic justice. The
Right insisted that the affected communities should not be required to
repay production loans or the partial cost of housing'" because there
were so needy -- a version of the "helpless victim" assumption.'" This
reinforced the growing belief among survivors that all aid providers --
both the State and private -- were obligated to provide them unlimited
support.
"'The House of Representatives, led by the Jaramillistas, in
congressional hearings tried to rescind a requirement that the NGOs had
agreed upon for the housing projects in the area. Specifically, the
agencies had agreed among themselves (and Resurgir agreed) that they
would all adopt a self-help method and require a repayment of half the
cost to community fund. They felt it was critical that some common
elements among the various programs be established in order to promote
the common objective of empowerment, which was being undermined by give-
away reconstruction programs. (Although agreed upon in these meetings,
in practice, each agency did what it wanted to. In addition to the
different construction methods, the actual quantity and quality of the
housing provided by the projects varied enormously.)
'"Chapter 8 will take up this topic in detail.
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C. Between People and Traditional Leaders
A general discontentment and indignation quickly emerged among the
survivors. The survivors' initial cohesion and pulling together
deteriorated as the reconstruction was slow in starting and old
political divisions reemerged. Rumors and blame-throwing were rampant
in the Valley as survivors tried to make sense of how the disaster had
happened and what was to happen next. The governor of Tolima was
accused of mismanagement and negligence and much of the blame for the
22,000 deaths was placed on him. The call for his resignation was
almost immediate. The town priest, who had slipped out of town the
night of the avalanche, was accused of purposefully not warning the
residents of Armero about the coming danger as a kind of retribution
against the town for its anticlerical activity during La Violencia.'"
Both local political and church leaders were suspect, limiting their
role in the recovery.
The people of the region also fought among themselves. Area
residents, who at first so generously opened their hearts and homes to
the survivors, came to feel besieged and to resent the seemingly endless
parade of free goods not destined for them. Clashes between the
survivor and other area residents became everyday occurrences. This
"Armero's town priest was one of the first victims of La Violencia
in the region. The Church was activelyon the side of the Conservatives
at the time. On April 10, 1948, Armero's priest was dragged from the
church (by outsiders, it is said) to the town plaza where he was
decapitated and his body mutilated. The assassins made the nuns witness
the horrifying event. Shortly thereafter, the Bishop of Ibague, with
Vatican approval, placed a curse on the town. The 1985 avalanche is
said to have been God's retribution against Armero for allowing this
murder almost forty years earlier. The contemporary priest's own
survival of the disaster lent authenticity to the curse for those
predisposed to believe.
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further made it difficult for the emergence of new leadership that might
effectively negotiate survivor and area resident interests towards a
more unified recovery.
D. Betveen People and Aid Providers (Public and Private)
General confusion over aid generated much anger among the survivor
population. There were may promises, but the projects seemed slow or
nonexistent. Many survivors felt that the aid was their property and
that the donations should be distributed equally among them.
While slow to organize themselves to take control of the assistance,
many small groups of survivors did come together around protests of the
government's handling of donations. Although most survivors were
outside of formally organized groups, there were survivors who organized
themselves or acquired assistance from different groups, including
political groups from the left and right. By January, different ad hoc
groups occupied public buildings and called general strikes in various
towns to protest the government's apparent inaction and accused the
government coordinating body, Resurgir, of being incapable and corrupt
(CINEP 1986). In the Valley, survivors demanded that Resurgir transfer
donations directly to them, respond faster, continue relief donations,
and also give everyone land, houses, and a microenterprise.
The survivors' discontent also manifested itself in a generalized
reticence to work in the reconstruction of the area. Resurgir and
others had initiated infrastructure recuperation projects that were also
to provide much needed employment. But many of them preferred not to
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work.'" So many that it was common practice to bus in workers all the
way from Ibague and to pay their transportation and higher wages. The
University of Tolima could not find sufficient workers from the survivor
population to harvest the cotton on their experimental farm. All this
with a 70% unemployment rate among survivors. Other projects who had
the explicit objective of employing survivors had to abandon the idea
because of their poor job performance. The project, "Ladrillos por
Colombia", which mounted a brick-making factory (materials necessary for
the reconstruction) was a prominent example. Having started out with
almost 100% workers who were survivors, they had less than 10% just four
months later.
The variety of recovery and development programs had created a kind
of "supermarket" mentality in the Valley. Survivors bounced between
agencies looking for the best deals -- who offered the most and required
the least. Agencies found themselves making compromises in order to
attract the relatively few beneficiaries. Self-help housing programs
found that it was next to impossible to build as planned when right next
door another program were giving away ready-made, contractor-built
houses. The participants in the former felt it was unfair that they
should have to work to receive what another was simply given; they
enacted work slowdowns and stoppages which threatened to bring the
projects to a standstill. As a result, most self-help construction
programs ended up also contract building in order just to finish the
housing.
'"Despite the fact that working in no way disqualified them from
their monthly government pensions. Pensions were 75% of a minimum
salary that a family would receive in normal times.
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The PVOs had other difficulties in working with the survivors. After
the disaster, the poor survivors were so unstable and their associations
so fluid that PVOs found it difficult to build on them or to count on
families for any length of time. With the beneficiaries lack of
organizational experience, the agencies found it very difficult to
implement community-based development projects (to which the failure of
self-help efforts also attests). With the slow implementation of
recovery projects, the beneficiaries' mistrust of the agencies grew and,
in some cases, translated into serious misunderstandings, the spread of
malicious rumors, and even acts of sabotage.
The projects which resulted in the Valley sparked one journalist to
note,
In this area one observes.. .the different agencies
that have given resources have done so with very good
will, but they have not implemented the assistance
with suitable and adequate policies that motivate and
push the victim community to be creators of their own
development.
- El Espectador, "Six months after the tragedy:
survivors do not leave limbo", May 16, 1986.
Development work is hard enough in normal times, but after a disaster
it is even more difficult. It was within this complex environment, with
numerous actors, pervasive aid, and deep conflicts between people, aid
providers, and the state, that our case takes place.
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base of the eruption column, generated by the explosive
eruption, was surrounded by a turbulent density current of
hot pyroclastic materials, including pumice and volcanic
ash, which generated surges and pyroclastic flows over the
glacier surface. The heat transmitted from the hot surges
led to melting of the glacier surface, generating large-scale
floods of meltwater down the volcano's flanks. The floods
channelled into the major river valleys, where they eroded
the soil and surface sediments, resulting in the formation of
lahars or dilute mudflows. During the initial explosive
event, the eruption column reached an altitude of 30 km,
and fallout of tephra from the plume formed a thin pumice
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Sigurdsson and Carey (1986).
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CHAPTER 6
Save The Children's Project Armero
A major challenge that development PVOs face in their post-disaster
programs is how to make the transition from relief to long-term
development work. One of the most troublesome questions is how and when
to phase-out relief and to phase-in development programs. Few agencies,
if any, have successfully answered it.
This chapter presents how one agency, Save the Children (SCF)' in
Armero, Colombia was able to move from relief to development, albeit
with mixed success. Following is a short description of Project
Armero's first year, including the agency's entrance on the scene, its
relief program, the phase-out of its relief assistance and move to
development programs. This case provides the data for in depth review
of the program strategy for introducing development (Chapter 7), the
relationship between agency and program participants (Chapter 8) and the
relationship between agency and government throughout the transition to
development programs (Chapter 9).
I. The Initial Response
On November 13, the news of the disaster shocked SCF staff working
both in Westport and Colombia. The Colombian staff acted quickly. An
emergency committee was formed almost immediately and a small group was
sent to the disaster zone (4 hours from BogotA) to report on the
conditions. As the affected area did not fall within the agency's area
of operations, the acting director was unsure of the best way to proceed
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and contacted headquarters. In Westport, the regional director for
Latin America, himself a Colombian, took an immediate personal interest
in the disaster. He coordinated the creation of an emergency fund and
the formation of an emergency committee to explore options. The two
offices maintained hourly contact as both gathered more information
about the magnitude of the disaster and the relief needs.
The emergency committee in Westport convened on November 15 and
decided that the regional director would go immediately to Colombia to
assess the situation and design an immediate response. He left with
US$10,000 and a media specialist from the agency's public relations
office. By phone, he directed the Colombian staff to purchase emergency
supplies and to rotate staff from the other project areas to the
disaster area. Meanwhile, in the States an emergency appeal to donors
for contributions had also begun.
In Colombia, no time was wasted. The local staff collected relief
supplies and donations which were taken to Armero by one of the field
project directors. With a small team, he managed to enter the disaster
area before it had been officially closed and, through close
coordination with the military mayor, gained permission to participate
in the relief operations. Four days after the disaster, the regional
director from Westport had joined the local team already in Armero.
Rather than staying in the village, the SCF team went to the hills in
the surrounding areas to locate survivors. They found a small group of
individuals and families huddled on high ground about 14 kilometers from
Armero. The families felt safe on the hillside and refused to come down
into the town of Guayabal where the government and international relief
agencies were providing emergency supplies and shelter. The team
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brought supplies and tents to them and began what soon became a "centro
de refugio", or emergency relief camp for survivors on a farm whose
owner had also survived the disaster.
II. The Emergency Relief Project
All in need were welcome at the camp. During the emergency/relief
phase of the Project, thirty-five families lived for varying periods of
time at the camp. At any one time, the camp had approximately 15 to 20
tents. With the staff, the resident families built rudimentary
latrines, a communal cooking area which doubled as a meeting place, and
fixed up the farm's warehouse for storage. Drinking and cooking water
was delivered to the camp by truck. For bathing and washing clothes,
the families walked to the nearby river.
As in neighboring camps, the families in the SCF camp were surviving
completely on the assistance from outside sources for the first three
months. The government was providing occasional basic foodstuffs and by
February, was also providing pensions of Col$4,500 per person per month.
SCF provided weekly market baskets of meat, eggs, vegetables, milk, and
other provisions. A health post was equipped in the camp and those with
more serious medical problems were taken for consultation to the tent
hospital in Guayabal and were provided with free medicines. Over the
first months, additional services such as child care, training
opportunities, and transportation were added.
The first three months the camp was overseen by SCF staff from the
other impact areas rotating to Armero on a monthly basis. Although they
did not have any disaster experience, the rotating staff were
experienced community development workers with a wide range of
experience in administering grassroots level programs. They lived at
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the camp in order to get to know the residents better and work more
closely with them. Their long days were spent buying supplies for the
families, overseeing the daily running of the camp, and meeting to
coordinate with other relief organizations working in the area.
One of the first things they did was to organize the camp families.
Following the models from their own areas, the staff called elections
and the families chose a junta directiva and formed committees for camp
protection, maintenance, and administration of the relief assistance.
The junta, as well as the committees, had fitful starts and their
membership was constantly in flux. General assemblies were held twice a
week in which information was shared and decisions made by vote. It was
the only camp in the area that had no military presence.
Early on, the junta completed clearly defined tasks in the
consolidation and maintenance of the camp. They distributed and erected
tents for new families, constructed the community kitchen and latrines.
They bought the gasoline for the electric generator, watched over the
warehouse of supplies, tried to make sure families did not use the
drinking water for bathing. With the staff, they also worked out the
ground rules for life in the camp which included the residents'
responsibilities in community work as well as a process to sanction
residents who did not comply.
The committees took care of other maintenance and organizational
tasks. The men rotated for night watch duty, for bringing firewood and
water, and for the upkeep of the electric generator. The women
organized the cooking duty, and formed the backbone of the health and
hygiene committee. In addition, other types of groups were formed with
a mix of relief and developmental orientation. They included the
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children's cooperative which ran a small concessions stand and met
together weekly, and the women's group, who shared child care, took
turns preparing the children's nutritional snacks, and received small
loans for a few chickens and a garden.
These community structures encountered difficulties from the very
beginning. Although the junta and committees were to act as channels
for the families to express their preferences about how to organize the
camp resources, the resident's involvement in the camp never reached the
point at which they took initiative. Resident participation remained
largely at the level of concurring and contributing labor to tasks and
plans traced by the agency.
Nevertheless, the community participation during the early relief
stage was quite remarkable in this disaster. The relief camp was
functioning relatively smoothly, the resident families were out of
immediate danger, and by February most men had returned to income
generating activities and their families were beginning to provide some
things for themselves. Building the camp on resident involvement was
remarkable in the Valley where other camps took many more months to
initiate mechanisms to achieve the same extent and intensity of
participation among their residents.
Two months after the tragedy, an apparent stability had returned to
the families living in the SCF camp. As time past, the families had
appropriated the camp itself as their own. The farm's barbed wire
fences and tent struts were converted into clothes lines; the communal
kitchen doubled as a sewing and meeting place. One popular resident
erected a covered space and built benches along side his tent for his
friends to talk away the long evening hours. Much to the chagrin of the
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project staff, families began to construct individual makeshift kitchens
with fires along side their tents. For a short time, there was even a
brothel working out of one tent which began when some "cousins" came to
visit a family residing in the camp.
As more tents filled in the camp site, families began staking out
their territory more clearly with the porches and "satellite" kitchens.
The walkways between tents were worn and also helped divide private from
public spaces. In June, when electricity was installed the camp was
full of blenders, radios, and even a fair number of television sets.
These adjustments notwithstanding, the camp remained an uncomfortable
place to live. Although on a hill benefitting from tne breeze, under
the hot sun the tents were like ovens during the day. At night, the
entire family slept together with no privacy for the adults. When the
rainy season began, water entered some poorly situated tents requiring
foundations and small moats to be built around them. During one strong
rain storm, a number of tents blew down in the middle of the night. The
infrastructure of the camp, while adequate for the most part, was
certainly less than convenient. To bathe and wash clothes, the families
had to make a fifteen minute hike down to the river -- a tedious march
to brush your teeth or with clothes piled in your arms. The latrines
were centrally located next to the tents, but the community lost
interest in keeping them clean and maintained; they quickly became
unpleasant to use and people preferred to go over the hill out of sight
in the open air. Drinking and cooking water came on trucks
sporadically. While never without water, the uncertainty of its timely
delivery kept the water rationed and the agency hounding the
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authorities. Living in these close quarters with new neighbors tried
many a resident's good humor.
At the same time, the daily routine also brought a certain calm.
Families sent their children to study in town and every Saturday,
themselves, went to the town market. During the week, all were busy
working, running the camp, and taking care of their families. Despite
the residents' activity and the physical consolidation of the camp, the
atmosphere was full of expectation and waiting.. .waiting for permanent
housing and jobs to rescue them from their state of limbo.
III. The Transition to the Agency's Standard Development Programs
By the end of December, a five-page preliminary project design for
the development program was approved in Westport. The report read, "the
27 families of the emergency program are ready to move to the
development program which is being defined jointly with the Colombian
SCF staff."' 8 This two-year program plan proposed to support sixty
families in the construction of permanent housing and in the
reactivation of employment opportunities. About 5,000 area residents
were targeted for programs of education and primary health care.
Together, these programs would make up the standard development project
sponsored by SCF.
In early February 1986, SCF hired the permanent project director and
by mid-March the majority of what would be the permanent local staff had
been assembled in Armero.'" A social worker, agronomist, planning
'"From the preliminary project design: Project Vida Nueva in
Tolima. Colombia, Program Plan for Two Years, presented by Jairo
Arboleda, December 1985.
'"From this moment on through the first year and a half, the
project functioned largely outside of the usual agency administration
regimen (communication channels, policy-making, chain of command) and
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support person, and administrative staff had joined the Project -- six
persons with development skills. (A doctor and architect support joined
a few months later.) They assumed the responsibility of the emergency
camp from the rotating staff and began to plan the transition to a
permanent development program.
With the arrival of the permanent staff, the project priority shifted
to the residents' return to work and the reactivation of production
activities. The first order of business was the decision of where to
locate the project, including both housing and productive enterprises.
The camp residents voted overwhelmingly to purchase the farm on which
they were camped -- the choice of a rural site reflecLing their
agricultural capabilities.
SCF purchased the farm at the end of March and the move towards the
development program definitively began. With the ownership of the land,
investment in permanent solutions could get underway. The credit and
employment creation program was the immediate priority. The design of
the housing and the other project components also began in earnest.
IV. The Phase-out of Relief: The Launching of a Crisis
SCF recognized that the time was right to begin the development
programs to provide permanent, long-term solutions. In terms of
building its own institutional base, SCF had approved a two-year budget
for the project, hired the permanent project staff, and purchased the
farm. Prolonging the relief assistance was consuming a substantial
portion of the Project's total resources. Moreover, much of the relief
the decision-making was concentrated in Armero.
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was becoming obsolete. As people were back to work, food donations were
unnecessary. And with the passing of the emergency health threat,
emergency medical treatment was no longer needed. Similarly, families
were wearing weary of camp living and permanent housing was needed. In
the disaster zone, the rehabilitation of the valley's infrastructure was
underway, the economy was recovering (albeit slowly and incompletely),
and other assistance programs had begun -- all important support for
sustainable development. The time clearly had come to move beyond
relief.
And so, the agency began the gradual phase-out its own food
donations. In April, the agency stopped supplying the food baskets with
the exception of the meat rations (in response to a request of camp
residents) and the nutritional supplements for the children. By June,
however, all food donations had been cut definitively. Similarly, with
the emergency passed and the health committees and weekly doctor visits
operating, the agency no longer paid for the families medicines and
medical visits. During this period, the project staff was also
marginalizing a destructive community leader while, at the same time,
trying to develop more leaders and to insure wider resident
participation generally. In this rearrangement of power, some who had
control over resources in the relief period had lost them. Although the
phase-out of relief aid was accompanied by the initiation of the
development project -- both the credit program and the design of the
housing were underway -- the phase-out measures were extremely unpopular
with the camp residents.
The problems between SCF and its camp residents began with the
phase-out of relief. A small group of old-timers, about five original
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families, complained bitterly and tried to convince the agency not to
cut the food rations. Their participation in community activities
dropped off sharply and some families threatened to leave to join other
projects. A growing split within the community emerged between the old-
timers and more recent arrivals. The old-timers had begun to withdraw
from camp activities and to actively pit themselves against the agency
and those who were participating. They were seeing their position of
privilege supplanted by a group of new-comers who were willing to
organize and work in the credit program. Quickly, different leaders
emerged from these two groups and the wrestling for control began within
the camp. What originally was only a protest against the agency's
cutting of donations blossomed into a full-scale internal power struggle
between old-timers and new-comers. The casualty of the struggle was the
entire beneficiary participation.
By the end of April, the community participation was in the throws of
a crisis. The families lost interest in running the camp: the
maintenance of the camp had already become a thing of the past, the
nightly watches no longer existed, the control of water and the cleanup
of the latrines disappeared. The current junta was on the rocks, most
of the committees were empty shells, and the general assemblies had
deteriorated into forums for destructive fighting between the two
factions of the community. Even the most active new families were
discouraged. The community organization that the project staff had
dreamed of promoting in the relief stage was no more than an illusion.
A rash of vandalism in the camp directed against the first production
projects also broke out. The cattle's watering hole was poisoned, the
fence around the sorghum crop was dismantled and the cattle herded in to
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trample and eat the new plants, and just before the harvest, over a
third of the sorghum crop (planted with a SCF loan) was burned by one of
its own partners. Other components of the project were also vandalized
-- for example, the instruments of the camp's health post, supplied by
the agency, were stolen. Although there was no concrete proof of who
did most of these (with the exception of the sorghum burning), the
general knowledge within the camp was that the group of old-timers
committed the sabotage and vandalism.
When these actions did not result in the agency reverting back to a
donation basis, this same small group took their fight outside of the
camp. They began a campaign to discredit the agency both locally and
nationally. The group went to the national headquarters of Resurgir and
to the largest national newspaper, both in BogotA, to report that the
project director was charging families $10,000 pesos to participate in
SCF's housing program and that he had stolen $18 million pesos that a
wealthy American had supposedly donated to the project. They also went
to the mayor of Guayabal to repeat the same stories. Neither Resurgir,
the newspaper nor the mayor paid any attention to the accounts as they
were also receiving the same stories about other aid providers.
This crisis arose at a critical time. Long-term solutions had to be
defined and beneficiary involvement was critical for the agency's
development objectives. Despite the project staff's best efforts, no
viable community forums existed for discussing, taking decisions, and
following through. In the middle of this crisis, the project had to
find the way involve the beneficiaries in order to implement the
community-based approach to the new development programs. At the same
time, however, the project staff clearly recognized that working with
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the current camp families threatened the viability of a community-based
development project.
V. Phasing-in the Development Programs: Coping with the Crisis
To break its destructive relationship with the camp residents, the
agency radically restructured its community participation strategy. The
agency opened the project up to beneficiaries from outside the camp and
requested a firm commitment on the part of the current camp residents
who wished to join the development project. In June and July, the staff
recruited highly motivated families who were better skilled and more
community-oriented than the original camp families. Primarily from the
flotante community, they had had less exposure to the relief network.
Upon passing through a preliminary selection process, the applicant
families formed their own housing construction groups or were accepted
into an existing one in order to definitively join the project. As the
old-timers saw the new families forming housing construction groups and
meeting regularly in preparation of building, they too began
construction groups so as not to be left out.
At the same time, the agency suspended indefinitely the community-
wide general assemblies. Instead, families shared information and acted
through their individual housing construction groups. Made up of ten
families each, their objectives and tasks were narrowly focused.
Finally, to break the over-reliance of the camp residents on the agency,
the staff moved out of the camp and their time spent at the camp was
limited. Meetings were held at the agency office in Guayabal.
Together, these actions were to signal to the camp residents a clear
break -- that the project was entering into a new and very different
phase.
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The crisis demonstrated to the project staff that the relief project
had failed to "set the foundation for long-term cooperation and
credibility with the affected community". The relationship with the
camp residents would not provide an effective bridge between the relief
and development projects. While the above measures dealt with the
deteriorated relationship with the camp residents, the rapid and
efficient phase-in of the development programs was the most important
mechanism the agency had to completely sever the relief relationship.
The early priority given to the return to work and creation of income
opportunities led the agency's phase-in of development project. When
all other projects in the Valley were constructing housing, SCF had
begun with an economic recovery program. Interest-free loans for farm-
based production as well as for other small manufacturing and commercial
enterprises were given to many camp families. The agency also directly
hired camp residents to upgrade the farm and build a school in Guayabal,
and referred them for other jobs in the area. With the reason for
relief largely gone, the dismantling of some of the relief support had
very compelling logic, even if it lacked a warm reception.
Over the next year, the project staff concentrated on transforming
all relief activities into permanent project components as originally
envisioned. With the recruitment of the remaining beneficiaries in
June, the project shifted its full attention to the construction of the
permanent housing. Already in April, families had begun to submit their
drawings. By July, the families approved the final design of both the
houses and of the village, and bulldozers levelled the construction
site. The first construction group broke ground on August 4, 1986.
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For the rest of the first year, the employment and production program
slowed down as the housing program took center stage. Still, loans were
consolidated, training provided, and a few enterprises moved to regular
credit sources. The other programs also further their transformation to
development programs. The education component, which began as ad hoc
literacy and leadership education during relief, moved to formal
relationship with governmental programs for vocational and leadership
training for adults and the New School system for primary school aged
children. The camp's health committee received continued training,
joining other health committees in the region. Social integration
activities also underwent similar transitions. Over Lne period, the
agency's expenditure for relief was systematically replaced by
development expenditures.
The phase-in of development programs also required the administrative
arrangements to make some adjustments. From a short, uncertain time
horizon, tight headquarters orchestration, emergency operating
procedures, and temporary personnel, the project moved to a more secure
project horizon, local decision-making, standard operating procedure,
and permanent development personnel. Emergency financing was replaced
by a defined project budget, and finally, a child-sponsorship finance
base two years later. Relationships established with other agencies
(both governmental and nongovernmental) to channel relief aid to the
project changed to agreements around development resources. The staff
had to leave behind relief duties to focus on the new programming.
A little over a year later, fifty-seven survivor families had moved
into their new houses and the new hamlet was almost completed with
infrastructure and space for small-scale economic activities. The
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soccer field and artificial lake (later to be used for irrigating parts
of the farm) were completed. A school was being built and the children
were already attending classes in a make-shift classroom. All of the
men and some of the women had returned to work, a growing number in
their own businesses. Families were cultivating sorghum, food, and a
variety of fruits on the farm; cattle, pigs and chickens were also being
raised. Still far from being optimally utilized, the farm was on its
way to providing important sustenance to project families.
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P A R T III :
INTEGRATING DISASTER RESPONSE WITH DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
Part III will now analyze in detail the strategy that Save The
Children implemented for integrating their disaster response with
development programs. The objective is to identify and analyze the set
of challenges that the case agency faced in the process.
Chapter 7 evaluates the overall strategy of shaping development
programs out of a relief project, looking at program and management
factors that hindered and eased the transition to development. The next
two chapters analyze the key relationships in the transition from
disaster to development assistance. Chapter 8 examines the relationship
between the agency and the program participants, addressing the
frequently encountered dependency relationship. Chapter 9 explores the
relationship between the agency and the host government in order to
identify what factors influence the relationship and how it may
facilitate the integration of relief with development assistance.
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CHAPTER 7
Shaping Development Programs out of Relief:
An Effective Post-Disaster Integration Strategy?
I. Introduction
SCF's post-disaster strategy was to use their relief project to
establish a presence in the Valley and, from there, to then phase in
their standard community-based development programs. This chapter will
now assess how effective and efficient this strategy was for introducing
the development work.
The task of shaping relief into a development program is a complex
one. Its complexity made the strategy particularly --- Licult. In
addition, the relief project itself produced negative consequences for
the development program. The relationships and operations from the
relief project unexpectedly conflicted with development objectives at
the point of transition. We now examine the program strategy of Save
the Children (SCF).
The chapter draws on three sources of argument and evidence. The
central case, in Chapter 6, sets the overall subject at hand and
illustrates particular points. Recent literature highlighting the
accepted wisdoms and expected outcomes is reviewed in Chapters 1-3 and
referred to here. Finally, other vignettes from post-disaster practice
provide a comparison for the central case experience.
A. The Paradox
The program strategy that SCF used in Armero paralleled a notoriously
difficult -- some would say, failed -- strategy used in other aid
settings. The strategy of starting with social services and branching
into development programs has been problematic on both the agency and
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program levels throughout the history of PVOs. During the post-war
period, PVOs were primarily providers of humanitarian and welfare
services. Those who made the shift to become development agencies in
the 1970s encountered great difficulties, both internal to their
organizations and with their project beneficiaries."" As a program
strategy, starting with social services and then branching into self-
help type projects has also consistently produced disappointing results.
From their experience with refugees, Rolfe et al. (1987) note that "it
appears difficult to change paths that appear to have been set; for
example, switching from grants to loans" (pg. 62). Tendler (1989) found
that microenterprise programs who embarked on the strategy had "great
difficulty to make the... transition from social and welfare services to
the income-generating ones" (pg.46)."' Is there any reason to think
that this same program strategy would be effective in a post-disaster
project?
There are two primary reasons why the strategy might be applied to
disaster situations. First, and most obvious, is the simple need to do
so. In a post-disaster situation, all agencies who want to implement
development programs must first face the task of moving beyond relief,
in one form or another. The agency may have provided emergency relief
and now wants to move to development work. Or they may have arrived
after the dust has settled and found the terms of relief assistance set
by others. In either case, agencies must find a way to turn the focus
""These difficulties have been well documented. See Tendler
(1982), Sommer (1977), and Chapter 2 for additional references.
1
"For other examples, see Sommer (1977) and Myscliwiec (1988).
Sommer (pg. 46) cautioned that, "...the blurring of [relief with
development] goals may negate developmental effectiveness."
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to development programs. It is an inescapable predicament. It was in
response to this apparent necessity, rather than to any deliberate
experiment, that our case agency responded as it did.
Second, a growing number of experts now argue that the difficulties
involved in introducing development in this way (relief to development)
can be worked out. As discussed in Chapter 2, the literature has found
that relief and development do not fit together well because relief aid
has been largely inappropriate (actually undermining development), that
it has a propensity to produce or reinforce a community's dependency on
outside materials and expertise, and because the two aid types embody
very different organizational and management styles.
When framed as such, these obstacles also have obvious solutions.
Relief can be made "more appropriate", the pervasiveness of outside aid
can be reduced and beneficiaries' participation in their own relief and
recovery increased in order to minimize dependency, and relief's
management style made more like management for development. By doing
this, the literature argues, the friction between relief and development
programs can be minimized. These lessons were part of the case agency's
repertoire and brought to Armero by the Regional Director for Latin
America and later by the Project Director in Armero. They both had good
reason to believe that, with those program components incorporated,
building development programs out from relief ought to work.
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B. Shortcomings of the Literature
The recent literature argues that the problems common to disaster
programs can be ameliorated by improving relief delivery. There is
ample evidence that these adjustments have greatly improved relief
itself (Cuny 1983; Anderson and Woodrow 1989). However, there is little
evidence that it has also aided agencies to address the major sticking
point of post-disaster programs -- the how and when to phase-out relief
and phase-in development aid. Today, it is fashionable to downplay
the tension between relief and development programs. The convention of
blaming relief aid for all post-disaster ills, so popular in the 1970s
and early 1980s, has been replaced by more conciliatory endeavors. Many
practitioner-scholars now look for workable solutions -- for ways to
make relief "support", "complement", and "encourage" development.
However, the gap between the principle of a supportive relief-
development relationship and the reality of their too often conflictive
association is glaring.
This tension, I argue, arises from the inherent differences between
the two post-disaster activities. Relief and development aid still have
to respond to fundamentally different needs and as a result are very
different from each other. The clash between them in the field often
has at its base conflicting roles of the aid provider(s), competition
for resources (material and human), institutional competition (between
agencies or branches within the same agency), project rigidity resulting
from the relief commitment, as well as the more widely reported
manifestations of dependency relationship between agency and
beneficiaries. The recent literature tends to forget or obscure these
differences between relief and development aid. The resultant tensions
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and their consequences for subsequent development programs ought not to
be so readily downplayed.
As Project Armero clearly illustrated, the transition to development
programs did not happen naturally and easily. These conflicts between
disaster relief and development programs obstruct the linking of the two
programs. And while field experience has demonstrated that the above
changes in relief may ease tensions between the two programs, one must
be careful not to overstate their effectiveness. Nowadays, it is rare
to find a PVO which does not try to incorporate these lessons into their
disaster assistance; yet the results have been very uneven.
This chapter now turns to an evaluation of the appl.ication of the old
program strategy (welfare services to development) in the situation of a
disaster. Was building development on the relief project an effective
strategy for introducing development programs?
C. Project Armero's Program Strategy
The disaster response "was organized following the good tradition of
SCF of helping to meet immediate needs and planning for more sustainable
solutions.""'
As in other programs, the agency's strategy in Armero aimed "to shape
immediate relief assistance into longer-term, self-help programs" and to
use its relief programs to lay "the foundation for long-term cooperation
and credibility with the affected communities and local governments"."'
"'From the preliminary project design: Project Vida Nueva in
Tolima, Colombia, Program Plan for Two Years, presented by Jairo
Arboleda, December 1985.
'"Save The Children Federation. "Program Department, Five Year
Plan", November 15, 1985.
174
The relief program would be a natural lead-in for a long-term,
development program -- that is, their "standard" program.'" The formal
project objective was to provide affected families with emergency
assistance and then to help them through recovery towards self-reliant
development.
As we saw, the relief project was conceived as orienting both
beneficiaries and agency programs towards the objective of development.
Specifically, the agency planned to shape relief into development
through two elements: beneficiary participation and laying the
administrative and program groundwork for doing longer-term development
work in the Valley. By running the camp with the involvement of the
beneficiaries, the agency hoped to build resident's capacity to solve
problems and organize solutions. Allowing them to take the lead in
rebuilding their own lives was to be an important mechanism to move to
the development program. With the administrative and program groundwork
in place, the emergency project was to lead into a self-sustaining
development project.
The agency provided relief assistance with the idea that it would
quickly shift to standard development programming. Relief activities
would be transformed into full-blown, permanent development programs.
From the beginning, the agency had in mind to build upon various relief
activities and to replace other temporary measures with permanent
solutions. For example, the tents and community latrines would become
permanent housing and infrastructure; handouts of food and interim jobs
"'The agency did not explicitly draw par-allels between this
strategy and other "social-services-to-development-programs" strategy
employed in other settings.
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would be replaced by self-managed enterprises supported by access to
credit and technical assistance. Emergency medical care would be
replaced by preventative primary health care and training; quick fix
skills training in leadership and management would be replaced by access
to government literacy programs, the New School education system, and
formal vocational training. This vision of programs to come was
provided by the agency's standard CBIRD approach.
The most important administrative element that the agency set in
place during the relief period was its bottom-up administration.
Beginning with the first decisions about what kind of emergency response
to take, the locus of decision-making was in the fiela. As in its
standard development projects, the agency employed local resources and
Colombian personnel. As the project got underway, the permanent project
staff had a great deal of autonomy to define and implement the Project.
Also, the camp residents were included in the structure for
communication and decision-making. This grassroots approach gave the
project maximum flexibility for planning and implementation of the
project.
Setting the administrative base for the subsequent development
project also included gaining a "toe-hold" in the post-disaster setting
of the Armero Valley. This toe-hold strategy resembled the start-ups of
the agency's other Impact Areas with the exception that, in this case,
the relief project itself was the entry point. It provided a way for
the agency to establish itself as an important actor in the Valley. The
making of a good reputation in the area, the cultivation of good
relationships with national and local authorities, and showing a "job
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well done" to donors all were building blocks for continued work after
the relief project was finished.
Finally, the toe-hold included speeding the incorporation of the
project into the recovery of the immediate region and community. They
wanted to make sure that the agency's recovery program could both take
advantage of recovery programs in the area as well as fall within the
socio-economic capacity of the Valley. As much as possible, the project
tried to build on what was there, to work through the local economic
channels and not contribute to their replacement or distortion.
By taking this development-oriented strategy, SCF hoped to avoid the
most obvious dependency-creating affects of traditional relief
activities and set in motion the Project's development requirements.
The starting point was a chaotic post-disaster environment to which the
agency had responded with traditional relief assistance. Nevertheless,
SCF wanted to establish a post-disaster program that would have an
impact well beyond the immediate crisis.
D. Two Unexpected Outcomes of the Post-Disaster Program Strategy
The agency had thrown itself into a very messy and chaotic situation
when it responded during the emergency. Coping with the myriad of
immediate problems threatened to be all consuming. However, the
development perspective allowed the agency staff to step back from the
immediate crisis and to act strategically -- to move the Project from
relief to development.
In the process, however, the agency was surprised by two unexpected
outcomes of their program strategy. The first was the tremendous
problems that the phase-out of relief caused. A full blown crisis in
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the agency's relationship with the beneficiaries erupted. Certainly, a
traditional relief project could be expected to encounter resistance
from beneficiaries, but why was this so in the SCF camp where the
residents had been involved in decision-making from the very
beginning?"' At the transition to the development project, the agency
also found its staff and funds being pulled between the relief and
development projects in which doing the former well meant not getting
the latter off the ground. The relief activities had also established a
certain program rigidity that made it difficult to change directions.
Earlier commitments were not easily cut. When and how to terminate
relief programs produced many dilemmas for the agency despite its
transition program strategy. The crisis that the Project experienced --
the relationship with its beneficiaries and the intense internal
competition for resources -- threatened to bring the entire project to a
grinding halt.
The agency's ultimate objective of moving to development was
achieved, but at the cost of efficiency and effectiveness. The relief
project did relief well and prodevelopmentally, but as a lead-in for the
development project it caused many of its own problems, as seen in
Chapter 6. Mixing relief and development objectives for a relief
project, in this case, caused the development objectives to suffer.
The second unexpected outcome of the program strategy became clear
after the transition to the development project was made. The move to
development had been one-sided. While the agency's programs did change,
"'A detailed analysis of the origins of the crisis in the agency-
beneficiary relationship is the subject of Chapter 8. However, some
issues related to program strategy are dealt with in the present
chapter.
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the beneficiaries of the relief project did not also make the move to
the development project, as the program strategy had also envisioned.
Project Armero has been heralded as a "successful" case of linking
relief and development. Beginning with an emergency camp serving 35
families, a year later it had built a small hamlet and was working in
employment, education, and health with 57 families in the standard style
of SCF development projects worldwide. Indeed, Project Armero appears
not only to have done relief well in terms of humanitarian assistance
and beneficiary participation, but also to have moved beyond relief,
transforming that assistance into a long-term cooperative relationship
with its beneficiaries.
But on closer examination, the "success" was incomplete. In terms of
the beneficiaries of the relief assistance, the project had failed. The
agency did not work with a set community over time, facilitating its
development. The families that participated in the relief project were
not those who ended up in the development project. The relief
assistance -- which implied high total and per capita expenditure and
great commitment of staff time to develop an effective community
apparatus -- was spent on a group of families who did not stay with the
project for the long-term. Limited project resources dissipated in
relief without having built a constructive agency-beneficiary
relationship necessary to usher in the development project.
The agency brought in better skilled, more motivated, community-
oriented families to fill the project. The number of original camp
residents dwindled as they moved on to other, mostly housing, programs.
In the end, only five of the fifty-seven beneficiary families in the
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development project -- less than ten percent -- were "old-timer"
families who had been with the project since its initiation.
Contrary to plan, SCF's post-disaster intervention, then, was really
two separate projects with a completely different set and type of
beneficiaries, and a different relationship with them. Linking relief
to development worked only in terms of the agency's own institutional
goals, but not in terms of a group of beneficiaries.
II. Building Development on Relief: Hov effective vas the strategy?
A. Hindering the Transition to Development Programs
By rectifying many of the shortcomings of traditional relief, SCF did
"good relief", as the literature defines it. Project Armero adopted
measures appropriate to the Valley's economy, to culture and the risk of
future disasters; the beneficiaries were involved in the emergency camp;
and the organizational and management style was in line with the
agency's standard development projects. But, as we saw, this
development-oriented relief did not inherently ease the transition into
development programs, as the literature would have us believe. The
crisis in the relationship with the beneficiaries and the internal
competition for resources were formidable obstacles to be overcome at
the point of transition.
The experience of Project Armero indicates that there are some
underlying problems in the program strategy of using relief as lead-in
to development, at least in the way it was done here. The case suggests
that it is not simply a matter of more or less traditional relief that
explains the difficulties that emerge to obstruct relief's integration
with development programs.
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- Multi-Sectoral and Complex Relief and Development Programs make the
Shift More Difficult
The type of programs which are being linked influences the ease of
their coming together. Other cases"' indicate that the simpler, more
limited relief and development programs link more smoothly than the more
comprehensive, complex ones like Project Armero. The same seems to be
true for two programs which are more alike.
Project Armero's relief project was complex and multi-sectoral, as
was the development project. This makes the move from one to the other
a particularly complex and difficult task. As we saw above, the
programs had to change (some phased out, some transformed), as did the
general rules of the game vis-a-vis the beneficiaries and program
objectives. Contrast this with a relief program during the drought in
Burkino Faso. Some of the community cereal banks were experiencing
severe strain to meet the needs of the villagers and faced imminent
closure. Outside programs decided to distribute emergency grain to
vulnerable communities through their banks. This not only provided
villagers with much-needed grain, but also allowed the banks to restock
after the drought and their non-emergency programs to pick up where they
had left off.
In this example, both the relief and development programs were within
the same sector -- grain distribution and cereal banks. There were no
huge change in activities from one program to the other. The cereal
banks were in place before the emergency and they had expertise and
"'My review of the literature and a sampling of project cases
suggests that conflictive relationships between relief and development
programs appear to be the more common variety. However, there are ample
examples of programs which apparently experienced less conflictive
relationships.
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infrastructure to manage relief aid -- that is, to distribute grain.
There was also a built-in return to their usual development role after
the crisis.""
Tendler (1989) notes that successful programs are "one-task" types of
organizations and not those which require complex transformations. An
organization which concentrates on a particular task and does
incremental intervention ("simple tasks") is more likely to be
successful. The cereal banks provided the "missing ingredient" and a
minimalist approach in the relief period. In contrast to Project
Armero's experience of severe constraints at the transition to
development, the cereal banks project demonstrated a good fit between
organization capabilities and the requirements of their chosen task. In
sum, the choice of a comprehensive and complex relief program was one
factor which made Project Armero's transition to development
particularly difficult.
- Development Objectives Compete with Relief for Project Resources
As development programs began, the short- and long-term objectives
competed for the project's limited human and material resources. It was
difficult for one agency to balance short-term and long-term objectives.
Precisely at the period that relief should have been winding down, the
agency found itself assuming more relief functions because the camp
residents were doing less.
"'This is not to say there are not other problems in the use of
cereal banks for coping with the emergency. Fundamental vulnerabilities
in the cereal banks became very evident in the course of this emergency
-- they were found to not be disaster resistant and they will require
outside relief aid in case of another drought. See Anderson and Woodrow
(1989) for discussion.
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The new permanent project staff was tied to relief to the detriment
of the start-up of development programs. For example, the agronomist
who was hired to initiate the employment/income program lived at the
camp itself during his first months. When he began the loan program,"'
he was still overseeing the camp maintenance and the clean-up of the
farm, both full-time jobs in themselves. The same was true for the
coordinator for social programs. As she began the women's clubs, the
literacy program, the New School program, and the interinstitutional
coordination she was still the point person for family and social
problems in the relief camp. The maintenance of the relief project
allowed little time for the staff to plan for and move to the long-term
project components.
In the same way, the project's resources were being split between
relief and development programs. With the continued need for an
emergency camp, the project's resources were tied but, with a fixed
budget, as relief expenditures grew, the amount available for the
development programs decreased. The relief assistance had to be
reduced.
During relief, the close physical and emotional association with the
daily life of the camp had increasingly tied the staff to the
continuance of relief activities. At the transition point, the agency
made some very visible changes in the organization of the administrative
arrangements. With the eruption of the crisis, the agency changes some
'This included assisting the formation of enterprises, assessing
and coordinating training needs, and establishing monitoring mechanisms.
The agronomist's most important task, the detailed Plan for the
development of the farm, never got elaborated in the first two years of
Project.
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very visible ways in which they interacted with camp residents --
specifically, distance was put between themselves. The project director
limited the time the staff spent physically at the camp which allowed
them to dedicate their time to the housing and other development project
components. It also signalled the new relationship with the camp
residents.
At the same time, the planning consultant was working on the formal
Project Design for the development components. Unlike the other staff
members, the consultant did not have fixed responsibilities and could
undertake the deliberate planning function without sacrificing current
work. The project design document became the centrai guide for the
project and was used in the staff's weekly planning meetings and year-
end evaluation. With this document unfolding, the phasing in of the new
long-term activities began.
- The Agency-Beneficiary Relationship Established in Relief was
Inappropriate for Development
The rules of the game in terms of the agency's relationship with the
beneficiaries had to change as the program moved into development
programs. In the relief programs, the relationship had many elements of
traditional relief. The residents were not a community with a shared
history or established leadership; they were a collection of families
who ended up together in a camp. Despite their participation in camp
maintenance, activities and project decision-making, their relationship
with the agency was fundamentally, and unavoidably, based on the
transfer of material donations which provided them with comprehensive
maintenance. In the process of moving to development, the agency had to
withdraw from its delivery role and break the material dependency it had
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created. The cutting of donations and tying assistance to active
beneficiary involvement represented a profound change in the
relationship. Despite all of the agency's efforts to minimize
dependency, just such a relationship had emerged and was the main
obstacle to the move to development programs."'
Contrast this with the relationship with beneficiaries of two
agencies -- one relief the other development -- during and after the
drought in Ethiopia. One relief agency provided food to peasant
families vulnerable to famine through a food-for-work (FFW) program.
The program was innovative in that it paid families to improve their own
land instead of the typical public works project that targets community
or regional infrastructure. By distributing food aid this way, the
program also was able to improve the productive capacity of the
peasants' land. The families were also then in a position to later take
advantage of the government's agricultural credit program to aid
families to recover from the drought."'
Both the FFW and the government credit programs are predicated on the
same relationship with the beneficiaries. They are both exchanges of
goods and services for work/participation in a program designed by the
implementing agency. Both the PVO and the government agency are, in the
terms of Robertson (1984), accessing a population. The shift from FFW,
therefore, does not require the beneficiaries to engage in a new kind of
"'rhe central case study suggests that agencies should not assume
that beneficiaries of their relief aid make good candidates for
participants in their development programs. This latter conclusion will
be treated in great detail in the Chapter 8. We will argue that the
strategy of a single agency doing both the relief and development
complicated the relationship with the beneficiaries.
"'Example from Hay (1986).
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relationship with the agency. Without this fundamental requirement to
change, the relationship is no obstacle for the transition itself. This
is true not only for programs like the Ethiopian ones, but also for
relief with a minimum of direct transfer of material goods to community-
based development programs."'
- Minimalist Approach Unwittingly Results in Comprehensive Relief for a
Few
To set the base for its development programs, the agency worked in
many different sectors during relief. This integrated assistance helped
the camp residents towards a more complete recovery. However, it also
resulted in comprehensive and pervasive involvement ot the agency in all
facets of camp residents' lives.
The agency's minimalist approach in relief -- establishing only a
small camp and resisting the temptation to expand or to take on other
camps -- unwittingly resulted in comprehensive relief for the twenty
families living in the camp at any one time. For these families, the
"'A similar example took place after the volcano eruption in the
Philippines in 1984. Before the disaster, an PVO had been training
staff to work in the villages in community development projects. In
response to the disaster, a municipal committee designated evacuation
centers and coordinated the services with other agencies. The PVO
placed some staff in the centers to help villagers organize themselves
to maintain the camp and to solve immediate needs. Three months later,
the villagers returned home. The PVO staff also went to the villages to
began their original task of community development. They formed
interest groups in their villages and began simple projects that had
rapid success.
In the this example, the PVO was not involved in direct transfer of
material goods at all during relief period. The time within the camp
was also quite short -- three months until they returned to their
villages. Avoiding these elements of traditional relief meant that
their relationship with the beneficiaries, even in the camps, was one
built around organization, not material transfers. This relationship
translated easily and directly to the villages in the community-based
development projects.
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multi-sectoral relief aid was anything but minimalist. Furthermore, the
families stayed in the camp for over a year. Although the relief
assistance was necessary, its comprehensive nature hindered the agency's
phasing-out of donations, as we saw in the case.
- Relief Criteria for Selecting Beneficiaries Collides with Development
Program Requirements
The relief criteria for selecting beneficiaries during the emergency
period collided with the agency's development objectives. Under relief,
those most encouraged to join the relief project were those who were the
worst off and those who made their way to the camp. In the camp, there
were families, single people, young and old -- no one was turned away.
However, organizational experience, stability, coping abilities, and
commitment to community were irrelevant for the participation in relief.
SCF's standard development projects usually require a demonstration of a
given group's commitment to a project. Its absence is reason enough for
the agency to chose not to work with them. 2'" However, when the agency
began its development programs in Armero, they were compelled to work
with those already in the relief camp, many of whom did not demonstrate
the development criteria. The result seriously threatened the viability
of the development project which followed.
Families had joined a relief program. Neither they nor SCF had
deliberately chosen the other for the development project. This simple
fact created a number of problems in the transition period. The
initiation of a beneficiary selection process a posteriori which had
'"SCF document, "Introduction to Community-Based Integrated Respon-
sive Development (CBIRD)", (pg. 19, 1980).
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development criteria allowed the agency to begin to rebuild an effective
partnership with its beneficiaries.
The beneficiaries believed that it was the agency's obligation to
maintain them. Like survivors of other disasters, the camp residents
considered the aid to be, in a sense, their own personal property. As
one member of the junta directiva expressed about his fellow camp
residents, "what the people don't understand is that SCF is private and
is here on a voluntary basis.""' Having joined during relief, they did
not have to agree to any conditions or demonstrate their community
spirit to receive assistance; nor were they ever refused relief
assistance if they did not help at the camp. Simply oy being a
survivor, they had the right to relief. By extension, they thought they
also had the right to partake in the development project. Just as they
had received food and shelter, they now had the right to a micro-
enterprise and house.
Relief criteria meant the agency was tied to the original
beneficiaries. So, while the agency's mandate was to assist children
and their families, a substantial number of the early residents in the
camp were single people. The agency received these individuals into the
development project if they wished to continue. Then there were some
"problem" individuals who joined the camp in relief and who wanted to
stay on. One man was a renowned thief in Armero; one family's "cousins"
that came to visit were prostitutes; two families with a long-standing
disagreement went after each other with machetes; another man raped a
little girl of the camp. The other resident families did not want to
'"Meeting with the junta. May 14, 1986.
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sanction these individuals -- they were afraid of reprisals. After a
few concrete episodes, however, the agency worked with the junta
directiva to have these families leave. Moving these individuals out of
the camp also meant moving their wives and children.
At the point of moving into the development project, the agency had
to get a firm commitment on the part of the camp residents and complete
the fifty-seven families for the housing project. The staff seized this
as the opportunity to diffuse the obligation mentality in the camp and
to chose beneficiaries who were willing to involve themselves in the
development process.
A new beneficiary selection procedure was initiated which required
applicant families to interview with the project staff and to provide
recommendations and references when possible. The project staff made
informal checks about families -- their organizational experience and
skills. As the final step, the applicant families had to form their own
housing group or be accepted into an existing one in order to
definitively join the project. Although the new families did not have
to move into the camp during the period of construction, many did.
By initiating this formal selection process with development
criteria, the staff chose highly motiv .ed families. Within two months,
the development project was full, the housing groups were formed, formal
contracts signed, and the construction groups were meeting weekly. The
original camp families who chose to stay with the project also had to
form construction groups and make a formal commitment to the project for
the duration of the housing program. The new beneficiary selection
process allowed the agency to dilute the immediate crisis with the camp
residents but, it did not repair the relationship with them. The
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majority of the relief beneficiaries did not bridge to the development
project.
- Beneficiary Participation in Relief does not Necessarily Prepare for
Participation in Development: Putting the Cart Before the Horse
SCF wanted to use relief activities to build decision-making and
management skills among the camp residents which would help them take
control of their future development. As we saw, the strategy did not
work."' The agency was unable to establish a cooperative partnership
with the beneficiaries.
Nevertheless, the strategy had some apparent logic. The need for
camp maintenance and the residents' involvement was obvious: Garbage
duty and building a more hygienic kitchen will benefit the health of all
in the camp; taking turns to prepare the nutrition snack for the
children will benefit all of the children; installing the light posts,
building the water tank, or repairing the latrines was for everyone.
But the fact remained glaring -- all of these were temporary
solutions. More emergency tasks were not the answer. The relief camp
needed to be replaced by permanent solutions -- housing, jobs, a school.
After the initial cohesion of the families had subsided, families had
little enthusiasm for maintaining what they saw as their state of limbo.
The project made the mistake of trying to organize the community
"'The roots of the crisis with the beneficiaries are found in the
relief affiliation itself. Chapter 8 will look in more detail at why
the beneficiary involvement in relief did not result in a relationship
with the agency that would have allowed the camp residents to have taken
the lead in the development process. Characteristics of the Armero
disaster and its aftermath, the historical trends of the Valley, the
make-up of the survivors themselves, when combined with the agency's
relief activities made it very difficult to have established the
intended relationship.
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participation around something that is not conducive to organization --
the maintenance of a temporary solution.
Obviously, the old free rider problem also had a part to play in the
residents' neglect of camp maintenance. This problem is more pronounced
at the stage of maintenance of a project than the stage in which
everybody's participation is needed in order to bring something into
being -- for example, the construction of their houses. More
precisely, this strategy of organizing beneficiaries around temporary
maintenance tasks suffered from "putting the horse before the cart". In
the development process, it is usually through working together first on
the construction of the housing that trust, mutual objectives, and
social ties are formed that will allow families to then work together to
maintain and improve their community upon its completion. In the
emergency camp, current development practice was turned upside down.
The camp residents were obliged to work together without the usual
experience of having done so before, and on temporary rather than
permanent solutions.
- The Relief Assistance was an Inefficient Way to Introduce Development
Programs
The relief project was an inefficient way for the agency to set the
groundwork for its development programs. The aid was soon redundant in
a situation where there was an overabundance of relief flooding the
area. SCF's emergency camp duplicated services available elsewhere or
which could have been assumed by an expert agency. The Red Cross, for
example, had ample material resources and expertise in the running of
emergency camps and in distributing material aid. Mounting a
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comprehensive relief program as the precursor to development programs
was hardly the most straightforward mechanism.
Clearly, SCF gained its good name and acceptance through its highly
visible activities and community-based work style; no doubt, this aided
tremendously in the following stages of work. However, other short-term
projects could also have accomplished this, but without inflicting the
wounds of relief and paternalism that plagued the project for ever
afterwards."' Certainly some useful things were gained for the
development programs, but the cost was too high. For an agency whose
primary objective was to do long-term development, they spent a great
deal of their limited resources during relief.
Other options for relief assistance existed that would have provided
SCF an important institutional presence and, in all likelihood, have
represented a greater support to the overall emergency management of the
disaster. Activities such as, institutional coordination, centers of
information, or the organization of sheltered communities and area
residents to participate in setting sectoral strategies were not
undertaken by anyone until much later (some were never undertaken).
These activities would have been well suited to the agency's expertise
in community development and would have been more efficient than the
concentration of limited resources in the support of thirty-five
families for six months at a high per capita cost.
'"In Chapter 5 we discussed the dependency of survivors throughout
the disaster zone in the aftermath of the disaster. SCF joined the
scene as a relief provider and inadvertently contributed to the
dependency (material and organizational) of its camp residents, as the
crisis suggests. Details of this result, despite emphasis on
beneficiary involvement, is the subject of the next chapter.
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In retrospect, the apparent need for relief did not necessarily mean
establishing a full-fledged emergency camp. Camps, although relatively
easy to get into, are often hard to get out of. Evidence from other
projects in the Valley who waited for the dust to settle before
beginning longer-term projects suggest that it is far easier to initiate
development where you have not done this kind of direct relief. The
Swiss Relief Corp, for example, arrived over six months after the
disaster, selected and organized a group of beneficiaries who had been
neighbors in Armero, and began a self-help housing project a full year
after the disaster. Although the project too experienced problems, the
agency was neither tied to problem beneficiaries nor fighting a prior
role as relief provider as SCF had had to do.
B. Easing the Transition to Development Programs
While the relationship with the camp residents failed to bridge into
the development stage, the administrative arrangements set in place
during relief fared much better. The bottom-up management style and the
integration of the Project with other development activities in the zone
during the relief period both were key in the process of transition to
development. Programs, for all their difficulties in relief, also
introduced important sectors for later development work.
- Setting Internal Administrative Base
The administrative and management apparatus of the relief project was
very similar to the agency's usual development project. The use of
local staff and resource, the grassroots level decision-making
structure, the extended time frame, and incorporation of community into
project planning and implementation all are uncharacteristic of
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traditional relief-style administration but, characteristic of SCF's
standard development projects. With this development style, the project
was able to complete its relief function very effectively.
Moreover, the development-oriented management was able to avoid many
of the short-comings of the traditional logistics approach to relief
administration. SCF project minimized the inherent tendency towards
rigid and authoritarian administration. 2'" The decisions were made at
the project level -- at first by the Director for Latin America and the
Caribbean Region who was on site and coordinated closely with the
country staff for the first three months, and then by the permanent
project director. The standard agency procedures were set aside and the
communication channels were streamlined between the field and Westport.
It was decentralized in its decision-making and included beneficiary
participation. The immediate results of this administrative apparatus
was a flexible management style that allowed the project to meet local
priorities.
The usual problems involved in using volunteers were minimized.
Unlike traditional relief projects, all SCF's personnel were Colombian
nationals with many years working with the agency. By using their own
regular staff, the agency was able to avoid using expensive expatriate
consultants who often do not know the disaster context or the agency and
who often leave after the disaster period thereby limiting agency
learning. Finally, although the time frame for the project was
uncertain, the agency did not insist on spending all of the money as
'"Cuny (1985) argues that private agencies attempting to operate in
post-disaster context will be invariably pushed towards adopting these
organizational characteristics in order to cope with the "elements of
confusion and uncertainty" of the situation.
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quickly as possible in the relief stage. If anything, the agency was
cautious, preferring to set up only a small camp. By not having time
constraints, the project was freer to spend the money on those things,
coming a bit later, but more important for the development project.
The administrative arrangements encompassed both product -- the
distribution of relief -- and process -- the involvement of locals and
institution building with an eye to sustainability. The project staff
could decide how much relief to make available, thereby avoiding the
common phenomenon of headquarters overloading the project. At the same
time, the special "emergency" status allowed the project to bypass the
usual administrative requirements which would have been both slower and
cumbersome. All of these arrangements permitted the project to move
faster and to extend a more resources (per beneficiary) than the
standard development projects.
- Setting the External Administrative Base: Relationships vith the
State and Other Aid Organizations
The agency was also successful at gaining a "toe-hold" in the post-
disaster setting of the Armero Valley. Its visibility in the zone and
beginning to incorporate the project into the community and regional
development trends strengthened the project during the initial relief
period as well as easing it into the development stage.
SCF's quick and visible response to the emergency needs as well as
its community-based approach earned the agency a reputation for being
serious and effective. The open cooperation with the local authorities
greatly added to the agency's perceived legitimacy as an important actor
in the area. The Colombian and international press featured the
agency's activities as an example of a good project. Perhaps the most
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visible evidence of the agency's good reputation was the agreement with
Resurgir who retroactively purchased the farm from the agency and
financed the new village's infrastructure."' Through its relief project
and the attention paid to joining the other relief efforts in the
Valley, the agency was able to assure itself a great deal of
collaboration useful for its continued work in the Valley.
The project also rapidly joined with the other relief and recovery
efforts in the Valley, coordinating with other programs--both of
international organizations and of government agencies."' The staff
attended the formal meetings of association of survivors and political
representatives. Many of the project's own activities worked with and
benefitted area residents as well as survivors such as, the construction
of the school and community center, sponsorship of weekly movies and the
town's youth group activities. The project worked within the Valley's
economy. Relief supplies and building materials were purchased locally.
Labor also was contracted locally from both the survivor and non-
survivor populations; salaries were commensurate with area levels.
The agency's relationship with official agencies in the zone greatly
facilitated the sharing of relief resources. These relationships
transferred easily to the development period later. The government
designated the camp an official evacuation and reception cite and
"'Resurgir was purchasing lots and financing infrastructure for
housing projects in Lerida, the preferred town for the relocation of the
disaster survivors. Resurgir was under absolutely no obligation to
reimburse SCF for the land which it had had no part in selecting or
developing.
'For example, the national training agency provided training to
small, preselected organized groups from the camp. The national family
welfare agency, provided training for the camp child care program and
the women's groups.
196
included it in the area's disaster preparedness plans to be used in case
of future eruptions. The project had practically unrestricted
coordination possibilities with Guayabal's mayor -- the key authority
for building permission, access to dump trucks, bulldozers, and other
equipment. Likewise, other agencies were eager to do joint projects
with SCF, like the boys school in Guayabal, undertaken by SCF, with
Resurgir and the International Red Cross.
By linking the project with the local economy and other programs, the
administrative arrangements facilitated the changes necessary to
effectively bridge the project to development. Unlike traditional
relief projects that come and go quickly, SCF's project established key
relationships and integrated its relief response with the economic
capacities of the region.
- The Long-Term Program Foundation is Set During Relief
During the relief period, the Armero project was able to set the
program foundation for long-term. SCF provided nontraditional programs
like education, community organization, women's clubs, and children's
programs. The agency was also able to act strategically during a very
chaotic time. They were able to initiate the relief activities which
would be transformed into development program components. Moreover, the
agency put its efforts in economic and income reactivation when other
aid providers were just building houses. From the beginning, the
project worked in sectors that would help beneficiaries to recover
beyond the need for relief aid. We saw how the employment and income
program led the transition out of relief by aiding families to support
themselves.
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In conclusion, the relief program complemented the agency's
development objectives by providing the administrative and program
foundation for the long-term presence in the area. However, the task of
shaping the complex relief project into community-based development was
ripe with difficulties and contradictions which came to a head at the
transition point. Moreover, the relief project itself produced effects
that had to be countered for the development programs to take off. It
was an inefficient mechanism to introduce development.
That development programs were introduced at all was due to the
agency's coping with the problems resulting from relief and to its
deliberate attention to the transition stage. It was the transition
strategy, not the larger shape-relief-into-development strategy, which
allowed the agency to phase relief into development. Project Armero
really did two distinct tasks in its post-disaster program: It provided
development-oriented relief and deliberately bridged to the development
program. The transition to development did not happen spontaneously; it
required as much attention as good relief.
III. Project Armero's Transition
The most troublesome element in the project was how and when to
phase-out relief and to phase-in development programs. Even with the
time for transition clearly identified, it could not happen overnight.
The hiring of permanent personnel, purchase of the farm, and returning
families to work happened over a five month period, from the end of
December to April. The phase-out of relief, beginning with food
donations and emergency medical assistance in April, continued
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throughout the first year and was overlapped with the initiation of
development programs during the period.
A. SCF'I Phase-Out of Relief was Contingent on Breaking Material
Dependency and the Introduction of Development
With the total destruction of Armero, survivors became refugees in
their own country. They could not return to a home that no longer
existed, but had to start afresh virtually from nothing. In such
extreme circumstances, the complete dismantling of relief assistance was
necessarily contingent upon the initiation of concrete recovery
opportunities such as permanent housing and employment. For many
survivors residing in the Valley, this meant that they would continue to
live in camps for over a year.
Residents in SCF's camp were no exception. The physical dismantling
of the camp was directly and visibly linked to the completion of the
housing construction. In the meantime, the employment and income
program allowed the partial dismantling of some of the relief services
provided at the camp.
The employment and production program was the cornerstone for the
move away from relief. During the transition period, this program also
linked its immediate short-term activities to long-term program
objectives. Families were referred to interim jobs that also fit their
long-term employment objectives, for example. The agency also employed
residents in the improvement of the farm which prepared it for their
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intensive use later.'2  As we saw, with families return to work, many
relief donations could be stopped.
The most visible element of the emergency program -- the tents and
infrastructure -- however, remained. The permanence of the camp made
the introduction of strictly development criteria in the programs more
difficult. With the camp continuing, the need for its maintenance also
persisted. Despite having been able to phase-out some relief aid, the
agency and it's positive image in the area continued to be tied, in
part, to its performance at the emergency camp.
The maintenance of the camp became more difficult, rather than
easier, as time past. The living conditions in the camp began to
seriously deteriorate as the families' initial enthusiasm for
maintaining the camp evaporated (around March/April). The need for more
attention to camp maintenance directly competed with the start-up of the
development programs. What was the agency to do? The staff could
assume more of the maintenance tasks and watch the community
contribution shrink, or it could not assume them and watch the living
standards at the camp -- already at the low end of acceptability --
deteriorate further.
Moreover, the agency had to commit its staff and resources to the
development project -- the permanent housing and income generating
programs. The camp residents, too, had mixed objectives. While many
complained bitterly about the hardships of camp life, at the same time,
they appeared prepared to endure certain camp inconveniences if that
'"For a detailed description of the employment and production
program, see: "Project Nueva Vida, Armero Colombia" (1986) and
"Proyecto Nueva Vida, Armero: Reporte Primer Afno" (March 1987) both by
Guarnizo and Clarke Guarnizo.
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meant the housing construction could get underway sooner. They were
prepared to make sacrifices for the final promise of moving out of the
camp.
In the short-run, then, the agency cut food donations at the same
time that it extended some services that families greatly desired.
These latter services also formed the beginnings of the longer-term
health and education components of the development project."* Most
important, the housing construction -- now the clear priority of the
families -- was initiated.
The persistent need for the camp, its maintenance and related
services, made it difficult to initiate the development programs with
the resources available to the Project. With some sacrifices and the
initiation of the housing and income generation programs, the slow
phase-out of donations and transformation into permanent solutions and
development programs began. The complete dismantling of the relief
project was finally completed over a year later, in March 1987.
B. The Components that Bridged Relief and Development in Project Armero
SCF had to determine how to do development after relief. We have
already reviewed the overall strategy of reshaping relief activities and
the case study identified the steps that the agency took. Here, we will
interpret the components of the transition.
""Among other things, the agency subsidized the children's
transportation and school supplies to facilitate their return to school,
set up a child care center for the younger children and paid for the
instructor and nutritional supplement, and they arranged for the doctor
from the health center in town to visit the camp weekly.
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Project Armero moved from relief to development programs by first
directly attacking the dependency relationship that was the base of the
crisis with the beneficiaries. The staff made a set of swift changes in
the community participation strategy (new beneficiaries and
participation through small housing groups), in the management
arrangements (staff distance from camp) and the program strategy
(housing priority). These changes were implemented within a period of
about two months. Together these actions signalled to the camp
residents the ending of the relief and that a new stage was beginning.
The early focus on the economic recovery of the beneficiaries led the
move out of relief by allowing the stoppage of food and other donations.
The removal -- even partial -- of the material basis of the dependency
relationship was the single most important step away from relief. The
changes in administration and beneficiary participation acted to "jump
start" the agency's development programs. Similarly, the agency worked
with government programs and other PVOs to channel resources to the
Project's housing and employment programs in an effort to improve the
prospects for their sustainability.
As we saw in section II of this chapter, the transition to
development encountered a number of difficulties at the transition
point, such as competing objectives for the limited project resources,
dysfunctional relationship with beneficiaries, and inadvertently
comprehensive relief activities. Similarly, the program elements that
eased the transition were a flexible, bottom-up administration and
functional external relationships (with the state, other PVOs, and the
Valley economy) both set in relief. These can be more generally grouped
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as the following project components: programs, project administration,
and the agency's relationship with the beneficiaries.
The case project's transition to a community-based development
program can be defined as the transformation of these three project
components to development criteria. Briefly, these transformations were
as follows in Project Armero:
The project activities changed from stop-gap, short-term, temporary
measures meeting immediate needs to programs which would provide
permanent solutions to long-term needs with the goal of becoming self-
sustaining. The shift required the phase-out of certain relief
activities, the replacement of various temporary measures with permanent
solutions, and the transformation of others into development programs.
Indicators of the program transformation included: the phase-out of
donations and other temporary measures, the changing ratio of
expenditures for donations to employment activities, the change of
relief activities into long-term programs (e.g. health, education,
social integration), and the changing ratio of investment in the
emergency camp to that in programs and permanent solutions
The administrative organization and apparatus also made adjustments
to move into development program. The administration took on new
functions while abandoning others. From a short, uncertain time
horizon, headquarters orchestration, temporary personnel, emergency
operating procedures, the administration moved to a more secure time
horizon, local decision-making, permanent development personnel, and
standard operating procedure. Similarly, the relationship with the
state and other programs changed from one of logistical support and ad
hoc coordination to formal joint programs with longer time horizons.
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Indicators of the administrative transformation include: Voluntary
staff were replaced by permanent project staff, the decision-making was
consolidated at the project level, emergency financing was replaced by
defined project budget, relationships established with other agencies to
channel relief aid to the project now began to channel development
resources (e.g. brokering for loans instead of shoes), and the
percentage of staff time and other resources in permanent activities
rose.
The transition of the agency-beneficiary relationship required the
agency to manage the dependency relationship resulting from the relief
period and to change from a donor to facilitator relationship with the
project beneficiaries. To make the transition, the agency had to
overcome certain expectations and inertia on the part of the
beneficiaries and to limit its own tendency to do more and more for the
beneficiaries. In the process, the agency brought in new, more
motivated families which ultimately supplanted the original relief
beneficiaries.
The indicators of the transition in the agency-beneficiary
relationship include: The instatement of beneficiary selection process
with development criteria, and the agency matching its approach with the
changing state of the beneficiaries (from their initial cohesion to
instability to false expectations and mistrust) by suspending general
assemblies and emphasizing narrower tasks and participation more geared
to individual and family recovery. On the part of the beneficiaries,
they moved from "input" participation to "initiative-taking"
participation, and eventually to occasional involvement in the
definition and implementation of the new development components.
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In sum, the transformation of programs, administrative arrangements,
and beneficiary relationship (with completely new beneficiaries)
provided the bridge beyond relief into standard development programs.
The overall program strategy (of shaping development out of the existing
relief project) contributed to each component's particular
transformation and the Project's one-sided transition.
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CHAPTER 8
The PVO and Beneficiary Relationship in Transition
I. Introduction
This chapter deals with an area of recurrent difficulties that PVOs
encounter in the transition from relief to development -- namely, their
relationship with program participants. Specifically, we will look at
the relationship as it relates to those PVOs who want to do development
programs after disasters and who, for that reason, look to diminish the
conflict which too often emerges between development Poencies and
disaster survivors, especially those who have participated in the relief
system.
This chapter will be divided into three steps. First, we will
explore the concept of dependency through the eyes of practitioners.
The manifestations of dependency and its postulated origins will be
analyzed, as will the reasons for which dependency is problematic and
for whom.
Next, this chapter will look at the agency-beneficiary relationship
in our case project in order to examine the explanatory power of the
common conceptions of dependency reviewed. The manifestations of the
dependency relationship in our central case have been described in
earlier chapters; however here, we will examine why the relationship
emerged, why it was problematic for the agency, and why the conventional
wisdom of beneficiary participation did not avoid, or at least temper,
its emergence.
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Finally, we will conclude the chapter with a concept of dependency
that stresses the relationship between the aid provider and user rather
than the set of behaviors of the latter. Lessons for practice are drawn
which are geared to those who are not simply interested in doing relief
better, but also in getting to development.
The Concept of "Dependency": Manifestations, Origins, and Strategies
for Coping
The relationship between an aid provider and aid user is complex and
an area of recurrent problems for practice. This is especially true in
post-disaster situations in which relief aid is necessary. The
problematic relationship is often framed as dependency, although the use
of the concept and its measurement vary tremendously. The "dependency
issue", as we will call it for the moment, has emerged repeatedly in PVO
field reports, case histories and the relief literature generally. In
post-disaster programs, it is particularly troublesome for agencies
wanting to help people move towards self-sufficiency.
It is impossible to measure dependency directly (Bates et al, 1982).
However, aid providers use the dependency concept to refer to a
detrimental relationship and a complex of behaviors. The identified
relationship is between outside donors and recipients and is based on
the transfer of goods and services. The relationship implies an
essential inequality. When this physical relationship creates or
reinforces a lack of self-reliance and power within the receiver group,
then aid provers consider it to be a dependency relationship. Moreover,
this dependency relationship is generally considered to be detrimental
when outside resources supplant existing coping and recovery mechanisms,
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making it impossible for the affected population and its institutions to
sustain the recovery without the outside aid.
Most often, aid workers identify dependency as a number of behaviors
on the part of disaster survivors and refugees. For example, when
program participants accept handouts but are reluctant to work towards
their own recovery and self-sufficiency. Or, when beneficiaries
restrict their activities to receiving donations, complaining about the
meager help received, and lobbying for more. Aid professionals the
world round have described disaster survivors as lacking initiative and
waiting for others to find solutions for them. "Inertia", "apathy", and
"passiveness" are common terms used to describe depenency. Although
dependency is an imprecise concept, "it is a visible factor" for aid
providers and one that they must deal with in post-disaster projects
(Rolfe et al. 1987).
Although the above manifestations of dependency are commonly reported
in disaster and refugee situations, aid providers generally disagree on
what dependency is, its origins, and why and for whom it is a problem.
Obviously, there is a parallel disagreement over what ought to be done
about it. Below is reviewed very briefly the theoretical uses of the
dependency concept from which aid professionals' common interpretations
will be fleshed out in more detail following.
The concept of dependency originates in essentially two literatures:
the macro, dependencia school and the micro, behavioralist school.
Broadly speaking, they share the same starting point -- dependency as "a
state of being determined or significantly affected by external
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sources" . " More than a one-way relationship between two actors
(countries or individuals), both literatures speak of interdependence,
or a mutual dependence relationship, which is reciprocal but effects the
two actors differently. Both levels of analyses speak about dependency
as a set of factors that affect an actor's capability to adapt to
changing circumstances.
From this common base, the two perspectives diverge, taking
different approaches to deal with different issues. The macro approach
seeks to explain underdevelopment by understanding economic
relationships.132 They argue that capitalist development results in the
superior power of a foreign society's economic system dominating another
society to the detriment of the latter's equitable and articulated
development. These analyses remain on the national and international
level; the individual no where fits into their analyses. The micro
approach, on the other hand, uses the concept of dependency relationship
precisely to explain individual behaviors which, along with other
factors, they argue cause people to be and to remain poor.13
"'Keohane and Nye (1977) is used as indicative of concept used by
many of this perspective.
"Dependencia theory was a specialized offshoot of the marxian
theory of capitalism that emerged in the 1960s to address the
difficulties associated with modernization theory. See Andre Gundar
Frank (1966, 1968) and Samir Amin (1974) for the use of the concept of
dependency to explain economic underdevelopment. Other authors
developing the theory and some representative works include Cardoso and
Faletto (1969), Theotonio dos Santos (1970), Cardoso (1973), and Evans
(1979).
'"This debate over whether structural factors or individual factors
determine and sustain poverty is a classic in U.S. social welfare
policy. See endnote #1 at the end of the chapter for discussion.
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It is this latter psychological and behavioral focus that disaster
and refugee aid professionals primarily employ. Professionals believe
that dependent behavior may result from either external or internal
factors to the individual. The former contends that disaster survivors
adopt behaviors to cope with conditions around them -- in this case set
by the relief process. Most of the above-noted observations of
dependency come from refugee camps where the aid has been the most
pervasive. The Refugee Policy Group (RPG n.d.) notes that the way
relief is provided creates dependency conditions: "such conditions, and
not some 'syndrome' in the minds of refugees, make dependent behavior a
reasonable and effective coping strategy for people who find themselves
in refugee camps". Similarly, Clark (1985) argues that dependency is
rational for those within a system (emergency camp) that rewards such
behavior. Waldron (1987) also sees dependency as an adaptive response
to imposed social and economic order of the camp -- emphasizing that it
is a learned response to dominating external factors.
Lack of alternatives available for survivors to meet their basic
needs -- when there is only one source for food, for example -- also may
establish a dependency relationship. Emergency programs often do not
allow for beneficiary participation in the management of aid. The
bureaucratic tendency is to retain decision-making and management of the
aid program. As a result, people perceive themselves as passive
respondents to the system; soon, the aid program also labels the aid
recipients as passive (Clark 1985). The longer this external
relationship dominates a person's life and the more extensive is the
"aid", the more dependency behavior will entrench.
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Researchers also study the psychological process of individual and
family adaptation, recently with specific reference to their adaptation
to aid programs. Williams (1990) highlights the process in which
"external factors.. .cause a major power shift from internal control to
external control over future life decisions" and how this affects the
families' potential for action in other spheres (social and economic).
In this vein, Schoenmeier (1987) notes,
A person's ability to act, his ability to activate his action
potential again and again, to be motivated, and to seize and meet
the demands made on him by his environment, require continual
confirmation. Thwarting an individual's possibilities for action
thus means not only denying him experience necessary for his self-
esteem, but also endangering his ability and willingness to
perform in the working world. The apathy frequently observed in
refugees in camps is the result of their having been continually
denied the opportunity to prove themselves.
Finally, scholars have noted that natural disasters often cause
profound alterations to the affected population's social arrangements
and networks. The destruction of pre-disaster forms of social
organization, including traditional leadership structures, may curtail
the ability of survivors to mobilize themselves to participate in
decision-making for their recovery. Likewise, the disruption of social
support and social networks may limit survivors' abilities to help
themselves economically; they no longer have access to important
resources.'3  When coupled with raised expectations about what aid is
available and what it can accomplish, these alterations explain, at
least in part, the incidence of survivors' dependent behaviors.
'Bloom (1982), Dean and Lin (1977), Maxwell (1982), Mitchell and
Trickett (1980), and Wortman (1984) have all identified social support
as an important factor that helps to diminish the effects of trauma and
promotes coping and recovery (as cited by Williams 1990).
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In sum, disaster survivors may not take active decisions for their
own future because of external factors such as the lack of opportunity
and resources, or local control of the resources made available.
Aid providers also cite factors internal to the individual that
create dependency behavior. Psychologists have long studied the
overwhelming emotion of loss that disaster survivors and refugees
experience. Loss may be of family members as well as any aspects of
their former lives -- material, social, and even their sense of future.
Researchers have noted what they call "psychic numbing" when loss is
accompanied by violence; this manifests itself as apathetic behavior,
detachment, or individuals' inability to feel or relate with others,
including their own family (Krumperman 1983). Because of the situations
in which survivors find themselves after the crisis event, many are
unable to resolve their grief (Baker 1984). It is this unresolved
grief, coupled with the accumulation of losses, psychologists argue that
greatly affect their response to aid programs and refugee camps and
result in dependency behavior (Williams 1990).
Another internal cause of dependency behavior that aid providers cite
is the pre-disaster characteristics of survivors themselves. For
example, the population may have a cultural or political tradition which
has not allowed them to participate in decision-making. Lack of
participatory skills, social deference, or fear of assuming more public
responsibilities all may result in dependency behavior, at least
temporarily. This has certainly been argued in non disaster situations
(Hughes 1985). In addition, survivors may have fewer human resources --
certain skills and knowledge which may be important for them to take
advantage of assistance in their move towards self-reliance.
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Finally, there are some aid providers who perceive that dependent
behavior stems from internal personal deficiencies or character
weaknesses. That is, disaster survivors or refugees suffer from some
"dependency syndrome" which makes them dependent. Clark (1987), among
others, has effectively argued that this position "blames the victim"
and most practitioners agree, at least in principle. However, in
practice aid providers still often see the source of the problem within
the survivor or refugee. Aid providers commonly vacillate between two
perceptions of their program beneficiaries who they expect "at one
moment [...] to be helpless, and at the next independent" (Rolfe et al.
1987).
To recap briefly, we have seen that aid professionals identify
dependency primarily as a complex of behaviors on the part of disaster
survivors that may be caused by a number of external and/or internal
factors. External factors may consist of the direct impact of the
crisis event itself -- which destroys social organization and support
networks -- and, importantly, the way that aid is provided -- which too
often supplants indigenous coping mechanisms, restricts opportunities,
and excludes recipients from taking a role in decision-making. Internal
factors may consist of survivors' profound sense of loss, their pre-
disaster characteristics, and personality traits.
Why dependency is a problem for aid providers has been hinted at
above. Dependency is a problem because it restrains people's move
towards self-sufficiency. But it is importance to see how it is seen
differently by different aid providers. Dependency is a problem for
relief providers who want to retire their aid, but who see the needs
persisting. Although relief providers may see dependency behavior as a
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rational mechanism for coping, they are also likely to see it as a
negative mechanism because it is people's yielding of their personal
power for self-determination. For some relief providers, dependency is
an unfortunate, but inevitable, part of providing disaster relief; in
extreme situations, getting aid quickly and efficiently to those that
need it is more important than worrying about dependency, which can be
dealt with later.
For development agencies, however, dependency is acutely problematic.
Many of these agencies have philosophies of community-based,
participatory development in which they define their roles as that of a
catalyst or facilitator rather as the principle "doer" of development.
Their development approach is seriously jeopardized when the program
participants cannot, or do not, take the initiative to lead their
recovery or, worse yet, "abuse" the aid that is provided. In non-
disaster circumstances, people's non-compliance with the development
rules -- namely, the participation in the definition, implementation and
evaluation of programs -- would be reason enough for an agency not to
work with a given set of people. But these situations of dependency are
too often part and parcel of post-disaster situations. By following
relief, development programs encounter significant problems, ranging
from apathy and unrealizable expectations to material and organizational
reliance, as the following quotes from the field attest,
"Villagers who have a history of handouts after disasters.. .make
high-risk beneficiaries for revolving loan funds." (India)
"The goal of this office was to encourage and motivate refugees to
pursue farming and by doing so to become less dependent on the
government of Somalia and outside agencies for food rations and other
assistance. Incentives were offered to get refugees involved in
basic farming...." (Somalia)
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"...income-generation and self-employment projects do play an
important part in helping refugees to move away from the
dependency which comes from receiving aid during the emergency or
relief phases." (Africa)
"...both parties were expecting {developmentl aid to be given in
the same way that food, clothes. tents, and other things had been
given up to that time." (Somalia)'"
To get a development program off the ground in a post-relief situation,
these agencies have to handle the "dependency issue".
Which brings us to the question of remedies. Today, whether aid
providers understand dependency's origin as internal or external, all
recognize that the solution is largely in their hands. Obviously,
however, what they believe dependency to be -- its origins and how it
affects an aid program -- will dictate the particular tact taken to cope
with it.
For a while now, aid providers have tried to design disaster relief
and reconstruction programs to be less dependency creating. The
strategy to limit the time period of their relief assistance -- say,
between 60 and 90 days -- is a classic example (Sommer 1977). Another
tact is not to give grants: "give grants, you assist them [the
refugees] to death" (as quoted by Rolfe et al. 1987). Rather, agencies
have reduced direct giveaways and have required contributions from
participants -- food-for-work programs are the best known of this
approach. Still another strategy is to make clear from the beginning to
program participants and staff alike that emergency relief has a
definite end and when that end will be. To reduce the potential for
dependency, aid providers have reduced the pervasiveness and extent of
"Excerpts taken from Anderson and Woodrow 1989, Rolfe et al,
(1987), and Young (1983). Emphasis is mine.
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the relief assistance.
Besides reducing and shortening relief, aid providers have also tried
to change fundamentally the process of relief. As we noted in Chapter
3, the model of a top-down, logistics approach to relief provision has
been revised. Efforts have been made to involve survivors and refugees
in their own relief and recovery (to psychologically and economically
empower them); to strengthen and build upon local institutions (recovery
of indigenous social organization and support networks); to focus on
education and training (redress pre-disaster deficiencies and build on
pre-disaster strengths -- increasing human resources); and other
strategies for increasing resources and opportunities necessary for
survivors to move towards self-sufficiency.
These development-oriented relief strategies also are aimed to reduce
the internal origins of dependency behavior. They seek to help
individuals to cope and recover psychologically from loss, thereby
reducing the behavioral manifestations of dependency.
Psychological studies of disaster victims have shown that it is
important that they be involved in meaningful activities as soon
after they have experienced trauma as possible, since
participation aids in the psychological coping process.
Psychologists have pointed out that participation: builds self-
esteem; rebuilds self-confidence; reduces feelings of isolation;
reduces lethargy, depression and despondency.
- RPG 1987.
Participation and psychological coping both are objectives in
themselves, but they are also mutually reinforcing.
In a post-disaster setting, added poignancy is brought to the element
of people's attitude or motivation. After a trauma, emotional anguish
can constrain families' pulling their lives together and rebuilding.
Williams (1990) suggests that researchers should help aid providers to
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identify which are the vulnerable families and to design assistance or
special intervention programs precisely to reduce their "psychological
sequelae". A somewhat different approach to changing survivors'
attitudes, Young (1984) argues that survivors must be given greater
power to influence their economic life. Economic power, he argues, will
motivate them, giving them greater self-confidence and personal
involvement with change and allowing them to overcome apathy and
passiveness."3
In sum, the concept of "dependency" is widely used in the context of
post-disaster aid programs. While practitioners most commonly use the
term to describe a set of behaviors of survivors, they also use
dependency to describe a relationship between aid provider and user in
which the former plays an important part in creating it. Based on these
understandings, practitioners have developed different strategies for
coping with dependency in order to implement development programs as we
have just reviewed.
II. The Case: Dependency Relationship in Project Armero
A. The Agency does Dependency-Mitigating Relief and Still Suffers
Dependency
SCF took a number of the approaches mentioned above to mitigate
possible problems in the agency-beneficiary relationship from the
beginning. The agency limited their response to reduce external
dependency creating factors and undertook activities to help camp
"'Young (1984) argues that apathy and passiveness is often acquired
through poverty and oppression. Many have argued that these attitudes
persist because of centuries of colonial occupation and excessive state
intervention.
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residents to cope with internal factors.
Most importantly, SCF staff stressed that the camp residents be
involved in all aspects of running the camp and defining longer-term,
permanent solutions."' Because of the extent of the damage and the
situation of survivors, this involvement took a particular tact. After
the disaster, there were few social organizations to recover and badly
crippled social support networks were difficult to help because of the
dispersal of the survivor population throughout the country.138 This
social disruption and instability were reflected in SCF's camp as well.
Families spent varying amounts of time in the camp; most had not known
each other in Armero. Rather than a survivor "community", the camp
residents were a collection of families thrown together under very
difficult circumstances. In this situation, the agency promoted the
formation of new social organizations and support networks -- through
the camp committees, women's and youth groups, and small group projects.
Because of the camp residents' almost unanimous lack of organizational
experience, groups received training in organization and leadership.
SCF also aimed a combination of human resource development activities
and the opening of economic opportunities to aid camp residents gain
badly needed income and to rebuild self-confidence. Early on, for
example, the women were given small loans to raise a few piglets and
chickens -- activities they had done in Armero. The return to these
activities was a great motivator and their participation in other
personal and community activities increased tremendous. During the
"'See Chapter 6, "The Emergency Relief Project".
36See Chapter 5, "Chaos Settles into Discernible Patterns".
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relief period, the agency also referred people to training programs or
brought training to the camp, initiated a literacy program, supported
small group economic efforts which formed in the camp, and referred camp
residents to jobs in the Valley. SCF itself also made small production
loans available to families and directly hired camp residents to work on
the construction of the school and the upgrading of the farm.
Besides camp residents' economic and community participation, the
agency also invited a primary mental health program to aid the survivors
psychological coping and recovery.'" In the camp, the program was run
by a small group of psychologists; it was short in duration (approx-
imately 2 months) and voluntary.
Despite the agency's efforts to mitigate dependency, the relationship
between SCF and the camp residents shared many elements of dependency
described earlier. As Chapter 6 discussed, SCF had set up its camp
amidst the other larger relief responses. The relief project was
characterized by an unequal relief relationship based on the transfer of
goods and services which represented a very significant portion of the
residents' resources and opportunities. A strong psychological and
organizational relationship was also established with the staff who
lived at the camp for the first four months.
The dependency relationship was characterized by a growing
paternalism on the part of the agency. As the chief source, or conduit,
for material and organizational aid to the camp, the agency found itself
providing for the survivors even after they were able, or should have
'"The mental health program was a collaboration between The Johns
Hopkins University, The Javariana University (BogotA), and the Servicio
Seccional de Salud of the Department of Tolima.
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been willing, to do many things for themselves. What began as a strong
role to get the project up and running evolved into a course of doing
more and more as beneficiaries' contribution dwindled.
For their part, the camp residents came to rely on the agency not
only for material assistance but also for motivational and
organizational aid. In many cases, individuals yielded personal respon-
sibility to the aid provider; a kind of "passive dependency" developed.
After the initial cohesion that founded the camp, the residents began
withdrawing from camp operations and activities and the junta and
committees slid into inactivity (despite best efforts of the agency).
As time past, the camp residents initiated a permanent demand for more
relief services and donations, not even demanding permanent solutions at
that point. Four months later as the shift to development programs
began, the agency required that program participants contribute to the
process for them to benefit from it. The protests grew louder and the
vandalism against community projects and the slandering of the agency
grew to a fever pitch. This kind of protest before a voluntary agency
is a more "active dependency".""
The dependency relationship established in relief was problematic for
the agency as we have seen saw in earlier chapters. The decline of the
residents' involvement in the camp maintenance resulted in deteriorating
health conditions and stole staff time from permanent solutions. Also,
the manifestations of dependency -- the agency's growing paternalism and
program rigidities and the camp residents' expectations, internal power
"*Note that protest is not always considered to be dependency. See
endnote #2.
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interests, and behavior"' -- obstructed the shift to development
activities.
Why were the approaches taken by SCF to mitigate the dependency
relationship unsuccessful? The disaster and refugee assistance
literature claims that involving the camp residents in assisting
themselves will "avoid the all too familiar dependency syndrome of 'over
assistance' programmes...." (Rapport 1987/88). But, despite these
efforts, the project suffered a severe dependency relationship. The
literature further claims that beneficiary involvement in program
planning improves the effectiveness of projects, even in emergencies,
and that it lays "the foundation for more self-reliant forms of
development" (Rapport 1988). We saw in Chapter 6 a case completely
contrary to this prospect.
Why did the involvement of people in the decision-making and
implementation not avoid dependency in the relief project? Why did the
beneficiary participation not set a fruitful relationship for long-term
development?
The following sections will analyze why simply involving camp
residents in assisting themselves did not avoid the dependency
relationship in Project Armero. We will look first at the outcomes of
the program to aid camp residents cope with the loss and grief -- that
is, what the literature has argued the internal origins of dependency.
Here, the residents' participation was critical in aiding them to cope
with the emotional and psychological trauma after the tragedy. This
"'See Chapters 6 ("The Phase-Out of Relief: The Launching of a
Crisis") and 7 (various sections) for discussion of these.
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positive outcome, however, did not aid the project to avoid the
dependency relationship nor its final blossoming into crisis.
Second, we will show that it was the external factors which were more
important in producing dependency. As the literature predicted, factors
from Armero's post-disaster environment -- such as, the pervasive and
prolonged aid -- did set the conditions for dependency on outside
material assistance, and with particular intensity as we have seen.
Just as important were the pre-disaster conditions -- the economic
relationships and political traditions of the Valley. Together with
particular characteristics of the survivors (skills, resources and
organization), these external factors also set the framework for the
relationships that formed between survivors and aid providers. We will
see how SCF inadvertently reinforced these dependency creating
conditions despite a relief effort designed to do otherwise. This
detailed review of Project Armero's experience will also illustrate why
the beneficiary participation did not set a fruitful relationship for
long-term development.
B. The Internal Origins of Dependency
We now turn to the internal origins of dependency and what the case
agency did to help survivors to cope with emotional and psychological
trauma.
- Psychological Factors
People's psychological recovery is an integral element in their total
recovery (Cuny 1983). Their psychological stress is not an inherently
debilitating "victim syndrome", but dependency is exacerbated by
despondency, depression, and other symptoms of emotional distress. Aid
agencies do no often design their programs to directly aid the
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psychological recovery of disaster survivors; instead, they tend to
focus on reconstruction or economic recovery. 1 2 However, the
psychological recovery is also an important element for people to take
their own initiative.
In the Armero Valley, emotional distress was a widespread and
significant problem. A study done on site by Bruno Lima et al. (1987)"3
found that,
about one half of adults in tent camps, and patients coming to the
health clinics in neighboring towns, had significant levels of
emotional distress, most of which warranted a formal psychiatric
diagnosis.
The same study also found that distress was not predicted by the
individual's experience in the disaster itself, but rather
emotional distress seemed to be more closely related to the social
and environmental conditions present after the disaster such as
having lost a job, not having formulated definitive plans for the
future, and not knowing a specific date for leaving the tent
camps. Also, the aspect of the camp which was most frequently
mentioned as being troublesome and upsetting was the behavior of
fellow victims, and not the heat, nor the lack of water, nor the
poor quality of the tents. (emphasis mine)"'
Survivors are not victims of the uncontrollable disaster event in their
past. What aid agencies do in the relief stage does have a tremendous
impact on the emotional well-being and recovery of survivors.
"
2In this regard, SCF's encouragement of the survivors'
psychological coping process so early was unusual in the Armero Valley.
In fact, the psychiatrists of the study complained of the lack of
concern for the mental health on the part of other agencies in the
Valley.
"
3The project undertaken jointly by Dr. Bruno Lima and Shaila Pai
of The Johns Hopkins University, Dr. Hernin Santacruz and Dr. Julio
Lozano of the Universidad Javariana, and Dr. Jairo Luna of the Servicio
Seccional de Salud, Department of Tolima.
"'Excerpts from the Bruno Lima's introduction for a forthcoming
photo book on the Armero disaster and recovery.
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Psychological recovery and participation can be sped along by doing the
right thing after the disaster; or, they can be stymied by ill-conceived
relief responses.
It appears that the approach that SCF took was "the right thing" to
aid psychological coping and recovery. Professionals working in the
area"5 agreed that the residents of SCF camp were unusual in that they
demonstrated less of the manifestations of emotional distress -- "most
prominently anxiety, depression, alcohol and drug abuse, suicide and
violence" -- relative to other camps (Lima et al. 1987).
Of course, residents of the SCF camp did suffer some symptoms of
emotional distress. For example, for almost a year atter the disaster
each time it rained heavily at night, the camp residents would not sleep
from fear and anxiety. It had rained heavily the night of the
avalanche. Some people refused to talk about what had happened to them
the night of November 13; others refused to ever return to the site of
Armero, just 14 km. away. Five months after the disaster, two women on
separate occasions chased their own children around the camp with
kitchen knives. They then collapsed into comatose states only to
recover without any memory of the incident. Shortly after these
episodes, two machete fights broke out among different men in the camp.
These fights occurred within a week of each other. Both sets of
incidents corresponded with waves of similar events in other camps.
(These events were monitored by the Department of Health psychologists).
"'Interview with psychologist and nurse from the Departamento de
Salud del Tolima, Fall 1986. Dr. Lima interviewed in Baltimore, Fall
1987.
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Other symptoms commonly found in the other camps did not persist if
they even appear in the first place. A group of psychologists,
sociologists, and social workers from SENA-Senalde also noted that
"maladjustment in the emotional roles, neglect of the fulfillment of
their home duties and decomposition of the family because of disinterest
in regrouping" were common in the sheltered population where channels
for participation were not particularly frequent at first (article in El
Espectador, 16 May, 1986).
However, in the case camp, recovering self-confidence and dignity
showed itself through earnest and growing voice in general assemblies,
an eagerness to return to work, and returning their children to school
early, among others. The consensus of these professionals was that SCF
families' early return to meaningful activities -- employment as well as
community activities -- had reduced the factors which contributed to
emotional distress.
The self-reinforcing relationship between participation and the
psychological coping process was corroborated by Lima et al,'s study
which looked at survivors residing in four tent camps in the Armero
Valley, eight months after the disaster event. Notably, the study found
that two thirds of the residents of the SCF camp said they were
satisfied with their circumstances in the project of their choice (a
"fair to good" rating). This compared with just one third of the
respondents of the three other camps in the study who rated their
situation favorably.
This feeling of well-being, in turn, influences what we loosely call
the survivors' "motivation", "enthusiasm", or "optimism". While
difficult to measure its impact scientifically, this quality is
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undeniably a key element in the families' struggle for total recovery.
From the point of view of the psychologists in the zone, SCF insistence
on beneficiary participation, focus on the rapid return to work, and
keeping the project moving forward decreased the conditions that
contribute to emotional stress. The camp residents early
accomplishments provided elements that, in theory, would be necessary to
combat dependency -- psychological recovery, positive experiences in
problem-solving, and an apparent mechanism for beneficiary-agency
cooperation.
Although an effective and appropriate means to organize relief
assistance during the first months, neither the families' participation
nor the effective relief project translated directly into the
development phase of the project. As the project began its shift, the
agency-resident relationship deteriorated. As "cooperation and
credibility" with the camp families were seriously threatened, the goal
of building the foundation for long-term relationship proved to be an
elusive goal for SCF's relief project.
- Human Resource Factors
The survivors of the tragedy came primarily from Armero's poor.
Before the disaster, these groups had no history of popular
organizations; they were accustomed to participate in political
patronage networks. The residents of SCF's camp also had a low level of
literacy, with 70% of the residents being functionally illiterate. The
residents did, however, have a wide experience in different productive
activities such as agriculture and animal husbandry, construction, petty
commerce, and services. But, after the tragedy they were left without
their former sources of employment. The farms where they had been day
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workers lay under mud, home gardens and small animals had been swept
away, the market for their goods and services no longer existed. They
were completely without property (machine or land) or, for the most
part, any form of capital.
However, other factors were more important than low literacy and
skill levels for influencing the survivors' economic recovery. In fact,
both skilled and unskilled among the camp residents found jobs or began
small enterprises, most with assistance from the agency. They also
received training and technical assistance. More problematic was the
general scarcity of jobs and the weak local demand for their goods and
services. Social factors such as people's instability, which kept them
from a steady job or training program, also was probably more important
than individual capabilities for economic recovery.
C. The External Origins of Dependency
- Post-Disaster Factors
The disaster literature repeatedly remarks that inherent in all
disasters are factors which can produce dependency on outside material
and organizational assistance (Rolfe et al. 1987; Cuny 1983; AFSC 1983;
Young 1983; Sommers 1977). In the Armero disaster, all of the dreaded
factors were present, and with particular intensity. The extent of the
damage was immense which produced severe social and economic disruption
in the Valley and required the relocation of the entire affected
population. Unlike other disasters, Armero survivors were left with
virtually nothing. This situation precipitated an equally immense
amount of assistance only available from the outside. Both the
governmental response and the international and national private
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response was immediate and active. The relief response was also poorly
coordinated, overly pervasive and prolonged.
The extreme disaster impact and the situation of the survivors
resulted in particularly unequal relationships between aid givers and
receivers. On the one hand, the survivors who went to live in the camps
were the poorest and with the fewest material resources. On the other,
the assistance agencies had all that the survivors felt they needed.
These agencies assumed a strong role of planner and implementor in order
to insure that their projects got running.
Moreover, the Armero disaster was extreme by any standards. The
economic disruption limited the resources and options available for
recovery and development for those staying in the Valley. The
disruption of social organization and support networks was worsened by
apparent acts of negligence, political favoritism, and mismanagement of
resources by the few traditional leaders left. Most detrimental,
however, was the physical dispersion of people and their extended
instability which meant that social mechanisms for recovery remained
weak or nonexistent.
The tremendously lopsided distribution of resources -- not only
material, but social and organizational as well -- made the uneven
relationship which developed between outside aid providers and inside
aid users practically inevitable. It is no surprise that widespread
dependent behavior was observed in the camps and shelters throughout the
Valley. The literature widely acknowledges that this
approach can stifle refugee participation, initiative, and self-
sufficiency by being inappropriately pervasive during the
emergency phase and perpetuating relief activities long after the
real emergency is over.
- R.P.G. (n.d.).
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Facilitating the development of new social structures takes time; a more
equal relationship between insider and outsider also takes time to
develop.
- Pre-Disaster Factors:
The Valley's history of export dependency and political traditions
exacerbated the disaster's impact, hindering people's recovery and
further setting the scene for the dependency relationship that
inadvertently arose between survivors and aid providers, such as SCF.
With Armero's disappearance, the survivors were left without their
previous sources of urban employment and had to turn to the agricultural
sector, the only other employer in the Valley (see Chapter 4). But the
agricultural sector had lost land under the mud and itself was in
decline because of the recession of the early 1980s and the increasing
share of cattle raising which employed even less labor than mechanized
farming. Agriculture simply could not absorb the "newly released" labor
from Armero.
Furthermore, many Armeritas had more urban skills, such as commerce,
services, small manufacturing, and construction. Few of these kinds of
jobs existed in the surrounding towns either. Because the Valley's
economic production had always been outward-oriented, intra-regional
infrastructure and markets were very weak or nonexistent. Even with
small production loans, these urban skilled workers had little demand
for their products. Many of their small enterprises went broke in the
first year. To replace demand would be a lengthy process.
In terms of economic factors, the Valley's outward-oriented
development had restricted employment opportunities to the agricultural
sector and had stymied the development of internal markets, both
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conditions which limited the survivors' opportunities for economic
recovery.
As we saw in an earlier chapter, the country's history of
exclusionary politics and the vestiges of the Frente Naclonal
arrangements had produced in the Armero Valley one of the most
politicized public administrations in the country and a fierce
competition between local political bosses for the control of a well-
developed patronage system. This same system had also left few
community organizations outside the apparatus of the traditional
parties. Clientalism and patronage were important ingredients in the
traditional relationship between residents of the Valley and the
Colombian state.
Furthermore, after La Violencia during the 1960s, the Colombian state
initiated a type of "reform from above" which was to pacify rural areas
in which violence had been severe. The specific aim was to preempt the
possibility of marxist guerilla movements reorienting the interparty
feud-like conflicts towards a revolutionary movement based on class
struggle (Smith 1985). The governments of the Frente Nacional initiated
a series of social reforms that brought visible material improvements
such as accelerated provision of housing and schools and new health
clinics to rural areas. At this time, too, juntas de accidn comunal
were established -- community action boards which were set up in both
rural and urban areas to improve communities' access to and
participation in expanding government programs and services. These
relationships with the Colombian state also functioned largely through
networks of patronage.
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Finally, the Colombian government has a history of offering the poor
material benefits and services when threatened by popular unrest.
Material benefits, rather than significant access/input into decision-
making, has been a successful policy to prevent poor people from
mobilizing significantly in opposition to the regime. The poor in
Colombia are not particularly politically radical but do want material
improvements in the quality of their lives (Smith 1984; Evers et al
1983). For that reason, they commonly stop their protest without
pushing further for political change when the state responds materially
to their protests.146
The meeting of popular protest with material concessions widely
characterizes the relations between the poor and the Colombian State; as
do networks of clientalism and patronage which function in largely the
same way with the added intermediary role of the regional boss and his
party apparatus. These mechanisms of interaction were the ones most in
tact in the Armero Valley after the disaster. As we shall now argue,
they also influenced the survivors' interaction not only with the State
but also with other aid providers.
C. SCF's Relief Response as Origin of Dependency
SCF's own program strategy resulted in the mixing of traditional
relief elements (immediate response, emergency camp, comprehensive aid)
'"Colombian social movements have widely used the mechanism of the
paro civico (the civil protest) to demand redress of social grievances.
During the 1970s and 1980s, these proved an effective means to gain
potable water, electricity, transportation services and the like. The
government did use a combination of material concessions and repression
to face these protests, but in almost forty percent of the paros
concessions were made (Santana 1983). In these cases, the protest
movement subsided once the government had responded materially.
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with elements of development (participation and long-term objectives).""
Inadvertently, this approach resembled traditional dependency-generating
relationships well-known in the Valley. The agency's role vis-a-vis the
camp residents mirrored those of the familiar patron and broker in the
Armero Valley. By resembling these roles, SCF's relief response
contributed to the dependency relationship between with its
beneficiaries.
When struck by disaster and then disaster assistance, survivors drew
upon their understanding from the past in order to respond to their
tumultuous present. An anthropologist, Anthony Oliver-Smith, explains
it this way,
In situations of massive change, people will attempt to gain
understanding of or control over changed conditions by structuring
them in terms of familiar concepts and working out new solutions
to new problems with tested understandings from the past.
- Oliver-Smith 1986.
For the survivors at the camp, the apparent patron relationship
allowed them to cope with the emergency in a familiar way. However,
these well-known patterns also reinforced their expectations of how the
recovery and development stages would be that ran counter to SCF's
standard development philosophy and plans for its development project.
Just five months later when the Project tried to make the transition to
development, the relationship that had grown up around relief, even with
all the anti-dependency efforts, was incompatible with the development-
style assistance; the result was the crisis in the agency's relationship
with the camp residents.
"'See Chapter 5 and 6.
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We will now offer an explanation for the emergence of this dependency
relationship. With the factors from the disaster context and the pre-
disaster characteristics of the Valley in focus, we will look at how the
agency's relief approach elicited dependency behavior from both itself
and the program participants.
- Relief Response Unvittingly Reproduced a Traditional Dependency
Relationship
By assuming the complete material support of the camp residents in
time of distress, the agency played the role of the traditional patron,
shielding its families in times of hardship. In return, the residents
gave the agency esteem, information, and cooperation. Even though the
residents contributed to the needs assessment and distribution of the
assistance, the agency had superior capacity to bestow tangible goods
and services as well as to organize the project -- the unequal
relationship being the hallmark of a patron-client relationship (Wolf
1966).
Through setting up the camp and aiding the residents materially with
donations as well as finding jobs for them and even hiring them
directly, the agency gave the impression, at least implicitly, that it
was assuming personal responsibility for maintaining the residents.
Early on, the agency also initiated discussion with the residents about
housing, employment and their futures generally, thereby giving every
indication that it was staying and could be counted on for the longer
term.
The residents, in turn, began to get to know the agency and to see
what benefits were available through their affiliation with the camp.
Over the first two months, their confidence grew in the security of
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their basic needs and in the agency's continued assistance. The camp
residents were more interested in developing the relationship with the
agency in order to receive benefits, than to influence the agency or
possible programs.'" As one camp resident explained, "you can get as
much as you ask for". Other comments, such as "this agency doesn't need
any kind of help from anybody" reflected the sentiments about the
capacity of their benefactor. Indeed, both agency and residents had
entered into a kind of implicit contract with the other.
Concurrently, this same relationship was experienced by other aid
providers and their program participants throughout the Valley. As Wolf
(1966) explains,
... the potential competition of patron with patron
that offers the client his leverage, his ability to
win support and to insist on its continuation. The
relation remains reciprocal, each party investing in
the other.
Throughout the first six months, over thirty-five organizations arrived
to the Valley to begin development programs. The agencies competed with
each other to attract and keep groups of survivors. The survivor
population moved between these, shopping for the "best deal". Should
beneficiaries of one project decide to move, either individually or in a
group, this would deny the agency its reason for being there in the
first place. In this way, some agencies in the Valley succumbed to
pressure to require less contribution from their beneficiaries."'
'"Nelson (1979) argues that this concern is the client's primary
motivation.
"'Many housing projects gave up their self-help methodology to give
away houses without any beneficiary contribution. By the end of the
first year, however, Resurgir and the agencies began to coordinate among
themselves to control who benefited from each project, and that they
only benefit from one.
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This came close to happening to the SCF project in March, before the
farm was purchased, when the new camp leadership met clandestinely with
another PVO in the area to see if they would receive their group into
their housing project. The other agency appeared to be moving faster;
they had land assigned for their project in Guayabal and were making
first contacts with potential participants in their program. After
talking with many people in the area, the group decided not to go only
because they became convinced that SCF offered more in the end.
In April, as the agency was beginning to phase out the donations, the
residents applied pressure for their continuance. They complained
bitterly and tried to convince the agency not to cut the food baskets.
Participation in community activities dropped off sharply and some
families again threatened to leave to join other projects. In the face
of what appeared to be their benefactor's reneging of his obligation, a
group of the residents made up exclusively of the "old-timers" (those
who had been with the camp since its very beginning) withdrew their
support, esteem, and cooperation from the agency -- that is, they
withdrew their part of the patron-client bargain. As we have seen, the
families protested as they knew how through complaining, non-
participation, and later sabotage."'
Throughout relief, the agency also operated as the intermediary or
broker between the camp residents and the sources of national and
international relief assistance (Wells 1982; Tendler 1982). The would-
be traditional brokers -- local economic elite, churches, politicians,
and the like -- were either no longer present or not up to the magnitude
'
50See Chapter 6, "The Phase-Out of Relief: The Launching of a
Crisis".
235
of the job. The links with external resources were, in many cases,
critical for families' survival and economic recovery.
SCF bridged the gap between different social groups -- the camp
residents, who were exclusively from lower income rural families and
working class groups, and the resource providers, who were most often
international donors or professional groups from the capital. In
essence, the agency functioned as the broker between other patrons and
the clients -- a match-maker for agencies with resources in search of an
organized group of survivors to service. "' For some cases, SCF also
functioned as the co-signer on loans; for others, the agency functioned
as the informal guarantor for resources transferred to the camp
residents.
The agency was able to augment their own funds with resources from
other groups and enlarge the project. As the agency was able to do
more, it also improved its reputation in front of its own donors in the
U.S., increasing the possibility for their continued support. And
through its cooperation with local institutions, the agency gained a
reputation as an important actor in the zone. These were all very
important considerations for the effectiveness of the agency's longer-
term development program to come.
In turn, the camp residents had access to resources and services that
they may not have known about or the capability to negotiate themselves.
They also experienced contact with different donors, many for the first
"'During relief, international groups had all kinds of things to
distribute -- blankets, clothes, toiletries, to mention just a few.
Later, the Forrest Service looking for someone to give seedlings to and
the International Red Cross trying to give small business loans. All
were looking for needy and organized groups with which to interact.
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time. SCF saw this as the first step towards transferring brokerage
skills to the residents so that in the future they might be able to
negotiate resources for themselves."2
Within the camp, the residents themselves reproduced the broker and
patron roles. By involving the community's junta to distribute the
relief assistance, the agency's participation strategy allowed the
emergence of caudillo-style leadership, the result of which was the
creation of unequal relationships among the camp residents themselves.
A system based on favors emerged and struggles for leadership of the
junta centered around the control of relief resources.'"
The small group which formed the first junta was eager to participate
in activities that enhanced their stature as resolvers of the
community's problems. Their legitimacy as leaders depended on what they
could deliver to the rest of the families. Without hesitation, they
transported and distributed the food, clothes, tents, and medical
supplies. The junta even held the keys to the storage warehouse, with
its stockpile of supplies.
The president of the junta, in particular, was trying to assume the
position of broker between SCF and camp residents. As in the caudillo
tradition, he wanted to gain the community's allegiance and the right to
be their leader because of his ability to deliver. Having the group of
families behind him, he could negotiate what he wanted from the agency.
As the intermediary, he wanted to become indispensable to both parties.
"'Part of CBIRD is the "vertical integration" which is essentially
this broker relationship.
"'This phenomenon is commonly expressed in refugee camps (Rapport,
no.1, Winter 1987/1988, pg. 8).
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So, through both his apparent and real control of goods arriving to the
camp, the president enhanced his stature in front of the other camp
residents."'
Some residents gave their allegiance to the president who they
believed was "resolving" their problems for them. This group became the
lobbying force for the continuation of relief assistance and the
distribution of development assistance in the relief-style. They were
made up exclusively of "old-timers"."'
Certainly this kind of clientalist leadership relationship can be
understood as a kind of participation. The agency, however, had a
different view of the desired kind of participation tnat is more closely
described by the term, empowerment. The staff believed that brokerage
skills were certainly part of any empowered community, but not to the
exclusion of broad participation in the development process. The
internal broker and caudillo role assumed by the president of the junta
was threatening to substitute a system of individual alliances for the
residents taking more direct and broad involvement in goal setting and
decision-making for the Project.
Finally, the emergency camp during the relief period resembled the
way in which communities organized in order to participate in the
government's programs and services through juntas de accidn comunal.
SCF established the camp in order to distribute donated goods and
"'Arriving to the camp with donated shoes that SCF had asked him to
pick up from the Red Cross, he would loudly proclaim, "Come, see what I
have managed to get for you...." He also did not give shoes to some
families who he did not like.
"For how this played out, see Chapter 4, "The phase-out of relief:
the launching of a crisis".
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services. Although the people were asked to organize and be involved in
the program, camp residents familiar with government programs understood
their participation primarily as a way to collect the assistance.
Moreover, the services provided through the camp structure -- health
care, nutrition and child care programs -- were those classically
undertaken by the public sector. In Colombian society, it is the
State's obligation to provide these services to its people. In fact, in
the first few months, SCF was replacing the State and was understood as
an alternative to the slow and distant Resurgir.
It is no wonder that the camp residents confused SCF with the State,
believing the agency also embodied the same obligation. In particular,
the "old-timers" demanded assistance as those it were their basic rights
in the same way that they would demand redress of social grievances
(reinvindicaciones) from the state. In a sense, disaster aid already
belonged to them. They expected the terms of the original relief aid to
continue indefinitely.
This relationship limited the overall potential for the camp
residents' organization during the relief stage. The residents learned
during relief that the point of organizing was to receive goods and
services. The initiative to organize in order to plan for their futures
was stunted. This became quite clear in the transition to the
development programs.
To summarize, the mixture of traditional relief with beneficiary
participation reproduced familiar unequal relationship. That SCF's
Project functioned as a patron, broker, and extension program is really
not so surprising. The extreme nature of the Armero disaster required
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that material aid be provided from the outside. Also, the agency had to
be highly involved, not only as facilitator of community action but also
as the primary actor, to get its project moving in this context. There
were many pressures to show visible results from both the program
participants and the agency's headquarters. All these factors led the
agency to undertake the traditional relief elements, and when the
residents initiative began to wane, to make sure that certain relief,
and later development, activities were implemented.
It was not necessarily a bad thing hypothetically that the agency
would reproduce traditional relationships. Through constructive
engagement, new forms can be introduced and the old relationship
transformed.'" The introduction of new relationships between aid
providers and users have to be compatible with the existing socio-
economic structures and the deeply entrenched organizational norms in
order for them to be workable, let alone to introduce change (Harris
1975).
The patron, broker, and extension program relationships represented
strong, familiar patterns of behavior for the survivor population.
Those who would have normally assumed these functions had died or lost
all in the Tragedy themselves. It may perhaps be argued that in the
short-run, the agency's occupation of these traditional roles helped the
population cope with the crisis in a way that was known to them.
However, SCF's long-term perspective had much more in mind. Unlike
the traditional patron and broker, the agency was trying to introduce a
'"SCF recognized that "fostering community participation should be
achieved in the initial stages through planning, monitoring, and
evaluation rather than by trying to minimize leadership and/or outside
intervention" (Buvinic n.d.).
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very different relationship between aid provider and user than the
traditional ones. The development-oriented principles of participation,
enlightened community leadership, egalitarian relationships, community
control and self-reliance were untried by the camp residents. As it
became obvious that these were unobtainable in the short-run, the
permanent staff believed that these principles could be introduced
immediately and reinforced gradually. However, the staff did not
predict the extent of the dependency generated by their actions in the
relief stage.
In the short run the agency's relief approach did not mitigate the
dependency relationship inherent to relief activities and probably even
aggravated it. The relief project was unable to meet its objective of
"set[ting] the foundation for long-term cooperation and credibility with
the affected community". Through community participation, SCF thought
it could avoid the obvious dependencies common to relief projects.
While in fact, it was replicating traditional dependency relationships.
This became painfully obvious as the project began to shift from relief
to development programs. At that point, the traditional relationship
and the kind of participation necessary for SCF's standard-style
development project came into critical and violent conflict. The agency
had to change the rules of the game that had arisen from the traditional
understandings and expectations generated by the relief relationship as
we saw in Chapter 7.
III. Conclusion
Our exploration of the relationship between aid provider and aid user
in the aftermath of disaster helps us to more clearly specify what the
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dependency relationship means in these situations and what an agency
might do about it in practice.
A. Theory
The origins of the dependency relationship in the Armero case was the
meeting of factors within the pre-disaster economic and political
relations, the disaster context, and the case agency's relief
intervention. That is, external factors were most important in creating
dependency relationship but were then exacerbated by particular
characteristics of the survivor population itself such as, socio-
economic status, education and skills. The pre-disaster economic
relations coupled with the severity of the disaster impact left
survivors with few individual or social resources with which to face
recovery. On the other hand, resources from the outside flooded into
the disaster zone. The political history of clientalism predisposed the
relationships between aid agencies and survivors to reproduce elements
of traditional patron-client relationships. Rather than empowering,
however, this logical coping mechanism reinforced dependency that had
been first established through material aid in the immediate relief.
To understand the dependency relationship that emerged in Project
Armero we must first remove the moralistic overtones which practitioners
have used to understand dependency. The focus on individuals and their
psychological problems, whatever their origin, has incorrectly stressed
survivors' weaknesses and has neglected their capabilities. In fact, in
almost all disasters, it is the affected population itself that
shoulders the majority, if not all, of the initial rescue and relief
activities (Fritz 1968). Most disaster survivors do not live in
emergency camps but manage on their own. Adepoju (1982) estimated that
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60% of the refugees in Africa lived outside of the camps.'15  In the
Armero disaster, an estimated 87% of the disaster survivors managed
outside of shelters. '8 Tremendous community cohesion and pulling
together in times of crisis are characteristic of disaster situations.
People possess the ability to adapt and change both as individuals and
as a society to recover from a disaster.
Traditional style relief providers, in particular, have been caught
in their own syndrome -- the "poor victim" syndrome -- in which they
believe that the disaster survivors are helpless and require their
outside aid. This portrayal of survivors is commonplace in the media
and fund raising materials. Not surprisingly, this approach elicits a
great outpouring of financial and material aid, but it also elicits
paternalism -- the pervasive aid criticized above as dependency
generating. Harrell-Bond has noted the basic failing of the relief
process "lies with the ideology of compassion, the unconscious
paternalism, superiority and monopoly of moral virtue which is built
into it." This "relief culture" leads to an ignoring of survivors'
knowledge of local conditions, traditional coping mechanisms, and
sensitivity to what is needed (Kent 1987).
The behavioral focus of many aid observers has tended to deemphasize
the significant objective material and organizational relationship
between aid provider and user. By focusing, instead, on the
relationship, we highlight once again the mutual interests and
"As cited by Williams (1990).
"'My estimates based on figures from Resurgir documents previously
cited.
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structures that limit both actors -- agencies as well as program
participants -- from changing their behavior and actions.
The concept that seems closest to explaining what happened in Project
Armero is the one that understands dependency as a relationship between
two actors. Most immediately, a dependency relationship is the result
of the relief association itself. Both parties -- aid providers and aid
users -- are mutually tied in an unequal relationship based on the
exchange of material and organizational assistance.
In our case program in Armero, the dependency relationship was
characterized by a growing invasiveness on the part of the agency. As
the chief source, or conduit, for material and organizational aid, SCF
found itself providing for the survivors even after they were able, or
should have been willing, to do many things for themselves. This
happened not because the staff was unaware of what they were doing, but
because they were caught in a dynamic which emerged from being a relief
provider in the first place. What began as a strong role to get the
project up and running evolved into a course of doing more and more to
make up for the beneficiaries' dwindling contribution.
The camp residents, on the other hand, came to rely on the aid
provider for material and organizational assistance. A kind of yielding
of personal responsibility, or "passive dependency", took place. As the
relief stage was prolonged, many people were led to believe that the
agency's provision of relief was an obligation and should continue
indefinitely. The residents' "participation" then converted to their
permanent demand for more services and donations.
The dependency relationship is particularly problematic for an agency
who wants to do development programs -- that is, whose final objective
244
is to aid the community's move to self reliance. These development
programs require a willing and motivated community. At the same time,
the agency must free up its resources from relief aid that is costly and
has only short-term impact to put into permanent, long-term programs.
The dependency relationship maintains its grip on the agency's resources
for relief, particularly problematic at the relief-development juncture.
In fact, "dependency" is a meaningful construct, and it is
troublesome, precisely because there is an outsider in the relationship.
Imagine a scenario in which a disaster has occurred in an isolated
region of a developing country and little is heard about it outside of
the immediate region. The people, through their relationships with
traditional elites or officials meet their most immediate needs for
food, shelter, and resources to begin rehabilitation of their homes and
agriculture. In this scenario, no one worries about limiting the help
peasants receive from their patrons; neither does any one worry about
how to get families to take initiative to begin solutions that go beyond
what the patron is willing and able to give. No one cries "dependency".
In fact, this relationship might just as well be called an "indigenous
coping mechanism".
This is not to say that dependency is an invented phenomenon; only to
say that who it is important to is also an important ingredient here.
There is a particular relationship that does emerge between an insider
and outsider that not only elicits dependency behavior on the part of
the aid receiver, but also on the part of the aid provider."
"What tends to elicit dependent behavior on the part of aid
providers are many. Their perceptions of disaster survivors as being
weak, helpless, or incompetent may influence them to overwhelm with
assistance. Other, less malevolent reasons, are the tremendous
pressures and practical requirements of a post-disaster situation that
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B. Practice
Unlike normal development programs, post-disaster development
programs must cope with acute need, the material relief relationship,
disruption of social structures and support networks, a generalized
relief culture, and some particular characteristics of camp residents --
all within a compressed and rapidly changing environment. However,
PVOs with a longer-term perspective have many more intervention options
than the pressures of the post-disaster situation would seem to
indicate. The following conclusions are geared to those who are not
simply interested in doing relief better, but also in getting to
development.
The relationship between the outsider and the insider after an
extreme disaster such as Armero is inherently unequal. The imbalance of
capabilities cannot be ignored, but must be handled. More specifically,
an agency in meeting an acute need and establishing a relationship based
on material transfer should be aware of and plan for the potential
repercussions of this relief association -- not only for the immediate
moment, but later as it impacts reconstruction and development efforts
(theirs or others). It is not enough, as the literature leads us to
believe, to be development-oriented in relief (involving victims);
agencies must anticipate the requirements of the changing relationship
between themselves and their program participants.
In Project Armero, the agency faced the classic problem of
conflicting relief and development roles. In this case, it was the same
agency trying to do both types of aid. SCF at one time was the provider
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these agencies encounter
of material sustenance. Overlapping the relief stage, the agency also
took on the role of employer of the same camp residents and then finally
to facilitator of self-help and incentive programs. It was difficult
for people to change midstream -- to relate in another way to the agency
that they had known as a relief provider. Faced with these multiple
agency roles, the camp residents held conflicting expectations of the
agency.
SCF, who fundamentally involved camp residents in the relief response
had to undergo a change in the relationship from relief to development.
Despite beneficiary involvement, the relationship during initial months
was fundamentally a relief association. Even with the shift to
development programs well warned and explained, the camp residents had
difficulty seeing the agency in a different light. SCF's initiation of
the development of community organization during the emergency stage
with a group of families that with no prior relationship with each other
and no organizational experience had little effect for the long-term.
This is not to say that organization and participation does not have
important consequences for relief, such as strengthening psychological
coping and speeding recovery. In a less extreme disaster in which much
of the community is in tact (not spread all over the country, and
without physical home), survivor involvement in relief will translate
much easier into a relationship compatible for long-term development
work.
From this review of SCF relief project, we submit two preliminary
conclusions for why the dependency emerged and why the relief approach
(which mixed traditional with development-oriented relief elements) was
ineffective to mitigate it in the short-run. First, although the
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conditions in a disaster zone set the scene for the emergence of mutual
dependency between donors and beneficiaries, the dependency between a
particular aid agency and beneficiaries results, in large part, from the
decisions taken by the agency during relief. he the agency gets
involved and what kinds of activities it undertakes are as important as
involving program participants.
An intervening agency can get involved during the emergency/crisis,
in the reconstruction activities, or later as long-term development
resumes. When an agency does so will determine some of its potential
for mitigating or coping with the dependency relationship. Our case
suggests that because the agency responded during the emergency, its
ability to move to their subsequent development project was made more
difficult. All things being equal, the longer the aid provider waits to
intervene after a disaster, the less tied he will be to relief, the more
flexibility he will have to design the development program and the
greater the potential for its effective implementation.
Equally important, the nature of the activities an agency undertakes
during the relief period, should it get involved, will also influence
the creation of a dependency relationship. If we do a simple taxonomy,
an agency may involve itself in any or combination of the following:
complete maintenance of survivors (such as a camp), direct transfer of
material aid, the donation of material aid but through other
intermediate organizations, direct relationship with survivors but with
no transfer of material aid (such as organization assistance), or other
disaster functions (administrative) such as, institutional coordination
between aid agencies or the creation of a center of information (without
relief contact with survivors). The aid providers' ability to use these
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options of course depends on the severity of the disaster. However, our
case suggests that the aid provider that does participate directly in
the distribution of material donations during relief will have
difficulty in eliciting people's participation in defining and
implementing long-term programs."'
The second proposition resulting from this case experience so far is
that the development-oriented approach when mixed with traditional
elements of relief does not necessarily mitigate the dependency
relationship in the short-run. If the agency distributes directly aid
(particularly comprehensive maintenance), it is likely to experience a
dependency relationship and may not expect to break it in the relief
period; the agency is probably in for a difficult transition. Our case
suggests that it is difficult to meet both relief and development needs
simultaneously and, by trying to do so, the goals get blurred. This
process led to the prolonging of relief by both agency and program
participants which reduced the developmental effectiveness of the
participation.
The implications of these factors -- when the agency gets involved
and what kind of activities -- as well as the mitigating potential of
the development-oriented approach when mixed with traditional relief
elements must be explored further in other post-disaster project cases.
'"The situation, of course, is more complicated than this simple
relationship. The agency that arrives early is often welcomed and
greatly appreciated. A deep rapport or identification may develop
between the personnel and the survivors because of having gone through
the early days together. However, the benefits of this early
relationship are often lost when the agency no longer gives away
material goods. On the other hand, the agency that arrives later may be
perceived as being an aparecido -- someone who did not live the tragedy
and is now appearing to take advantage of the suffering.
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The present case suggests that the substance of the program is equally
as important as the process.
Endnote #1
This debate over whether structural factors or individual factors
determine and sustain poverty is a classic in U.S. social welfare
policy. The former contends that poverty is a systemic result of the
dominant mode of production. Macro factors beyond the individual's
control, such as the restructuring of the world's economy, the inherent
inequality of the capitalist system (which thwarts the possibility of
full employment and a just distribution of income), and racism against
non-white population are to blame for poverty (Reich 1981; Szymanski
1976; Sackery 1973; Gans 1972; Wachtel 1971). The latter posits that
causes of poverty are found at the level of the individual: The poor
are poor because they have some particular characteristics that prevent
their progress, such as laziness, lack of discipline, moral decay or
cultural idiosyncrasies. This is often called the "culture of poverty"
explanation of poverty (Glazer and Moynihan 1970; Banfield 1970; Lewis
1968). The individualistic approach may also contend that poverty
results from bad luck or from the lack of skills; both of these
conditions can be overcome through hard work, cleverness, and the
acquisition of new skills and knowledge, that is human capital (Becker
1964).
Key in this discussion is the ideological disagreement over
dependency's relationship to poverty which has shaped recent public
policy research. Liberals generally agree that dependency is only
potentially related to poverty; as a result, they believe antipoverty
programs (direct welfare benefits) are more effective at reducing
poverty, despite the potential for increasing dependency in the short-
run (Ellwood and Summers 1986; Williamson et al., 1975). Conservatives,
on the other hand, draw a direct and immediate connection between
dependency and poverty -- that welfare programs foster dependency on
government assistance and reduce the possibility that participants will
ever escape poverty on their own. This perspective argues that anti-
dependency programs (job/skill training, education assistance,
accompanied by the termination of welfare benefits) offer the best hope
for reducing poverty (Mead 1985; Murray 1984; Gilder 1980).
Finally, the present analysis of dependency in a post-disaster
context is not attempting to explain poverty, but rather the social
phenomenon of the dependency relationship itself. Its role in helping
or hindering people to recover from a disaster -- economically,
socially, psychologically -- cuts across socio-economic status.
The dependency issue which is the subject of this chapter, while
parallel in the above respects to the social welfare issue in the U.S.,
differs significantly from the former discussion. First and foremost,
disaster relief and social welfare are two very different types of
assistance. Disaster relief is a short-term, interim assistance whose
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termination is a certainty; it is not, as welfare is, a permanent
institution which has become part of society's mechanism for coping with
poverty. In principle and often in practice, relief does not
distinguish between the rich and poor after a disaster; it benefits
skilled and unskilled, educated and uneducated alike. Moreover, after a
disaster, a large percentage of the affected population may receive it.
None of this can be said about welfare in the U.S.
In addition, relief aid takes place within a compressed and dramatic
period of time. The many nongovernmental agencies that assist do so
voluntarily, not because of civic obligation. The kind of assistance
offered, then, varies more (greater agency flexibility) than welfare
assistance which is dictated by law.
Endnote #2
Note that protest is not always considered to be dependency. In
fact, there is general disagreement over whether this kind of protest
reflects dependency or some kind of militancy. In the present analysis,
a distinction is made between who is the outsider in the relationship.
I argue that there is a difference if the outsider is the State or a
voluntary organization. There are distinctly different relationships
that each may establish with disaster survivors with different
responsibilities/obligations to the insider. Protests before the State
for services is a legitimate right of the citizenry; the same action
before a voluntary organization while it may improve the PVO's
accountability, may also forfeit what an already accountable
organization can offer in the community. In disasters, peoples'
protests are not always a sign that the aid provided has been
inappropriate or unaccountable.
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CHAPTER 9
The Relationship Between the PVO and the Government
I. Introduction
Throughout this thesis, we have been analyzing relationships between
three main protagonists in the post-disaster situation -- namely,
people, the affected country's government, and a wide array of
responders (in particular, development PVOs). In Chapter 8, we closely
looked at the relationship between the PVOs and people. In this
chapter, we will look directly at the relationships between PVOs and
governments and, in doing so, indirectly at the relationship between
people and their government.
The PVO-government relationship has been the center of discussion in
recent years. As northern PVOs try to implement alternative development
strategies and to insure their wider impact and sustainability, they
must balance their need for autonomy with that for coordination with
government development efforts. On the other hand, governments, too,
have recognized the growing importance of PVOs within their borders --
their potential for aiding government efforts as well as for threatening
their political authority and control over the development process.
After a disaster, the tensions between the many, often conflicting,
interests are magnified; the stakes for each actor, too, are higher.
There is no single theory on PVO-State relationships, nor is there
general agreement on what their central characteristics are.
Interpretations range from complementary to antagonistic. Following,
the main approaches to the issue will be outlined, first in normal and
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then in disaster situations. This chapter first characterizes the
relationships in the literature for a non-disaster environment,
outlining the factors determining these relationships. Second, this
analysis examines the PVO-government relationship in the special
situation of a disaster. Our central case study -- Save The Children
(SCF) and the Government of Colombia (GOC) -- is used to characterize
one such relationship and to identify the factors that determined it.
This case will find that the institutional context in Armero was largely
set by the initial decisions made by the GOC in response to pre-disaster
economic and political interests. Nevertheless, using a flexible
strategy on-site, SCF was able not only to tap GOC's resources but also
to influence its post-disaster policy. By diversifying its own
institutional relationships, the PVO maintained its program flexibility
and independence. The agency's shift from relief to development
programs was greatly aided by its carefully orchestrated relations with
the GOC.
We will focus our attention on the PVO-government interaction within
the boundaries of the disaster-affected country, at both local and
national levels."' For our purposes, the term "government" is defined
as a "cadre of functionaries in control of the state apparatus of public
administration" (Robinson et al. 1986) or, simply, "the regime in power"
"'There is now considerable concern -- and a growing literature --
about the relationship international PVOs have with their home
governments. As USAID's contribution to PVO's financing grows, for
example, so does the discussion about its effects on PVO's policies,
strategies, and autonomy. The 1980s saw a dismaying growth of such
contributions. Some PVOs receive up to 80% of their funding from the
U.S. government. Although an important topic, it will not be treated
here.
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(Alford and Friedland 1985).' The government institutions that we will
be referring to in our look at the post-disaster context include:
public sector agencies formed by regular ministries and decentralized
institutions and their specially-activated, disaster-related units and
programs; political authorities including the country's president to the
city mayor, party apparata and factions; and the extraordinary disaster
relief/reconstruction body of the government (Resurgir) set up in the
disaster's aftermath.
Although our case agency belongs to the U.S. development PVOs, the
present analysis also includes indigenous PVOs. We will be focusing
primarily on development PVOs, or what Korten (1986) calls "Second and
Third Generation" PVOs, that is, those doing "small scale self-reliant
local development" and those doing "sustainable systems development",
respectively. Both have an abiding interest in insuring sustainable
development gains. The latter, however, takes a more integrative
approach which includes the,
collaboration with government, and a wide range of other local and
national institutions -- both public and private -- toward
development of more supportive policies, programs, and
institutions.
- Korten 1986.
Korten's categories include a very disparate set of PVOs with a wide
range of goals, scope, and operational styles. Of interest to this
analysis, however, is their range of relationships with the government
(public sector and political authorities). It is this dimension that
this chapter will be focusing on. Our case agency evolved from First to
16The "State" is a more fundamental construct than government: "a
sovereign, institutionalized hierarchy of power justified by law"
(Robinson et al. 1986) or, "a separate legal and constitutional order"
(Alford and Friedland 1985).
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Second Generation during the 1970s. Since then, the agency has
collaborated with many echelons of host government activity, although
interaction mostly remained at the micro level; it is currently in a
period of redefinition of the overall agency's role, working out how it
enters the macro-level policy arena.
II. The PVO-Government Relationship: Range of Observed Relationships
and the Factors Influencing Their Emergence
A. Non-Disaster Environment
Existing literature has characterized different types of PVO-
Government relationships and the links between the actors. Analysts
have also outlined contextual as well as institutional factors which
influence the particular relationships that emerge, focusing primarily
on the different roles each actor plays and the historically-shaped
perceptions each has of the other. The literature has concentrated
largely on the macro level, analyzing various strategies for
collaboration and coordination between the two sectors. The micro
level, however, has been neglected. Grounded in the SCF-GOC case, this
chapter will shed light on the strategies PVOs adopt in the field to
cope with and influence more structural parameters.
From an institutional perspective, research into the PVO-government
interactions has identified a variety of relationships and links between
the two sectors. Since Tendler's path breaking work (1982), the
relationships have generally been broken into some version of the
following six: complementarity; filling unoccupied territory;
replication or diffusion; government takeover (in some cases, a
subcategory of the previous); competition or substitution; and
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brokerage. All of these relationships have been the subject of
different reviews asking how to improve the functioning of PVO-
government collaboration (Smith 1990; Vansant 1989; Uphoff 198; Paul
1988). In particular reference to the informal sector in Latin America,
Otero (1990) draws a typology of macro-level government relationships
with PVOs ranging from passive to active to directive collaboration.
Others authors have identified specific links between the two
sectors. These links include the exchange of resources (financial,
material, human), information, experience, methods, influence (policy-
making), and authority (Montgomery 1988; Streeten 1987). Finally,
besides the type of relationship and specific exchanges, Cernea (1988)
outlined different roles that PVOs may play in conjunction with a public
sector project's life cycle -- that is, he has remarked the importance
of timing and purpose of relationships.
What are the factors that determine how a PVO will interact with a
government? Just as with PVO-government relationships, the literature
also registers a variety of determinants of such relationships. Some
authors stress that government and PVO institutions operate as part of
the larger political arena in the country. The larger institutional
context sets many parameters where the nature of the State is one of the
most important. Under an authoritarian system or a strong state, for
example, very little room is left for competition for power. PVOs
operating under such conditions are closely regulated by the government
and their activities are sharply reduced."" PVOs flourish in
"Evidence of this relationship is plentiful, such as in the cases
of Indonesia, South Korea, Chile, and Uganda under Idi Amin. See Smith
(1985), pg. 11.
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environments where the State is nonexistent or weak or operate with only
limited effectiveness (Anheier 1987; Uphoff 198 ; Montgomery 1983).
Other contextual factors, such as the political institutionalization of
paternalism and patronage, also influence PVO-government relationships
(Uphoff 198 ). PVOs are not above the fray but must pay attention to
local political constraints and opportunities.
Also influencing PVO-government relationships are each actor's
inherent characteristics and their mutual perceptions of one another.
Downs and Solimano (1989) remind us that governments and PVOs have
different mandates, at least in principle. Governments are concerned
about coverage while PVOs are more free to concentrate on quality.
Governments must respond to citizen needs in all areas where PVOs may
choose where to work and with whom as well as when to leave.
Governments must respond quickly or suffer political consequences while
PVOs may take more time to weigh their response.
Paul (1988) cites the longstanding antagonism between PVOs and
governments, the clash of their cultures, and their operational
differences (financing and support services) which have traditionally
influenced their relationship -- primarily keeping each other at arm's
length. Tendler (1982) has argued that there may be a kind of "natural"
division of labor in which PVOs do some things better than governments
and vice-a-versa. That is, each actor may have a distinguishable
comparative advantage and disadvantage in certain tasks or sectors --
like health or nutrition.
Rather than any comparative advantage, other analysts argue that it
is the institutional interests of each actor which most influence how
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they interact. Sanyal (198 ) illustrates that their interests originate
both from institutional history and their pursuits of the moment.
Historically development PVOs have been suspicious of government
institutions and closely have guarded their independence, when
necessary. They have feared that interaction with public agencies would
result in cooptation and bureaucratization by larger government goals
and resources (Salamon 1987). PVOs do not want to be aligned, or
perceived as being aligned, with partisan or corrupt (sometimes
considered to be the same thing!) politics of governments. Development
PVOs have also historically been concerned with working directly with
people (not governments) and maintaining their operational flexibility.
Similarly, governments have historically been skeptical of PVOs.
They suspect them of evading taxes, using public monies for personal or
partisan gain, of unfairly competing with the private sector, and of
being havens for leftist intellectuals and opposition movements (Smith
1985). Governments are doubtful that coordination with PVOs will be
productive because of PVOs' small size, and the uncoordinated and
disparate nature of the sector (Cernea 1988). Governments believe many
PVOs to be inefficient users of resources with only limited
effectiveness and impact. Thus, mutual suspicions have historically
tempered the interaction between the two.
However, their relations are not always in conflict. More recently,
both PVOs and governments have also seen interacting with each other as
in their mutual interest. PVOs are concerned with the sustainability of
the benefits from their development strategies; they see support from
the public sector as often necessary (Streeten 1987). PVOs also are
interested in influencing governmental development policy to support
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their efforts at the grassroots (Otero 1990). Their interests in
encouraging governments to adopt their own methods and to replicate them
on a grand scale has also nudged many PVOs closer to government (Vansant
1989). A few PVOs -- Korten's (1986) "Third Generation" ones -- are
focusing on these relationships as their primary work.
Governments, too, recognize that PVOs may help to extend government
services to areas or sectors of the population where they are not
working. PVO services may also pacify popular unrest by delivering
demanded goods and services. Through PVOs, governments may see
themselves extending their areas of control/authority, inclusionary
efforts to extend their patronage system (Robertson 1984).
These interests in support of PVO-government interaction make up the
institutions' immediate interests. Depending on the specifics of each
situation and actor, these interests may bring the two sectors together
in the variety of ways observed earlier.
B. Disaster Environments
After a disaster, the institutional context in which PVOs and
governments interact is altered. Consequently, the factors influencing
their relationships are significantly different than in non-disaster
contexts. The emergency period is characterized by unclear, ambiguous,
and uncertain conditions making the definition of goals and taking of
decisions a formidable task for affected governments and responding
PVOs.
- Government Response: Dilemmas of Disasters
Most affected country governments play the role of central managers
(better or worse) in a disaster. It is, after all, the affected
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government which has the legal power to initiate international relief
assistance for its people. The role that the government adopts to
handle the emergency and the subsequent recovery period is an important
determinant of the institutional context in which a PVO will work. For
example, after the Mexico twin earthquakes of 1985, the government
initially rejected international assistance. When the government later
accepted international aid, it attempted to keep tight reins over the
aid. They even tried to restrict local civil response, although
unsuccessfully (Monsivais 1986). In contrast, less than two months
later after the volcano explosion and avalanche, the Colombian
government actively invited assistance from international and Colombian
sources alike. Much of the foreign and national assistance escaped the
government's coordination.
The Mexican and Colombian governments chose two different solutions
to the same basic dilemma. After disasters, in general governments want
to maintain control over relief operations as they are keenly aware of
the negative political fallout of mishandled disaster relief. Although
for governments to effectively respond to the emergency they may need
international aid, such aid can complicate the response. The dilemma is
whether to call for assistance and, in doing so, possibly lose control
(Kent 1987). The calculation is essentially one of balancing political
with humanitarian requirements. How the overall disaster response is
then structured provides an important institutional context influencing
how responding institutions interact with one another.
In an emergency response after a disaster, it is not clear that there
is a division of labor that represents an inherent comparative
advantage. Kent (1987) argues that the sheer number of actors on the
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scene, their variety, and too disparate interests do not allow
interdependencies or shared goals and values to emerge which would
facilitate actors to work together in anyway approximating a "system".
Nevertheless, there has been a tendency toward specialization among
disaster actors and more predictable interactions (both positive and
negative) between them. As some countries adopt disaster preparedness
plans, the roles of different actors have been more defined. Some of
the duplication of efforts and damaging interactions have been reduced,
although both are still characteristic of disaster situations.
Besides the shared interest in aiding the afflicted peoples, the
interests of PVOs and governments may in fact be more divergent in
disasters than in normal times. Governments are especially sensitive to
the political dimensions of disasters (Davis and Seitz 1982). Disasters
place enormous strains on the infrastructure and administration of most
developing country governments -- very few of which have disaster
preparedness systems in place (Kent 1987). In Armenia -- where for the
first time in its history, the Soviet Union accepted outside aid of any
significance and allowed the news media in -- the weaknesses of the
Soviet civil defense and health systems were laid bare to the world."
Disasters are x-ray like events that not only show the suffering of the
disaster-affected peoples, but also reveal the poverty conditions under
which many live in the country. Disasters also may point to failures of
government policies.
Most important, if the government is able to adequately handle
relief, it may earn prestige and authority, globally and within the
"'For an interesting discussion of the political dimension of the
Armenian earthquake of 1988, see Libaridian (1989).
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country. However, the opposite is more common: governments are almost
universally accused of incompetence as opposition groups use the
disaster as political ammunition. The handling of the disaster relief
becomes general fodder for standing political battles. If the affected
governments let in international relief, they may be accused of
surrendering responsibility. If they do not, they are accused of not
doing enough for their people or obstructing humanitarian aid. In this
politicized setting, governments may perceive PVOs -- with their
fostering of grassroots participation -- both as a threat to established
political order and as a blessing to operations on the ground.
Governments also worry that disaster relief may cause deep divisions
between those receiving aid and those who do not. Unaffected
populations who watch the parade of relief to disaster victims may
become jealous and discontent. Those receiving international assistance
may develop new lifestyles and unrealistic expectations. Both
situations may be exploited by opposition groups to discredit the
current government. Indeed, outcomes of elections after disasters have
often hinged on a government's performance in disaster response and
recovery (Kent 1987; Cuny 1983; Abney and Hill 1966). Governments have
also been known to fall after disasters, as in the case of Nicaragua
after the 1972 earthquake (Rosset and Vandermeer 1986; Bommer 1983).
- PVO Response: Dilemmas of Disasters
Aiding afflicted peoples are the primary interests guiding PVOs
disaster response. Since the Second World War, however, PVOs have also
been guided by the objective of establishing themselves as permanent
institutions and then growing and stabilizing. As we saw in Chapter
Two, PVO responses to disasters have played an important part in this.
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It is common for them to use their disaster response as a way to get a
toe-hold in the area in order to introduce their primary objectives,
like their longer-term religious, political, or development work (Cuny
1983). Depending on their strategies to promote these interests, PVOs
will design their interaction with governments.
Disasters, with their ample media coverage, have also historically
provided PVOs with opportunities to increase their exposure to donors
and boost their funds. In this high visibility environment, PVOs often
try to distinguish themselves from the crowd. They often shun
collaboration with other aid providers who may appear, in any way, to
conflict or interfere with their particular goals (Kent 1987). Their
headquarters needs material -- information and photographs -- to be able
to make the case for continued funding at home. That is, the way the
PVO sector is structured reinforces the "lone ranger" approach often
observed in the field. Some of this competition between PVOs has been
reduced by joint funding through PVO umbrella groups at home -- although
by no means has the basic tendency been removed.
These historical interests have tended to bring a dilemma. If the
PVO works with the government during a disaster, it may increase its
resource base and visibility improving its ability to alleviate
suffering. However, by doing so, the PVO's people-to-people image may
be tainted and its work called into question as the inevitable cries of
corruption against the government are extended to those working closely
with it. Although this is a dilemma that underlies decisions PVOs make
vis-a-vis their interaction with governments, more immediate
institutional interests most often provide the deciding factor of PVOs'
resolution of the dilemma.
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PVOs will have a variety of different immediate interests in the
period following a disaster. The PVO may have more funds than it
usually has for its regular development programs; the agency then is not
so worried about stretching their resources as spending them (Cuny
1983). Being efficient may not be as important and PVO duplication of
government services may result. Or, the PVO may insist on maintaining
an alternative route to beneficiaries because of specific problems of
government corruption, overloaded and slow bureaucracy or dangerous
political motives (Kent 1987). That is, after disasters the intention
of working directly with affected peoples and bypassing even local
government may be more pronounced than in normal times. Harrell-Bond
(1984) calls this open competition between PVOs and local government
officials, "battles for sovereignty". Just as the PVO's interest in
independence may be sharpened in a disaster, the PVO's interest in
improving their general capacity may be sharpened as well. A PVO
working in the affected area before the disaster, for example, may now
be interested in dramatically scaling-up their operations and they see
government disaster resources as the opportunity to do so.
Underlying the PVO-government relationship, then, are two fundamental
interests. The government attempts to keep the monopoly over what and
how to do things, in order to maximize its legitimacy. The PVO, on the
other hand, tries to bypass any constraint to the implementation of its
plans as well as to maintain its efficiency and legitimacy vis-a-vis its
sponsors and the receiving populations. Sometimes these interests bring
the two actors together in collaboration, sometimes they repel them.
These concerns and interests outlined here are determined both
historically and by immediate pursuits of the institutions predating the
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disaster. The literature has argued that the institutional context, the
specific characteristics of the disaster, and specific institutional
interests will determine the relationships adopted by PVOs and
governments. And yet too little attention has been given to the micro
level factors and on-site PVO mechanisms to adapt to specific
conditions.
In reality, the relationships established between PVOs and
governments are often fluid. PVOs tend to adopt non-conventional, on-
the-spot strategies to interact with the government in a disaster.
There is a high variability of relationships; they range from almost
total independence to almost total dependence. The same agency may
itself experience the entire spectrum over the post-disaster period.
The specific conditions at the disaster site are also important.
Although the PVO's response are indeed conditioned by the macro
factors, it is not possible to correctly forecast the type of
intervention or relationship with the government the PVO will establish.
Rather, the above-mentioned factors (context, prior relations, disaster
characteristics) can unleash new, unexpected conditions that both the
PVO and the government can use, resulting in various outcomes. PVOs are
often in a better position, due to their size and policy-making
structure, to rapidly adapt to changing conditions and are able to set
up strategies to promote their own agendas. For instance, PVOs may set
examples for government programs to follow or they may "sell" projects
to the government allowing the latter to save face in an embarrassing
situation.
The following case illustrates the variability of relationships that
one PVO established with the host government. The success of the
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collaboration resulted in large part from the agency's ability to
understand the environment and thereby to access resources and gain some
leverage on the state apparatus in benefit of their program participants
and area residents generally.
III. The Armero Disaster: The Government of Colombia (GOC) and PVOs
SCF engaged in a variety of relationships with the different levels
and representatives of the Government of Colombia (GOC), over the
period from the emergency period and beyond. The following section
characterizes the SCF-GOC relationships, drawing comparisons with
categories in the literature.
A. Before the Disaster: PVO-Government Relationship in Colombia
The Colombian PVO sector is made up of international and national
PVOs. The latter can be separated into two groups. The first, and
oldest, are those organizations which have taken a social service
approach -- many coming from the religious traditions. The other type
of PVO is one who has a more recent tradition -- the involvement of the
private, for-profit sector in non-profit work. They have set up
foundations which channel philanthropy to the lower-income groups.
Their activities have centered on productive activities (credit and
technical assistance to small enterprises) as well as housing, health
and recreation (Smith 1985). Their founders and board of directors are
from the Colombian business and industrial elite. They are often
regionally based. For example, in Medellin the industrial sector
associations and other business people have a PVO which provides
business loans and technical assistance (Antioquia Presente) to micro
entrepreneurs. In Bogotd, the construction sector (and others)
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established a similar PVO provided low-cost housing (Ayudemos). The
Department of Tolima, too, has a PVO similar to that of Antioquia
(Actuar-Tolima). The Fundaci6n Carvajal, the best known and largest
Colombian PVO, was established by the Carvajal Compafnia, a large
corporation whose services include a printing house and business
supplies and services.
The relationships between these agencies and the government have been
characterized by relatively more exchange than many of the service-
oriented PVOs (with perhaps the exception of those directly linked to
the Catholic Church hierarch). Because of their elite make-up and
connections to important for-profit corporations, they have more access
to government officials and resources. At the same time, their elite
connections have also allowed them to tap international resources as
well.
Before November 1985, the Colombian PVO sector played a role of "gap
filler",
linking into existing government services for their clients when
they can, extending them where necessary, or operating as
surrogates in voids left uncovered by government (by its political
choice, lack of resources, or both).
- Smith 1985.
Smith (1985) describes the GOC's "preference for bigness,
responsiveness to clientelistic demands by local political interests,
and deferential attitudes to large business groups" all have limited the
government's interactions with the PVO.sector. He found that the
government's attitudes towards PVOs varies tremendously across level of
government, region of the country, and sector; his interviewees from
the governmental sectors, however, demonstrated the range of attitudes
mentioned earlier, from positive to highly skeptical. As we described
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in Chapter Four, the government and the two parties have in place their
patronage apparatus, complete with their own voluntary associations at
the grassroots (the juntas de accidn comunal). The local level
government, then, sees little reason to have alternative means for
citizen mobilization and input in government or policy-making.
For PVOs, the highly developed clientelistic system has traditionally
made them suspicious of the government's political motives and has
tempered much of their collaboration with representatives of local
government. Smith found that PVOs, too, exhibited the same range of
attitudes about the government of Colombia as in the literature
generally -- primarily being suspicious of government's size and
political motives.
Smith also notes that in Colombia, the indigenous and international
non-profit sector has historically been free of government regulation
and of difficult procedures for their legal establishment. No
traditional conflict of note has characterized PVO-government relations
(Low Murtra 1983). In fact, PVOs have generally eschewed confrontation
with regional power groups, preferring to play a broker role between the
poor and the government, primarily at the local level." PVO demands
have focused on material and technical needs, rather than challenging
the political or economic status quo. The GOC has historically been
unable to direct its programs to meet needs of the bottom forty percent
"'It is very common, for instance, for local political leaders
(gamonales) to set up non-profit foundations to channel monies coming
from parliamentary funds to promote their own political agenda and to
benefit their supporters. In Armero, too, this occurred. The local
political leader, Alfonso Jaramillo, had a PVO (Protecho) organized as a
grassroots organization to promote low-cost housing; after the disaster,
Jaramillo attempted to resuscitate it.
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of the population, the hard-core poor living below minimum wage. It is
with this group that the PVOs have traditionally worked.
Just two years before, in March of 1983, an earthquake rocked the
Colonial city of Popaydn, damaging the historical zone, levelling
hundreds of low-income houses, wounding 1,500 people and killing 246.
The government responded by creating a centralized corporation at the
departmental level (Department of Cauca). Scientists, clerics, and the
powerful sectors of Popayan society sat on the corporation but the
popular sectors (survivors and PVOs) were omitted (Santana Rodriguez
1989). The President channelled funds through this reconstruction
corporation as well as the public and private financial sectors.
B. Immediate Institutional Interests: Political Crisis Influences the
GOC's Actions in Armero Disaster
One week before the disaster struck in November of 1985, the GOC
found itself in the midst of a serious political crisis. Since the mid-
1940s, Colombia has had indigenous guerilla movements within its
borders. For decades, the government has tried to destroy them
militarily, with limited success. However, in the early 1980s the
government of President Belisario Betancur opened negotiations with the
leadership of Colombia's long-standing guerilla movements. In 1984,
President Betancur signed peace agreements with five guerrilla groups.'"
On November 6, 1985, the M-19, one of the most important of the five,
occupied the Supreme Court situated on the main plaza opposite the
Congress in downtown BogotA. The M-19 wanted to use the Supreme Court
'The FARC, EPL, M-19, and a faction of the ELN.
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as a forum to publicly accuse the army of continuing the assassination
of their leaders and militants during the cease fire period -- to put
the government on trial for their betrayal of the peace agreements. The
government answered the occupation by storming the building with tanks
and rockets. Driving right up the front steps to the entrance, the
tanks fired, setting the Court ablaze. Supreme Court judges (half of
all in the country), court officials and visitors, and guerrillas alike
were killed. The event shook Colombian society to the core.
President Betancur's handling of the crisis was severely criticized.
Although the government closely guarded information, reports of the
army's strong arm tactics over the President, the sacrificing of the
Supreme Court judges, and the capture and torture of guerrillas (despite
the official reports of no survivors) quickly spread. The government
was in the throws of a political crisis.
Seven days later, the Nevado del Ruiz erupted and the avalanche wiped
Armero off the map. Amidst the severe criticism and suspicion over the
Supreme Court incident and peace process, all eyes were on President
Betancur. His handling of the Armero disaster was tremendously
important for the legitimacy of his government. Moreover, the country
was due to undergo elections for president and congress in less than a
year.
In this highly charged political context, President Betancur took a
personal interest in the handling of the disaster response. He created
the national reconstruction agency, Resurgir and, like Popaydn,
concentrated all decision-making and resources in the agency. Resurgir
began as a small coordinating body in the President's Office (La
Presidencia) with higher than cabinet status. President Betancur
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personally chaired Resurgir's Board of Directors which was made up of
representatives from the political establishment, the ecclesiastical
hierarchy, and the private sector. Private sector representatives
included those from the producer associations from the coffee sector,
housing construction, finance, and private family welfare funds (cajas
de compensacidn familiar) (Santana Rodriguez 1989). The survivors
themselves did not have representation on the Board of Directors,
although within the first year they did gain representation on a few
committees.
Betancur also invited international relief into the country and
called on Colombians to respond. He was keenly aware of the stakes of
his actions. And as the Colombian infrastructure and administration
predictably strained under the load of managing the enormous relief and
reconstruction task, the government did indeed come under tremendous
criticism."" As the post-disaster period unfolded, the political
concerns influenced greatly the activities the government took.
Following, we will examine this influence in the case of the
government's interaction with the private voluntary sector, SCF in
particular.
C. The institutional Landscape After the Disaster: Resurgir and the
Public Sector Agencies, Private for-profit Sector, IGOs, and PVOs
Resurgir had less than ten persons working for the first three
months. Resurgir began to assume more functions and hired more
personnel, borrowing many from other public entities."' It divided its
"'For summary of a few of the political battles, see Chapter Five.
alt was generally considered to have been effective in keeping the
administrative costs to a minimum. The administrative costs were just
3.5% of the total expenditures for the first nine months (Gomez Barrero
1986). Just over half of these administrative expenditures went to
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work into the areas of risk prevention, social rehabilitation, and
social, economic and material reconstruction; each had a series of
programs and sub-programs. Resurgir worked directly with survivors as
well as through intermediary public sector institutions. These programs
were coordinated with a wide range of public institutions. The public
institutions included the regular ministries and their local/regional
offices, and existing programs. The regional and municipal governments
submitted project proposals and aided in the implementation of
reconstruction programs within their jurisdictions.
Despite its ample coordinating efforts, Resurgir was reluctant to
share policy-making tasks with the other public entities. The
Department of National Planning, for example, initially took up the
planning for the economic recuperation and reactivation of the affected
zones. Planning, a public agency well-known for its quality personnel
and operations, was involved in the initial policy-making for the
region's economic reactivation. But soon Planning disagreed over policy
with Resurgir. Resurgir was most interested in housing and
reconstruction and, in fact, only gave secondary attention to the
economic planning in the first year. Eventually, Resurgir relieved
Planning of these tasks. The economic recovery in the affected areas
was poorly coordinated and slow in coming.
Despite interinstitutional frictions, most of Resurgir's work was
through the relevant public sector agencies. Unlike Planning which was
a policy-making agency, the other public institutions -- like those of
personnel salaries. Salaries were on par with other civil service
positions and they were able to contract some very well-qualified
personnel.
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health, education, social welfare -- were primarily implementers and
received funding from Resurgir to do projects. In Tolima, the
decentralized public institutions moved largely in accordance with local
political interests;"' Resurgir's mortar-and-bricks type of projects
were good for satisfying those. In this sense, the reconstruction
assistance, which responded to proposals by departmental and municipal
authorities, fit well into the regional patronage system. The
interinstitutional collaboration between public agencies met a variety
of these interests.
Like before the disaster, the GOC worked extensively with the private
(for-profit) sector in the rehabilitation of the Armero Valley. The
most important decisions -- policy and program -- were made centrally at
the headquarters of Resurgir in BogotA where representatives of producer
groups sat on the board of directors. Resurgir gave contracts, for
studies and projects, to large firms from BogotA. The design and
planning of the new city of Ldrida, for example, was done by a large
private architecture and construction firm, Noriega and Restrepo Ltda.
The regional public sector agencies gave construction contracts to firms
they had on their own lists of contractors many of whom were from the
departmental capital of Ibagud.
Besides benefitting from the reconstruction contracts, the larger-
scale private sector also captured the resources targeted for economic
reactivation of the zone. Resurgir channeled its initial economic
support directly to the traditional private sector in the Valley, the
large landowners, and their traditional activities of cotton, rice, and
"'The remnants from the Frente Nacional -- see Chapter Four and
Hartlyn (1988).
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sorghum (large mechanized crops) and livestock. Special support was
given to new investments which would generate employment and production.
The majority and the most important economic resources, such as loans
and permits to import tax-free agricultural machinery, went to the
largest landholders in the Armero Valley.'" Disaster economic resources
were distributed according to pre-disaster patterns.
From the very beginning, Resurgir and National Planning had also
decided not to expropriate any land for disaster recovery/reconstruction
purposes, even though Resurgir had been explicitly invested with the
power to implement these standing legal decrees. It was an explicit
policy of Resurgir the directorship not to redistribute the Valley's
resources.171 Instead of expropriation, Resurgir bought all of the land
that they needed for their projects at prices reflecting the post-
disaster inflation. The beneficiaries of these higher prices were,
again, the wealthy elite of the Valley who had land to sell.217
Resurgir also coordinated the resources and programs offered by the
international government organizations (IGOs). Agencies like UNDP, the
"'Just four families received almost all of the first $1,000
million pesos designated to a special fund for subsidized credit (10%
interest rate versus approx. 60% in normal market). Resurgir noted that
other credits for the survivors generally were held up because of users'
lack of "guarantees" (including collateral and co-signers) (Gomez
Barrero 1986; pg. 23).
17
'Armero's landed elite did not invest sufficient resources in the
prevention of erosion before the disaster and there were no incentives
to do so afterwards. The same economic activities that were
contributing to land degradation were reinforced by the resources made
available for disaster rehabilitation.
172There was one exception, the Hacienda La Reforma, which was for
sale long before the disaster but because of its size had not sold.
Resurgir bought it within the first year although it did not have a
specific plan for it.
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World Bank, and others worked directly through Resurgir with the
different government agency counterparts responsible for their
particular programs. They worked in a range of programs including
housing, economic reactivation, and social services. The beneficiaries
of their programs ranged from direct survivors of Armero to affected
communities in the surrounding areas.
Resurgir's collaboration with international and local PVOs also
continued in the pre-disaster patterns. In the context in which the
largest resources were managed by the government and public sector
agencies, the PVOs almost immediately, undertook their traditional
social service activities aimed at the poorest'survivors. Their
activities included housing, micro-enterprise development, and some
health and education services. They continued to fill gaps for the
government programs at the local level. They organized beneficiaries to
receive public monies destined for particular activities as well as
implemented their own programs. In the case of housing, there was
particular collaboration between Resurgir and PVOs. Resurgir provided
land complete with services in Ldrida for PVOs to then implement their
housing schemes. Those PVOs who participated, then, provided housing on
a designated parcel.
In general, then, the institutional arrangements after the disaster
in Armero followed roughly the same patterns as they had in non-disaster
periods. The GOC made policy and moved the largest sums of money and
resources. The regional and local public sector agencies and government
also scrambled to Bogotd for resources. The most important resources
for economic rehabilitation of the affected zone responded to interests
of the traditional productive elite who were well-organized into
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producer associations and well-represented politically on the board of
directors of Resurgir. Finally, to target the poorest survivors,
Resurgir relied heavily on the PVOs to implement social service
activities to the ground.
- Political Interests Guide Disaster Policy and Impact Institutional
Environment
Political interests guide governments to make disaster policy and
program decisions. They often have little to do with the requirements
of disaster-stricken peoples. The case of Government of Colombia was no
exception. As we saw, when the disaster hit, the government was under
tremendous political pressure to manage well the disp-ter response. But
in addition to the "usual" political interests, disasters are themselves
acutely political events. Depending on the extent of damage, the
recovery stage becomes the very "stuff" of politics; recovery activities
involve the distribution of very sizeable resources. Colombia's very
well-developed clientelistic system clicked into action, taking center
stage in the actions of the national government and Resurgir -- first in
a behind the scenes struggle and later as an open political
confrontation between local political factions.
Political interests influenced many of the decisions such as who
staffed Resurgir as well as where and how to distribute disaster relief
and reconstruction resources. We will look at one particular case which
illustrates not only how political interests shape disaster recovery
decisions, but also how these policies, in turn, set the parameters in
which PVOs work. The government's policy to rebuild Armero in LArida
impacted SCF's capacity to work and, in particular, the relationships it
established with the GOC. We will also use this example to review the
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results of this relationship; did SCF influence government policy
towards the disaster zone?
The government, through Resurgir, envisioned the disaster recovery as
the reconstruction of Armero in one place, Lrida, despite the dispersal
of survivors to all parts of the Armero Valley and the country. In
Chapter Five ("Between Political Factions"), we saw how regional
political considerations largely determined the decision to rebuild
Armero in LArida. In addition, the desire to be seen as doing something
for the survivors also led the government to place importance on high
visibility projects -- physical reconstruction, concentrated in one
place. With the placement of a developer as the first director of
Resurgir, the concept of rebuilding a complete town, rather than the
absorption of the survivor population in the areas they had relocated,
took form.
Large concentrations of resources for reconstruction poured into the
town. Resurgir bought large lots and laid the urban infrastructure then
gave these lots to any PVO who would do their housing program in
LArida.4" Resources for economic reactivation also were initially
concentrated in lArida. On many occasions, survivors were told that
they would not receive any government benefits (largely understood as
housing and monthly pensions) unless they moved to the town.
The other side of the now destroyed Armero -- the Guayabal side --
was largely ignored by Resurgir. Yet, there was no legal or cultural
'"The urbanization costs in Lerida were extremely high. The plans,
drawn in BogotA, had been based on aerial photographs which did not
indicate the amount of leveling (earth moving) that needed to take place
nor the fact that these lots consisted significantly of solid rock
making the infrastructure work very difficult.
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basis for locating the "New Armero" in LArida. The town of Guayabal was
within the jurisdiction of Armero and, therefore, had the legal claim to
become the new municipal head. Historically the people from Armero and
Lrida disliked each other strongly. Even the technical reasons for
locating the new town in IArida -- because it was on higher ground --
was weak as people continued to stream into Guayabal where there were
more survivors settling and even the Red Cross had offices.
The result of this decision to concentrate reconstruction in Lhrida
set some difficult conditions for intervening PVOs. First, the
artificial reinforcement of LArida contributed to the prolonged
instability of the survivors. Survivors were reluctant to commit
themselves to any project afraid that, by committing themselves to
something too soon in another area, they would no longer be eligible for
future opportunities in Ldrida. Those living in the Valley (in
locations other than the camps in IArida) were reluctant to move to
LArida definitively and waited; those coming in and out of the Valley
shopping for opportunities continued to rotate between the different
agencies. For many, this period of general instability continued
throughout the first year. Such fluidity made it difficult for PVOs to
begin their housing programs; those agencies which began small
enterprise programs found that many of their beneficiaries moved without
repaying loans.
Second, the PVOs which took Resurgir up on their offer of free
serviced land in Ldrida for their housing programs encountered other
problems. Most importantly, their formal agreements with Resurgir also
tied them to the latter's timetable. They had to wait to be assigned
land; this took considerably more time than expected. And as the laying
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of infrastructure in the lots encountered difficulties, the PVOs housing
construction suffered further delays. The PVOs' dependency on state
resources meant they forfeited a certain degree of their program
flexibility. SCF bought its land in April, while other programs were
finally assigned land months later; some agencies were still waiting for
their infrastructure a year later. Lastly, the LArida policy meant that
the bulk of resources for the Valley were bypassing the Guayabal side
which meant less resources for those PVOs working with the survivors and
area residents there.
By January, a large number of relief and development organizations
(Resurgir, PVOs, IGOs, and local authorities and representatives of
decentralized public agencies) were working in the Armero Valley. One
of the first tasks that SCF's new project director in Armero did was to
call for formal coordination between the institutions beginning to work
in Guayabal. February 7 was the first meeting in which seventeen
agencies (10 private and 7 official) formed the interinstitutional
coordinating body. In just a few months, this body had twenty-five
agencies actively participating.
The central objectives were to coordinate and to mutually support
their institutional efforts in benefit of the population (survivor and
resident) in the area of Guayabal. To do so effectively, all agreed
that they had to rescue the importance of Guayabal as a regional
development center in the eyes of Resurgir."'7 The Guayabal agencies
"'The coordinating body also planned to work together to define a
plan of action that would focus on employment generation and the
economic development of the region (when all other focus was on building
housing). The group aimed to promote the coordination of information
and preparation of the community in disaster preparedness in case of a
new event. These two objectives were not achieved through
interinstitutional coordination. The economic development of the zone
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together implemented programs for the town, such as the construction of
a school and cultural center, and the celebrations of important
festivals and disaster commemoration. While LArida gained the fame of
being a place with institutional infighting and complexity, Guayabal,
with fewer actors, was gaining the reputation as the place where things
were getting done. The international funders progressively stopped in
Guayabal to initiate programs. The press too discovered Guayabal. At
the same time, the PVOs working in Guayabal began to negotiate with
Resurgir for support on the same terms as PVO programs in Irida.
Through the constant interaction, the local agencies quickly acquired
shared interests in the development of Guayabal. They also came to
share the same nemeses -- the Resurgir representatives in BogotA. Not
only the PVOs, but also the municipal authorities and even the local
representative from Resurgir identified with the local interests."'
When the local representatives adopted an advocate position from the
field, her relationship with Resurgir in BogotA became strained and she
was eventually removed from her post. Nevertheless, Resurgir generally
counted on its own representatives in the Valley to provide information
and feedback to the agency. SCF staff met frequently with the
representative to pass on their perspectives about the local
remained in the hands of Resurgir. Disaster prevention and preparedness
was adopted by SENA with very limited participation of the institutions
in Guayabal.
'There is evidence that this institutional coming together at the
municipal level represented a push for more local autonomy and stronger
role in local development. Local elections for mayors were held for the
first time in Colombia's history in 1988. Previously, all mayors were
appointed by governors as political recompense -- as part of the
patronage system. This practice insured that the mayors' were
accountable to the governor and national party leaders, rather than to
their own local populations.
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consequences of national reconstruction policy and requests for certain
actions by Resurgir. Resurgir-Bogoti did respond to many of the local
requests filtered in this way.
Indeed, this local coordination was able to elevate the importance of
Guayabal in the recovery of the disaster zone. SCF and the
participating agencies were able to pressure Resurgir to designate
Guayabal as a central redevelopment point in the Valley. Originally
just 300 houses were planned to be built in Guayabal; the number was
increased to 1,000. Resurgir also finally contracted for the Urban
Development Plan of Guayabal. This plan was discussed in open forums
(unlike that for New L~rida where interinstitutional coordination was
weak) and the institutional and community participation achieved some
reforms in the plan's implementation. By understanding the environment,
SCF was able to access and manipulate resources to their advantage and
gain some leverage on the state apparatus in benefit of their program
participants and Guayabal residents generally.
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D. Save the Children (SCF) "* and the Government of Colombia (GOC)
- The Relationship in the Emergency and Beyond
SCF intervened because of fundamental humanitarian reasons. However,
institutionally the agency had other reasons to respond, which became
more important as the immediate crisis passed. SCF also saw their
response as an opportunity to strengthen their institutional image and
capabilities of their regular programs. From the beginning, the agency
wanted to demonstrate the importance of involving survivors in their own
relief and recovery -- that is, demonstrating the virtues of their
community-based development approach even in disaster situations.
Although SCF-Colombia had a long history of collaboration with different
state agencies, the agency was not widely-known; their disaster response
would provide the opportunity to raise their national profile.
During the emergency, the agency's primary goal was to provide needed
relief, and to operate unimpeded with access to relief resources. The
agency did this by coordinating closely with government and other actors
at the local level. First, the staff sought official consent to assist
"'Smith (1985)'s gap-filler role of Colombian PVOs (linking,
extending, replacing) is also true for Save The Children (SCF).
Integrating their programs and impact areas with ongoing development
programs has been part of the agency's CBIRD strategy for two decades.
The agency has had both formal and informal agreements with different
Ministries; SCF's programs have formed part of national programs such as
the New School of the Ministry of Education.
At the project level, SCF has entered into most of the literature's
relationships with the state at different times and places. The agency
has worked independently in remote areas where the state has no
presence; they have also undertaken a range of collaborative efforts as
part of their normal way of doing projects. In the health sector, for
example, SCF has trained health promoters who organize their villages
and work in conjunction with the country's rural health care system. In
the local areas, SCF generally had developed good working relationships
with the different government representatives and administrators.
Transmitting brokerage skills to the poor communities to access
government agencies for goods and services is an agency objective.
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from the military mayor appointed to coordinate the relief efforts in
Guayabal. As the agency established the camp, they continued to share
information and coordinate closely with the municipal authorities. This
relationship became an extremely important and fruitful one throughout
the post-disaster period. Over the initial weeks and months, the mayor
and other relief authorities used the SCF camp often for coordination
meetings where resources were shared informally. SCF soon gained a very
good name with local authorities for the camp's community-run model and
its commitment to the survivors. Having arrived early and worked
together from the beginning counted in the eyes of local authorities and
people. SCF's camp was included on all of the distribution lists for
relief supplies that arrived to the Red Cross or Resurgir in Guayabal.
In the first months, SCF's interactions with the GOC included
information sharing (perhaps the most important resource at the time),
channeling of relief supplies and services to survivors at the SCF camp,
SCF received families referred by other authorities (including Resurgir,
the Red Cross, and the mayor) and, importantly, moral support between
the aid personnel across institutions. SCF crafted its initial relief
program to complement the other efforts in Guayabal as well as to
provide a model for development-oriented relief. Unlike other PVOs who
came to work in Armero, SCF pursued its program activities as
independently from Resurgir as possible. The agency made no formal
agreements with Resurgir in the first months.
During the emergency relief period, SCF's relationship was primarily
complementary with the local authorities, filling the gap for Resurgir
by being operational on the ground. Relief supplies and services,
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information, administration of survivor families, and moral support made
up the exchange between the two institutions.
During the emergency period, SCF had been very interested in setting
up its own presence on the scene. However, as the emergency period
passed, it became increasingly evident that the SCF camp was duplicating
efforts already underway by the Red Cross and Resurgir in the area. For
its small size (no more than 30 families at its peak), it was an
expensive undertaking (per capita) for the agency and, in terms of pure
numbers, did not represent a great percentage of those sheltered. At
this point, the SCF camp was duplicating what Resurgir and the Red Cross
shelter services.'"
As we saw earlier, the different agencies also got to know each other
through the coordination meetings. The informal coordination of relief
resources translated into longer-term interinstitutional collaboration.
SCF worked closely with local municipal authorities and community groups
from Guayabal as part of its regular development programs. Among other
informal collaborations, a SCF staff sat on the local review board of
the Urban Development Plan for Guayabal. SCF's project director
supervised the construction of a new addition to the health post in
town. SCF's other staff represented the agency on various conferences
on the development of the disaster area.
As a result, SCF was able to make individual agreements with
different public sector institutions in order to implement joint
projects. These activities extended the agencies' own resources and
'"But because the camp was to be transformed into a permanent
housing project, there was no sense of competition -- just inefficiency
for the PVO.
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increased their ability to do projects and the public sector agencies
were able to access more beneficiaries for their programs. SCF was able
to capture US$333,000 to complement the original budget of US$500,000 in
the first year (Guarnizo and Clarke Guarnizo 1987).
From the relief supplies and services which made up the initial SCF
interactions with government and PVOs, in the transition stage were
characterized by more permanent, development goods and services. For
example, through new agreements, Resurgir reimbursed SCF for the value
of the farm and of the urban infrastructure by the end of the first
year. The same terms afforded to PVOs in Lrida was granted
retroactively to SCF. Through other agreements, the National Training
Service (SENA) provided SCF with tools and equipment and an instructor
and architect for six months for the self-help housing construction;
SENA also provided vocational and business training for micro-
enterprises and leadership training for the project community's junta.
SCF invited the Secretaria de Desarrollo del Tolima to reforest the
project's farm and to provide a tree nursery complete with a forestry
engineer and technical assistance. The agreement with the National
Family Welfare Institute (ICBF) with UNICEF monies provided personnel
and resources for projects with children as well as other income
generating projects for "social development". In the first year alone,
the agency had eleven formal agreements for recovery and development
programs and countless informal ones.
With these public agencies, SCF played the role of broker. SCF
approached the agencies looking for activities for collaboration. It
was easier for the public agencies to access their target groups through
a PVO at the grassroots which would also guarantee follow up, be a
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cosigner of a loan, or simply provide institutional continuity for the
length of the project.'
For the SCF project, these interinstitutional agreements allowed them
to diversify their relationships and resources in the field. Later, as
funds from Westport became scarce, the project found itself still able
to move ahead because of these other resources. They were not dependent
on any one source to be able to do its programs.
Throughout the transition period the agency began consolidating the
development project in the Guayabal area. The linkages with the
government agencies reflected this change of objectives from short-term
immediate needs to activities which link people with development
resources.
At the national level, coordination meetings with other PVOs who were
working in different sectors -- like housing or small-scale enterprise
development -- were called. They were held primarily in BogotA
(sometimes in Ibagud). There were obvious logistical difficulty of
pulling a staff member from their work to make the trip. But, the
agency stopped sending representatives because the results of these
meetings were insignificant. They were forums for PVO posturing,
advertising, and differentiating themselves from each other. The few
guidelines drawn up to provide common criteria for working and to reduce
detrimental competition in the field,"' while agreed upon in meetings,
were not followed in practice. In contrast to the local level, SCF's
coordination attempts with other PVOs nationally did not represent
"See Chapter 8 for discussion of SCF's broker relationship.
"'For example, requiring beneficiaries to repay half the cost of
the housing to a community fund.
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immediate or productive exchanges/interactions. SCF did not become part
of any national system or web of organizations influencing macro-level
government development policies. In fact, no "system" did emerge.
Instead, the agency focused on those interinstitutional relationships
closer to home and those which represented concrete benefits for the
agency's programs. Alliances and networks in the northern part of the
Armero Valley and the individually negotiated agreements with public
agencies did allow the agency to wield more power and to have
considerable impact on the local development landscape.
As the development programs began, SCF also directly accessed
Resurgir in their central offices; the project director was making more
frequent trips to Bogoti for the negotiations of the reimbursement
agreements for the farm. To avoid the bureaucratic delays that were
plaguing other PVOs who were coordinating closely with the government
(waiting to be assigned land and infrastructure), SCF had bought land
themselves. It was almost a year later that the project director
approached Resurgir to co-finance the project -- to buy the land and
finance the infrastructure works as they had done for the projects in
Ldrida.
By following its own goals of moving from its relief to development
style programs, SCF engaged in a number of relationships with the
government. Certainly in relief, SCF programs were at different times
complements and substitutes to government programs. By working at the
local level, SCF at first filled an unoccupied territory. Above all,
the agency functioned as a broker between its program participants and
the myriad of disaster resources and programs that arrived to the
Valley. This became increasingly important in the move to development
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programs and the agency making formal agreements with the public sector.
There is little direct evidence, however, that the government replicated
SCF-style programs (although perhaps the initial camp management
influenced Resurgir's camps); there is evidence, however, that the
agency did play a part in influencing government policy-making regarding
Guayabal.
The relationship that SCF had with the GOC during the emergency was
one of coordination for operations at the local level with municipal
authorities and representatives of Resurgir and the sectoral ministries;
the agency had only minimum interaction with the GOC at the national
level. As SCF's program shifted out of relief to long-term activities,
the relationships established during the emergency period easily took on
new dimensions. The relief goods and services shifted to permanent
resources and as more of Resurgir's resources made it to the operational
levels of the public sector agencies, SCF was able to tap into more
resources for their programs. The diversity of institutional
relationships with the public sector and municipal authorities provided
the agency relative independence and flexibility to pursue its
integrated development objectives.
IV. Conclusions
The determinants of SCF's interactions/relationships with the GOC --
Resurgir, local political authorities, and the public agencies -- were a
number of factors largely set in motion by institutional interests. As
we have seen, the institutional setting in which SCF was moving was
determined by long-standing economic relations, well-developed
clientelistic system, and the GOC as the big money mover. SCF was a
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small actor with its two-year budget of half a million dollars. In this
context of heavy state intervention, SCF diversified its relationships
thereby maintaining its institutional independence and flexibility of
action, easing the transition to its development programs.. Other PVOs
who tried to work more closely and adapt to state regulation, found
themselves more constrained.
The Armero Disaster provided SCF with new potential to influence the
Colombian government. The agency gained much more recognition
nationally and across public sector agencies. Formal agreements were
signed that were not only related to disaster recovery activities, but
also to normal development programs. As Resurgir faded away, the
relationships with the GOC have returned to the respective sectoral
ministries (at both local and national levels). Because of the name
gained for the agency by its involvement in the disaster and the social
stature of the new country director, the agency may be in a better
position to influence government development policy. However, the
traditional relationships with the private (for-profit) sector and
clientelistic system continued as before and SCF, like other PVOs,
continued its traditional social service emphasis and gap-filler role.
While playing broker between its project participants and disaster-
related agencies and resources coming to the Valley, SCF did play a
"Third sector" role. But given the poorly organized and dispersed
nature of the Armeritas and the multitude of PVOs, it is not clear how
important a third sector role the PVOs generally, and SCF in particular,
played. By maintaining its independence, the agency was better able to
shape its programs according to its own interests as opposed to many
PVOs working in LArida who were dependent on governmental priorities and
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timing. In this sense, SCF was able, at least in theory, to represent
more the survivors vis-a-vis the government institutions than those more
dependent.
In the larger sense, SCF's transition to development programs meant
managing its external relationships to link with longer-term resources
and to shift to development benefits. Relationships with the government
and public agencies were critical for SCF in this process.
Putting in place relationships with the the government that would
engender and maintain sustainable development was part of SCF's
transition to development programs. Important economic and political
factors that affect the recovery of the affected region are of a long-
term systemic nature and had to be managed to have sustainable
consequences. As the post-disaster environment underwent complex
changes, the program's transition paralleled and inter-played with it to
be successful. The more general issue, then, is how PVOs interact with
their changing environment in order to get to development programs. In
this question, their relationships with the State is an important
factor.
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CHAPTER 10
Conclusions and Recommendations
This chapter presents the main conclusions and recommendations of the
dissertation. The first part of this chapter presents principle
findings from the general PVO and the case study experience of
integrating disaster and development assistance. The second part of
this chapter outlines where aid agencies can begin to develop viable
institutional mechanisms for managing overlapping responsibilities in
disaster response and longer-term reduction efforts.
I. Principle Findings
Practice is out of sync with theory.
In the past fifteen years, a revolution has taken place in the way we
understand what causes disasters and, in particular, the role that
development plays. The first section of the thesis showed that
researchers and practitioners now agree that it is people who create the
conditions for disaster agents to do damage. Disasters are occurring
more because of environmental mismanagement and abuse. Furthermore,
analysts also recognize development's potential for increasing the risks
of disaster; it is no longer accepted as the force which will
automatically reduce populations' vulnerability. People are vulnerable
to natural disasters because of a number of factors inherent in certain
development processes like population growth, income distribution, land-
use, and technology.
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This research's review of practice indicated that PVOs have attempted
to reflect the new conceptualization of the disaster-development
relationship in their programs. PVOs are trying to integrate the two
types of aid in order to mutually support each other. Before a disaster
happens, some development programs in hazard prone areas include
disaster-related components which aim to prevent and mitigate disaster
impacts. After a disaster, aid may be provided in ways that minimize
the duration of the emergency and build disaster mitigation into the
rehabilitation and development programs which follow.
Despite the new research understanding and program directions, these
efforts to integrate disaster and development in practice have faltered.
This thesis finds that the difficulties lie in the fact that the
institutional mechanisms necessary for putting these goals into practice
have not kept pace.
The post-war foreign aid model which separates disaster and
development aid into two institutional jurisdictions is still largely in
place. Cooperation among the different actors in disaster reduction has
been inadequate. Development agencies often do not play a role in the
disaster reduction process. PVOs who have tried to bridge the
institutional gap have met serious obstacles and have had mixed results,
at best.
* To bridge the institutional gap between disaster and development aid,
PV0s must cope with a number of challenges.
The remainder of the thesis set about understanding the institutional
process of integrating disaster and development assistance after a
disaster. Part One of the thesis discussed system level obstacles to
integrating disaster and development assistance.
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- System Level Challenges
The overarching obstacle to integrating disaster response with
development aid is the historical separation between the institutions
responsible. As a result of the separation, agencies have missed
important opportunities to use disaster relief to support later
development activities, and to use development aid to address the
underlying vulnerabilities that insure the reoccurrence of disasters.
Despite efforts to cross these boundaries, the disaster response and
preparedness network remains apart from the development complex.
This institutional division affects PVO efforts to integrate their
disaster and development programs in a variety of ways. PVOs, for
example, often receive funds from donor governments for their response
work. But, donor governments want to maintain a strict distinction
between emergency funds and regular development funds because they
provide the latter according to their foreign policy considerations. By
keeping the two separate, donor governments are able to provide relief
aid to a country without being "ensnared" into providing long-term aid
afterwards. As a result, these funding policies obstruct integration
efforts. They restrict the time period of funding to a few months or
specify that the funds can be spent on relief items only. Both these
stipulations limit resources to implementing agencies, including PVOs,
precluding them from moving into recovery and development projects. The
short-term funds also often make it difficult for them to include
beneficiary participation and more development-oriented management
style.
Other pressures in the aid system that keep the two aid types apart
are issues of resources and expertise. Institutional jurisdictions have
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created anti-disaster bias within the ranks of development
professionals, the bilateral and multilateral aid agencies and banks.
Many development professionals still equate disaster programs with
relief which they have criticized for having little long-term effect on
the reduction of poverty. They have generally been slow to see a role
for themselves after disasters. The shunning of disaster-related
activities is reinforced by scarce resources. Development agencies have
been hesitant to fund disaster prevention and mitigation activities
which they see competing with existing priorities for funding. For
these reasons, the move to development programs after disaster simply
does not happen in many cases because no development institution picks
up the disaster-related development needs.
- Program Level Challenges
Part Two of the thesis reviewed in detail one specific strategy
(integrated relief-recovery-development program) in order to identify
and analyze the set of challenges that the case agency faced. These
challenges included program and management issues, relationships with
program participants and with the host government. Together, these
issues provide a framework of understanding through which aid providers
can evaluate the integration process and plan to cope. Below is a brief
sketch of the framework.
- Programming and Management
Our case agency took a program approach to integrating disaster and
development aid which consisted of shifting programs from short-term,
temporary measures meeting immediate needs to programs which would
provide permanent solutions to long-term needs and which would be both
sustainable and disaster-resistant. The major sticking point in this
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task was the how and when to phase out relief and phase in development
aid.
The strategy that our case agency took paralleled a notoriously
difficult program strategy used in other aid settings. Shifting from
social services to self-help type programs has consistently produced
disappointing results in other aid programs. The case agency also found
it difficult to change a path that appeared to have been set. Not only
were particular expectations difficult to modify, but also commitments
that the agency made during relief resulted in a measure of project
rigidity, making it more difficult to make timely changes as the post-
disaster situation moved beyond the emergency.
The case evidence suggests, for example, that relief objectives will
compete with development objectives at the point of shifting; and that
for those agencies whose ultimate objective is a development program, a
relief project may be an inefficient way to begin. Multi-sectoral and
complex relief and development programs also appear to make the shift to
development more difficult.
In addition, the case suggests that the management styles in disaster
response and development programs ought to be as alike as possible in
order to ease integration. The case agency's bottom-up management
structure -- local staff, a longer-term time frame, and a response
coordinated with other aid efforts -- was instrumental in facilitating
the programs transition to development.
* Interagency Coordination
Interagency coordination continues to be an area of particular
difficulty for all aid providers, including PVOs. They still compete
with each other for victims, program turf, and recognition. In an
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effort to insure funding, PVOs often try hard to distinguish themselves
from the other agencies at times making it near impossible to
collaborate.
Despite these persistent problems, coordination among agencies doing
similar activities after a disaster has improved over the years. Joint
campaigns for raising resources have lessened some of the competition,
also allowing PVOs to share information and expertise. Our case
documented the experience in Guayabal, an example of fruitful inter-
agency coordination, that can occur when agencies are committed to
collaboration. Despite these improvements, our review found that
coordination between the different stages of post-disaster aid has not
fared as well.
- Relationship with the Host Government
The relationship that our case agency established with the affected
country government increased its ability to respond to the disaster and
to integrate with regional development programs. The relationship was,
however, replete with dilemmas.
Implementing alternative programs and insuring their wider impact and
sustainability, the case agency had to balance its need for autonomy
with that for coordination with government aid efforts. On the other
hand, the government had to balance its need for international
assistance that PVOs and others provided with that for political
authority and control over the disaster-development process.
The resolution of these dilemmas brought the case agency and
representatives of the government agencies together in collaboration
around activities at the local level. However, during the initial post
disaster period, the agency maintained its autonomy at the national
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level. Later, the agency coordinated with national level redevelopment
programs. In this way, the agency accessed much needed resources while
maintaining flexibility to design and implement its programs.
e Relationship with Program Participants
The relationship that a PVO establishes with program participants is
an area of recurrent difficulties -- particularly during the transition
to development. As the case revealed, even the most collaborative
relationships between agencies and people during relief may still create
or reinforce a lack of self-reliance and power within the affected
group. Despite care to the contrary, outside resources often supplant
existing coping and recovery mechanisms, making it impossible for the
affected population and its institutions to sustain the recovery without
the outside aid.
This dependency relationship is a problem for relief providers who
want to retire their aid, but who see the needs persisting. For
development agencies following relief, manifestations of the dependency
relationship, ranging from apathy and unrealizable expectations to
material and organizational reliance, are acutely problematic. When
people cannot, or do not, take the initiative to lead their own
recovery, the PVOs' adoption of the strict role as a catalyst or
facilitator of development is jeopardized.
e Contextual Factors
Pre-disaster conditions of the affected region as well as the post-
disaster situation set many of the parameters for PVO programs and
management choices and influence their effectiveness. In the Armero
case, we saw how the Valley's economic relationships and political
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traditions influenced the impact of the disaster as well as the
resources available for the population's coping and recovery.
The post-disaster environment also influenced what aid providers
could do. The extreme social and economic disruption exacerbated
further by initial emergency responses conditioned the dependency on
outside material and organizational assistance that emerged in the
aftermath.
II. Recommendations
New ways for enhancing cooperation among the different actors in
disaster reduction must take place. Institutional jurisdictions must be
transcended and new arrangements promoted. Development agencies, in
particular, must be encouraged to play their role in the disaster
reduction process. In a word, institutional mechanisms need to "catch-
up" with current thinking in disaster research in order to meet the
emerging policy and program priorities.
This research suggests the following places to start in overcoming
the separation of disaster and development assistance.
- First, more information needs to be generated about mechanisms used
to transcend institutional jurisdictions to link short- with long-term
disaster reduction measures.
- Integration Mechanisms
PVOs do, in fact, employ a number of institutional mechanisms to
bridge the gap between disaster response and development programs. We
studied in detail an integrated relief-recovery-development programs.
But they also employ integration mechanisms that entail the coordination
between more than one agency -- such as joint projects and coordinated
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transfers -- as well as those that are within a single agency -- such as
when development programs add-on disaster components.
Disaster response agencies do joint projects with development
agencies after disasters. Although these have usually arisen when
comprehensive recovery solutions are required, as in resettlement plans,
joint projects are also used in less extreme cases. Professionals and
resources are drawn from both institutions into a semi-autonomous
organization to design and implement programs during the recovery period
and into the early stages of development programming.
The coordinated transfer of disaster to development programs is when
the most temporary, interim relief activities are followed by medium-
term recovery programs, which are finally incorporated into longer-term
(often government sponsored) development plans. The coordination may
include phasing-over sectoral activities, transferring program
participants, or shifting management infrastructure (staff, funding,
decision-making, time frame) from one agency program to another.
A single agency may also integrate its disaster and development
programs through integrated relief-recovery-development programs, and
add-on disaster components in development agencies. In the first, like
our central case study, the PVO provides emergency relief with the
specific intention of laying the groundwork for a longer-term project.
Over the post-disaster period, the PVO transforms its relief activities
into its standard development programs. In the second, the PVO expands
its ongoing development programs to benefit disaster-affected peoples
and regions. The disaster-related projects are housed within the
development agency, often with special funds raised for the relief and
recovery components.
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All these integration mechanisms encounter the various system and
program level challenges noted earlier and have had uneven success at
bridging institutional gaps. But more importantly, aid providers often
do not even attempt any of these means to integrate disaster and
development and the momentum to bridge the gap dissipates.
The integration experience must be documented and evaluated, both
across disaster types and institutional environments. PVOs can do case
studies of their programs in which joint projects, add-on components,
and succession of programs were used. This research will help determine
which of these mechanisms more effectively cope with the challenges
identified in this present research.
In this regard, this dissertation has already identified and detailed
the difficulties of the single agency relief-recovery-development
strategy to integration. The case evidence of this research clearly
illustrated the dangers of blurring the boundaries of disaster and
development assistance. PVOs should plan for the likely consequences
that relief will have on resources and on the relationship with program
participants. Development-oriented relief with beneficiary involvement
should be coupled with a transition strategy for shifting to a
relationship which is characterized by supported self-reliance.
Clearly, the transition task will be less difficult, although never
smooth, when: there is a clear break, there is no confusion over the
role and relationship with aid providers, and when the disaster itself
is less severe leaving community organization in tact. The case
experience suggests that this is more adequately accomplished when
rather than melded together, disaster response and development programs
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should be clearly demarcated (as when there are two different agencies)
and better coordinated.
- Programs
Our case experience underscores the importance of recovery programs
as bridges between disaster response and development assistance.
Recovery programs provide an intermediate step through which agencies
may change their programs; for example, in moving from deliverer of food
during relief, to employer of affected people during the recovery, to
facilitator of community-based initiatives during development.
They may also help resolve conflicts between the different program
and management styles. Recovery programs embody both short- and long-
term objectives, thereby providing an area where relief and development
agencies can find common ground. In particular, they court development
interests. Thus, they are the most likely opportunities for jointly
funding activities. In addition, greater focus on recovery programs
counters agencies' tendency to prolong relief and to overspend during
the emergency.
- Relationship with Program Participants
Our central case reaffirms the common wisdom which says that, even in
relief, PVOs ought to establish a relationship with program participants
in which the latter take decisions, action, and evaluate their own
progress. They can do so by reducing the pervasiveness of their aid and
by working through indigenous institutions when possible and
appropriate. When social structure and community organization suffer
minor damage, program participants are more equal partners and the
dependency relationship is likely to be less.
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However, the case experience also adds a serious word of caution.
When responding to an acute need and establishing a relationship based
on material transfer, the agency should be aware of and plan for the
potential repercussions of this relief association. Measures to
mitigate the dependency relationship should be coupled with a transition
strategy for shifting to a relationship which is characterized by
supported self-reliance. Particularly important in this is to work with
survivors on generating income and other opportunities. That is, aid
providers must anticipate the requirements of the changing relationship
between themselves and the program participants.
- Relationship with Host Government
In times of disaster the pressures and dilemmas in the relationships
between PVOs and host governments are magnified. Our case experience
suggests that a PVO who establishes flexible relationships with the host
government are more able to access support to move beyond relief.
There is a range of relationships that a PVO can establish with the
host government to further disaster-resistant development goals. For
example, the PVO may try to influence the government, through
demonstration projects, to adopt mitigation and preparedness measures.
If governments are already doing so, PVO projects may fill in gaps.
- Second, the international aid network itself needs some revamping to
support integration efforts.
One logical place to start is with the large bilateral and
multilateral donors. Donor agencies should evaluate the impact of their
aid policies on the disaster-development integration process after
disasters. They should be encouraged to be more flexible in their
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funding policies. The time period for spending emergency funds can be
extended and funds allowed to be spent on longer-term recovery programs
and disaster mitigation initiatives.
Although the centrality of development professionals for disaster
reduction is recognized in principle, they lack the tools to bridge the
institutional gap. Development PVOs should: Hire personnel with both
disaster management and development experience for field positions;
educate and train personnel in hazards assessment and disaster
mitigation skills; include phase-over activities rather than phase-out
activities when appropriate; establish forums to exchange information
and share experience in non-disaster times and to draw up flexible
agreements between potential partner agencies. That is, PVOs should
work out beforehand strategies for bridging the institutional gap.
PVO program experience has proved to be fertile ground for reaping
lessons about the integration of disaster response and development
assistance. After all, they have been doing both types of aid for at
least twenty years now. Emergencies have been the place where aid
providers have experimented and tested methods of integrating disaster
and development assistance. Emergencies, however, are not the most
appropriate time to do so. The detailed case analysis and framework of
understanding seek to provide a road map of key institutional issues to
allow PVOs to better plan and carry out effective disaster-reduction
programs that integrate short- and long-term objectives.
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ANNEX 1: Definitions of Relief, Recovery, and Development Programs
In its conventional sense, relief aid is considered to be short-term
aid that meets emergency and life-threatening needs. The aid is
characterized by donations of basic goods and services such as food,
shelter, clothes and health care. Delivery of aid has often been
through external sources, with an emphasis on speed and efficiency. In
principle, the assistance does not distinguish between different social
groups but targets all those in need. Moreover, its termination, while
not always clear when, is nevertheless a given. The use of this term
does not include aid for reconstruction or rehabilitation. As outlined
earlier, relief assistance may be more traditional or more development-
oriented. "
A problem with the treatment of development-oriented relief in the
literature is the blurring of what is called relief and what, I argue,
should more correctly be called "recovery" programs. Some analysts
include recovery and reconstruction programs in the category of relief,
largely because they are disaster-related and the same relief agency
often funds both. This is clearly misleading, however. Recovery aid
may be (and arguably, should be) more closely tied to development than
relief objectives; development agencies also undertake disaster recovery
programs. The grouping together of recovery aid under the rubric of
relief causes recent literature to miss some key relationships and
interactions between early, short-term aid and later, long-term aid.
"'See Chapter 3, "Post-Disaster Integration" discussion on
reoriented relief aid.
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Our review of the literature and cases suggests the importance of
distinguishing between relief, which meet life-threatening needs, and
recovery programs, which replace physical and economic losses, restore
economic opportunities as well as the emotional well-being of victims
(Cuny 1983). This thesis distinguishes two additional kinds of recovery
programs: one more linked to relief and the other to development. The
first are stop-gap, interim activities which address very specific
disaster caused needs but which do not attempt to remedy the underlying
problems. For example, an employment program which provides much needed
income in the affected area, but which does not include a training
component, credit or other means to open up permanent opportunities.
The other kind of recovery programs may be called "disaster-related
development" programs. These recovery activities seek to reduce a
population's risk to disaster through including disaster mitigation
components which make development more "disaster-resistant". They are
undertaken during the reconstruction period, but may include medium- or
long-term actions. In practice, these programs are often narrowly
conceived of as technology to reduce physical vulnerabilities, such as
building codes and zoning restrictions. However, they also include
programs with a broader understanding of and an assault on social and
economic factors that cause vulnerability. Like development programs,
these activities seek to change causative factors and counter already
accumulated conditions that put people at risk but do so during the
process of recovering from the effects of the disaster. Integrated
programs to combat deforestation or programs targeted to increase food
security rather than growth of production are examples.
327
Development programs, in this dissertation, refer specifically to
PVOs' standard, non-emergency programs. Development aid is
distinguished- from relief by its longer-term horizon, its focus on
permanent, or "durable", solutions and its objective of sustainability.
It differs from recovery aid in that its objectives are always long-term
and while they may include disaster-related components (hazard
prevention and mitigation), programs are moving forward, not focusing on
replacement activities per se. PVO development programs reflect a wide
variety of principles, objectives, areas of expertise, and approaches.
Nevertheless, our review of integration efforts suggests the importance
of a general implementation approach which works with communities
towards self-reliance. These programs often promote the development of
local institutions, the education and training of the population, and
the support of productive sectors.
Annex 2: The Case Agency: Save the Children Federation
Today, Save The Children Federation (SCF) is a major U.S.
international child assistance agency working in over forty countries,
including the U.S.. SCF has a clear philosophy of how to provide
development assistance. This philosophy has been incorporated into a
formal approach which the agency uses in all of their standard develop-
ment programs. CBIRD, Community Based Integrated Responsive Develop-
ment, is a grassroots approach that stresses working with communities
towards self-reliance.
In its early years, the agency primarily undertook relief assistance.
It got its start in 1932 by pioneering hot lunch programs and health
care services in the Appalachian area of the United States. During the
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First World War, SCF provided clothing, food, and medicines to abandoned
children, devastated families and towns. During the 1950s, SCF again
supported victims of war, this time in Korea and Lebanon. Here, they
made their first attempt with reconstruction assistance. With the
influence of the U.N. movements in community development in the 1960s,
SCF shifted into community development projects. At the same time, the
programs expanded to Latin America with the Alliance for Progress. In
the 1970s, the agency developed its integrated community development
approach and began to move away from relief assistance. Today in
the 1980s, the agency has found itself responding to disasters and
refugee crises in South East Asia, Africa, and Latin America in addition
to its standard community-based development projects. The agency has
long-term projects in Lebanon and Israel's West Bank and Gaza strip as
well as continuing famine relief programs in Ethiopia and refugee
programs in Somalia. In the year of the Armero disaster, SCF responded
to three natural disasters in the Latin American region alone. The
agency has accumulated substantial relief experience and are part of a
growing worldwide dialogue about the most appropriate role for the
private voluntary sector in these situations.
Because of its development focus, SCF's efforts in disaster relief
have been particularly conscious of the long-term impacts. Originally,
this issue was debated and action taken in the 1970s with their own
shift away from charity assistance in their standard programs. They
argued then that charity only alleviated the symptoms of poverty rather
than targeted their causes. This concern arose in part from SCF's
experience in the early 1970s when they, like other PVOs, stopped direct
grants to individuals (in the form of check-to-child) and instead pooled
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the resources and required community contributions to any project.
Those communities who had been working with SCF under the old rules
resisted the new way of doing things. In disaster situations, the
agency was also concerned that relief might even worsen poverty in the
long-run through tying people to charity assistance impeding their
ability to move towards self-reliance--the primary goal of SCF's
programs.
With the recurring cycle of emergency situations, however, the agency
found itself repeatedly in the position of assisting people affected by
disaster, war, and famine. So, the agency tried to use this experience
to learn how to cope with emergencies in ways that would shorten their
duration and facilitate the affected population's move to self-reliant
development. They have had some acknowledged successes. In Ethiopia
and Sudan, for example, SCF introduced an innovative approach to famine
relief with some rather remarkable results. With the help of the
beneficiary communities, they brought famine relief to families in their
own villages, thereby maintaining community integrity and preserving the
base for future recovery and rehabilitation. "The slow but steady
recovery of people in these areas is a startling contrast to the
abandoned villages and overcrowded feeding centers...."
Over the last five years, Save The Children has
gradually diversified its modes of programming
assistance in order to reach increasing numbers of
children in need. The scenes of our most critically-
needed and encompassing programs of the early to mid-
80s include relief programs to families displaced by
civil war in Lebanon operating in considerable peril;
responses to the tragedies of the Boat People in
southeast Asia, and victims of the Italian earthquake;
income-raising and development programs for refugees
in camps in Pakistan, the West Bank/Gaza and Somalia;
and over the past year, the distribution of food,
medicine and health services to families ravaged by
drought and starvation in Ethiopia and Sudan. What
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were once "the exceptions" to Save The Children's
types of programming assistance. have become. in a
time of repeated natural catastrophes and political
upheaval. an increasingly significant portion of our
overall assistance portfolio.
- SCF, Program Department, Five Year Plan (November, 1985).
The agency felt that bringing a development focus to relief is an
important contribution that SCF has made to the practice of post-
disaster assistance. Today, they are confident that relief can be
linked effectively with development assistance. They are continuing to
draw lessons from their experience about how best "to shape immediate
relief assistance into longer-term, self-help programs" and in the
process to lay "the foundation for long-term cooperation and credibility
with the affected communities and local governments". At the time of
the Armero disaster, however, the agency did not have a general policy
for their disaster intervention. They were exploring the development of
a manual or set of standardized guidelines for the field offices as well
as other activities to improve their disaster response.
However, involvement in relief work presented some practical
difficulties for the agency. Relief work takes place in a messy,
chaotic situation with the tremendous pressure to respond quickly. It
is difficult to get the information necessary to design a relief
response that effectively builds on available community resources. In
addition, the agency has to mobilize particular expertise at a moment's
notice, cope with the financial and logistical constraints, not to
mention the issue of when and how to phase out relief and/or introduce
longer-term community development projects. The potential for failure
is greater given the number of uncontrollable variables at play. In
Colombia, for example, the agency had already had one dreadful
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experience when it responded to the 1979 Popaydn disaster, and the
regional staff was concerned whether they could respond effectively to
the Armero disaster.
Save The Children - Colombia
Before getting involved in Armero, SCF had been working in Colombia
since the early 1960s when the agency first moved into Latin America.
One of the oldest and largest country programs, SCF is working in three
(four with Armero) rural project sites with a budget in 1985 of
approximately US$800,000. The national office is located in Bogotd
where development professionals support the programs in the impact
areas. In the impact areas, local staff work in the areas of production
and employment, education and training, housing, primary health care,
among others. SCF-Colombia has been in the forefront worldwide with
their work with women in development as well as the development of
appropriate technology for agriculture.
332
APPENDIX 3:
THEORIES OF THE DISASTER-DEVELOPMENT RELATIONSHIP
DEFINITION OF
DISASTERS
1. ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
COvns
Natural Hazard -- D I S A S T E R
Vulnerable Population
O DISASTER-DEVELOPMENT PRACTICE
RELATIONSHIP
-level of development exacerbates disaster impact]
-disaster impact 'sets back* development
-indvdual deasson-making produces vulnerabihty
natural criss ovent which tends Io be random and abenant
Il MARXIST PERSPECTIVE
underdeveloping
Capitalist Dev'T ' populations
kcraeasng +
margnaizabon denorat g
physia
envwonment
Cheracten
- event Is result of "normarL process of devolopment
- al disasters are man-made
Ill. EMERGING PERSPECTIVE
environmental
abuse and -*- natural hazard
misrnanagement
+ DISASTER
development
factors (and-use -- vurable
technology, populabon
migration, etc.)
[ process of development causes disasters
socio-economuc structure produces vulnerabikty
DISASTER
-facors in development exacrbate disaster imped
disasters threaten development sustainabiity
cobinivaon o sicura conddons and
individual decision-mraking produces vukierabiiy
Prognosis
- outside aid is appropriate and necessary
- technology provides mechanism to reduce damage
(prediction schemes and emergency relief coordinawon)
Solaoths
- dsion of labor according to post-disaster
stages - I e. separation of disaster and
development aid)
- aid reinforces status quo ante
- margnalizabon conbnuos
SoAtons
- relief to support indigenous coping mechanisms
- incorporate disaster planning into socialist
development planning
- disaster aid may contribute to development
SobdIkms
pro-acie: ink disaster mitgation and environmental
management with development planning
post-event Iink disaster relief and recovery
aid to development planning
